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This study explores the link between the entrapment bias and the concept of face 
(self- and other-positive) and internal and external justification processes.  It examines 
how face-saving concerns and justification needs moderate the entrapment bias in 
accountability condition (i.e., presence of constituencies and reporting requirements). In 
addition, this research examines whether the size and influence of personal networks is 
associated with face-saving behaviors that, in turn, affect entrapment.   The research also 
explores whether overall face concerns have an effect on internal and external self-
justification. Finally, the study explored messages used by individuals in a scenario 
potentially leading to entrapment.
Respondents in the study were 236 undergraduate students majoring in 
communication enrolled in a large East Coast university.  Study participants were 
assigned to one of the four conditions:  (1) constituency, reporting; (2) constituency, no 
reporting; (3) no constituency; reporting; (4) no constituency; no reporting.
The current investigation did not support the findings from previous studies that 
suggest that justification processes and face concerns lead to entrapment. This study 
found that only internal self-justification and other-positive face concerns are related to 
entrapment, but instead of contributing to entrapment, these aspects prevent individuals 
from becoming entrapped.  Personal networks were demonstrated to have positive effect 
on both self- and other-positive face concerns, providing empirical support for the value 
of using personal networks as a predictor of face goals.  However, personal networks did 
not contribute to entrapment. Finally, the study examined messages used by individuals 
in a situation leading to entrapment, suggesting that when individuals try to explain their 
behavior, they tend to use causal accounts. 
Overall, this study has made a contribution to the field of communication by 
identifying processes and conditions (e.g., concern for other-positive face, internal self-
justification, reporting requirement, no direct observation by constituency, keeping clear 
record of performance success or failure) that may prevent entrapment bias from 
occurring. These processes and conditions could potentially improve the outcomes of 
negotiation with the use of effective communication strategies.
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A woman decides to wait for a bus rather than walk. With the decision to wait for 
the bus and time invested in doing so, the woman waits for such a long time that she 
could have walked to the destination and back again by the time the bus finally arrives. 
This situation exemplifies the entrapment bias, when individuals continue to incur costs 
to achieve their objectives instead of changing their behavior.
The entrapment bias is the tendency of people to assume that the more resources 
are expended, the closer they are to attaining their desired goal (Rubin, Kim, & Peretz, 
1990). In research, this phenomenon is referred to as sunk cost (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), 
entrapment or entrapment bias (Brockner, 1977), concord fallacy (Arkes & Ayton, 1999), 
and escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976, 1981). All of these terms refer to the same 
phenomenon, and in the research literature they are used interchangeably. 
The phenomenon of entrapment has been observed and studied by scholars on 
different levels (i.e., macro, interpersonal and intrapersonal) and in different types of 
situations (e.g., waiting, bidding at an auction, gambling, decision making) to uncover 
variables and circumstances underlying the entrapment (Brockner, 1977; Schelling, 1960; 
Shubik, 1971; Staw, 1976). Responsibility levels, social motivations, information 
ambiguity, and observed rate of loss have been identified as some of the variables 
influencing conflict escalation (Rubin & Brockner, 1975; Staw, 1981; Teger, 1980). 
The entrapment bias has been studied predominantly within business decision-
making and organizational contexts, including negotiation (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). 
Negotiation is used in a wide variety of settings: policy and law formulation, fiscal 
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budgets and salary discussions, house settlements and establishment of children’s 
curfews (Wall & Blum, 1991; Ways, 1979). Although many negotiators are able to 
achieve their desired outcomes, others fail to do so even when the parties involved have a 
zone of agreement; that is, when the maximum price the buyer is willing to offer is larger 
than the minimum price acceptable to the seller (Raiffa, 1982). This logic is applicable to 
a wide variety of negotiation contexts—not just buyer-seller interactions (Neale & 
Bazerman, 1985). Bazerman (1986) suggests that the entrapment bias could be one of the 
reasons why negotiators fail to achieve settlements. 
This dissertation examines the link between the entrapment bias and the concept 
of face—the desire to create and sustain positive identity in front of others (Goffman, 
1955)—and internal and external justification processes. Because negotiation often 
involves the presence of other people (i.e., constituency) who influence negotiators’ 
performance (Gelfand & Realo, 1999), this dissertation explores how face-saving 
concerns and justification needs moderate the entrapment bias in the presence of 
constituencies. In addition, this research examines whether the size and influence of 
personal networks is associated with face-saving behaviors that, in turn, affect 
entrapment. 
In this chapter the theoretical rationale for the study is provided and research 
hypotheses are outlined. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the research methods 
employed in the study. Chapter 3 presents the study results. The summary of the study, 
chapter 4 discusses the results and their implications, and identifies limitations of the 






Brockner (1992) defines escalation as “the tendency for decision makers to persist 
with failing courses of action” (p. 39). Fox and Hoffman (2002) outline five common 
characteristics that all escalation situations share. First, an individual is engaged in a 
goal-directed activity (e.g., problem-solving). Second, some type of resources (e.g., 
money, time, effort, or emotion) has been expended to achieve the goal. Third, 
expenditures have not brought the desired results. Fourth, a decision has to be made 
whether to continue or quit investing in the same course of action. And fifth, future 
prospects seem unlikely for making gains or even covering losses by continuing in the 
same path, yet the person continues the original course of action.
A number of explanations have been provided for the escalation of commitment, 
such as self-justification, prospect theory, decision dilemma and persistence. Staw (1976, 
1981) used Festinger’s (1957) and Aronson’s (1968) theories of cognitive dissonance to 
suggest that individuals become entrapped because they feel the need to provide 
justification for their actions. The sources of justification could be either internal or 
external. With internal justification, the decision maker justifies to himself or herself that 
the decision to pursue the course of action was rational; withdrawal would indicate that 
the decision was inappropriate. With external self-justification, individuals want to 
appear rational or do not want to expose their mistakes to others, such as bosses or 
stakeholders. 
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Empirical evidence supports the self-justification explanation of entrapment. For 
example, studies conducted by Staw (1976), Staw and Ross (1987), Brockner and Rubin 
(1985), and Arkes and Blumer (1985) suggest that individuals tend to make investment 
decisions and stick to the chosen course of action so as not to appear wasteful and to 
appear consistent in their decisions. For example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) conducted a 
study in which they manipulated the cost of theater tickets for season subscribers. Some 
subscribers received discounts and others did not, and the tickets they received were 
discretely marked accordingly. The researchers counted ticket stubs after performances 
and the results showed that those individuals who paid full price were more likely to 
attend all of the plays or at least more plays than those individuals who purchased the 
discounted tickets.
Another theory used to explain the entrapment phenomenon is Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, applied to escalation by Whyte (1986). The theory 
suggests that a biasing effect occurs when individuals frame situations as losses or gains 
relative to some neutral reference point. The value function (or utility), which is in a 
shape of “S,” is convex and steep in the domain of losses and concave in the domain of 
gains (see Figure 1). In other words, individuals are expected to be risk averse when they 
consider the situation (prospect) from the point of view of maximizing gains and risk-
taking when they view the situation from the frame of minimizing losses. According to 
Whyte (1986), when using a loss frame, individuals feel compelled to recover the cost 
that they have lost even at the risk of losing more, thus becoming entrapped. 
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Figure 1. The proposed value function from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).
Bazerman (1984) added responsibility to the prospect theory explanations of 
escalation. He indicated that individuals responsible for making an original decision that 
led to failure have a different frame of mind than those who are not responsible for the 
decision. The nonresponsible decision makers are at a neutral reference point of the 
curve, because they have not experienced any sunk costs. In contrast, the responsible 
decision makers tend to be on the losing end of the curve because they have expended 
resources with no return and must decide whether to withdraw or continue by risking 
further. The failure to reinvest is perceived as certain loss, therefore, the decision makers 
feel pressured to re-invest to try to avoid such certain loss.
Davis and Bobko (1986) conducted a study in which 50% of the participants were 
personally responsible for the initial funding decision and 50% were not. The researchers 
then manipulated the decision-making frame by providing the participants with 
information about a program that either was framed negatively as failing (i.e., “after 2 






time or full-time jobs”), or framed positively as a success (i.e., “after 2 years of operation 
the program has placed 39.9% of all participants in either part-time or full-time jobs”). 
Participants were then asked to make a decision to continue or terminate the program. 
The results of the study indicated that participants in the negative frame with personal 
responsibility for initial allocation conditions were more prone to entrapment than 
participants in the other three conditions. In other words, those participants both in the 
negative frame and personally responsible made the decision to continue with the 
program.
Bowen (1987) proposed that the entrapment phenomenon could be explained by 
the framework called difficult business decision dilemma. He suggested that because 
many studies do not provide clear negative feedback about initial allocation of resources 
(e.g., the project is a failure), the escalation demonstrated by research participants could 
be explained by a variety of motives such as their curiosity, desire to bring a project to 
fruition, or desire to learn about the problem. However, Brockner (1992) argued that 
some research that used self-report measures has shown that the research participants did 
think the feedback they received about the project was indeed negative (Brockner & 
Rubin, 1985).
Fox and Hoffman (2002) used motivation theories developed by Lewin (1935) 
and Atkinson and Raynor (1974) to offer another explanation of the escalation: that 
individuals desire to be persistent. In other words, people are goal driven and are 
motivated to accomplish their goals. Lewin’s theory involves psychological regions of 
tension, goal valence, or desirability, and psychological distance of the path to goal 
obtainment (how long or difficult is it to achieve the goal). The interaction between these 
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elements is used to explain the strength of motivational force driving the individual to 
achieve a goal. Achievement motivation theory, suggested by Atkinson and Raynor, 
involves goal desirability (i.e., expectancy to achieve the goal) and movement by inertia 
(i.e., individuals continue to pursue goals just because this is what they have been doing). 
An individual’s persistence to attain a goal will be determined by the combination of 
inertial tendencies resulting from past experiences and the strength of current goal 
desirability. 
Some empirical evidence provides support for the persistence or goal-driven 
explanation. For example, Garland and Conlon (1998) manipulated investment decision 
and project completion by telling some participants that a project designed to revamp a 
company’s manufacturing capabilities was 20% complete and others that a project was 
80% complete. Participants in the 80% completion cell were more likely to allocate more 
resources to the project, leading the researchers to conclude that the participants did so 
just to get the project over with. Those individuals in the 20% completion preferred 
withdrawal. Similar studies have been carried out by Garland (1990) and Arkes and Blum 
(1985). However, no self-reported data studies explain that persistence is in fact behind 
the cognitive processes that lead to escalation. Furthermore, if persistence by itself is an 
explanation for escalation, it is not clear why individuals who are not responsible for the 
original allocation decision, but given the task of making a follow-up allocation decision 
(i.e., are given a set goal), refuse to allocate further resources to a given project and thus 
do not become entrapped.
Brockner (1992) argued that none of the theories presented (e.g., self-justification, 
decision dilemma, or prospect theory) could explain the escalation phenomena in its 
8
entirety. All of them provide explanations of entrapment in some circumstances. 
However, because the self-justification explanation has received most support in past 
research, the current study will focus on the self-justification explanation of escalation 
phenomenon as it relates to the desire to save face and the need to justify one’s actions. 
Self-justification
Self-justification has been systematically explored in compliance-gaining 
research. According to Kelman (1961), compliance can occur when a person accepts 
influence from another individual or from a group in hopes to achieve a favorable 
reaction from others. The individual is willing to be influenced because he or she wants 
to receive certain awards or avoid punishment that the other individual or group controls. 
Compliance gaining has been extensively studied using forced compliance experiments in 
which participants are induced to advocate a counter-attitudinal position to motivate them 
to advocate views that violate their own attitudes (Eagley & Chaiken, 1993). For 
example, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) conducted an experiment in which participants 
were asked to complete a boring task. Afterward, half of the participants were offered $1 
and the other half were offered $20 to mislead a confederate that the task was enjoyable 
and interesting. Those participants offered higher incentives did not change their 
attitudes, whereas, the participants paid just $1 came to believe that the boring task they 
completed was indeed enjoyable. In other words, participants offered low incentives had 
to justify spending time completing a boring task by perceptually biasing the task as 
enjoyable.
Other experiments on self-justification have included writing attitude-discrepant 
essays (Scheier & Carver, 1980) and eating a disliked food (Zimbardo, Weisenberg, 
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Firestone, & Levy, 1965). These experiments have shown that individuals faced with 
personal negative consequences—such as engaging in a task they do not want to 
perform—as a result of counter-attitudinal acts, with no external rewards to compensate 
for the dissatisfying nature of the experimental task, tend to change their opinions on an 
attitudinal issue to cognitively reduce any negative outcomes resulting from their 
behavior. In short, people feel compelled to justify their previous behavior and defend 
themselves from negative consequences through the perceptual biasing of behavioral 
outcomes. 
In addition to negative consequences, two other factors affect the biasing of 
outcomes within forced-compliance situations. The first factor is the commitment to 
behavioral consequences, which are irrevocable or not easily changed (Brehm & Cohen, 
1962). The second factor is a sense of having at least a moderate degree of choice in 
one’s behavior. In other words, an individual should feel personally responsible for the 
negative consequences of his or her behavior (Cooper, 1971). 
A number of studies have investigated factors influencing the nonrational 
escalation of commitment to a previous action. For example, Staw (1976) examined how 
responsibility for negative consequences affects nonrational escalation of commitment. 
The author examines the process of escalating commitment through conducting the 
simulation of making a business investment decision. The participants were divided into 
two groups, one with high responsibility and one with low. Those participants in the 
group with high responsibility were asked to allocate funds to one of two corporate 
divisions of an organization. The participants were then told that, after 5 years of the 
initial allocation of funds, their investment turned out to be either successful or 
10
unsuccessful. Subsequently, the participants were asked to make a second allocation to 
either one of the divisions. The low-responsibility group did not have to make a prior 
decision as to which corporate division was most deserving of the funds. This group was 
presented with the entire financial decision case, including successful or unsuccessful 
results of the first allocation. The low-responsibility participants were then asked to make 
the second allocation decision. The study results indicate that participants in the high-
responsibility condition, who were told their first allocation was unsuccessful, committed 
a significantly higher amount to the original division in the second allocation than the 
participants in the low-responsibility group. Thus, Staw concluded that personal 
responsibility for negative consequences leads to increased investment of resources in a 
previously chosen course of action.
In another study, Rubin and Brockner (1975) investigated the passage of time as a 
factor influencing the entrapment bias. They demonstrated how closeness to achieving a 
goal affects escalation of commitment to the futile investment of resources. The scholars 
conducted an experiment in which the passage of time could be viewed as an investment 
or as an expense. The experiment participants were given an initial sum of money (the 
“initial stake”) and an opportunity to win a bigger some of money (the “jackpot”). To win 
the jackpot, the participants had to solve a series of crossword puzzles. Some of the 
crossword puzzles were so difficult that they required the use of a dictionary. To obtain 
the dictionary (i.e., scarce resource), participants had to wait in line until the resource 
became available, which it never did. As the time passed, the amount of money in both 
the jackpot and initial stake decreased. Thus, the longer the time spent waiting for the 
dictionary, the greater the expense to the participants, and the greater the investment. 
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The authors manipulated three variables: rate of decrease of the jackpot, 
availability of a chart providing information about the decrease (i.e., length of waiting 
time), and information concerning participants’ illusory position in line for the dictionary. 
The study results showed that entrapment in the waiting condition was high overall. 
Entrapment was particularly high when the jackpot decreased slowly, when the decrease 
chart was not available, and when participants thought that they were first in line for the 
dictionary instead of third. This study illustrates that goal completion could be used as a 
reason to self-justify a commitment to failing action. 
Overall, the discussion of self-justification research illustrates that there are five 
conditions that could lead to an entrapment bias: negative consequences (i.e., failure of 
the original decision), commitment to behavior, perceived degree of freedom in 
commitment to this behavior, responsibility for the negative consequences, and desire for 
goal completion.
Gaps in Self-Justification and Entrapment Research
Although a number of studies have provided support for self-justification theory 
(see Brockner [1992] for review), only a few studies take into consideration social factors 
and the way these social factors could affect escalation. Brockner and Rubin (1985) 
identify four types of social variables that can influence escalation: group influence, 
behavioral modeling, presence of an audience, and competition against a social (labor vs. 
management) or nonsocial (waiting for a bus) entity in an attempt to achieve the goal. 
One factor of particular interest to the current research is the presence of an external 
audience, but only a few studies (Brockner, Rubin, Fine, et al., 1982; Brockner, Rubin, & 
Lang, 1981; Fox & Staw, 1979; Staw & Hoang, 1995) have examined the presence of an 
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audience and its effect on entrapment. Further, no studies have explored the role of 
cultural variables (e.g., distinguishing between dimensions of face, personal networks) in 
entrapment situations.
Another gap in entrapment research and the self-justification explanation of the 
escalation phenomena, is a lack of studies that examine cognitive processes that may 
explain escalation. Three types of research have been conducted to provide support for 
the self-justification explanation of the escalation phenomena. The most popular type 
includes studies that “operationalize feedback from prior resource allocations and 
decision makers’ needs to justify those prior resource allocations; the typical finding is 
that escalation is greatest when both feedback is negative and justification needs are 
high” (Brockner, 1992, p. 49). But these studies do not examine cognitive processes—
that is, what led the participants to make the decision. These studies measure 
commitment to a previous decision, which is often operationalized as the amount of 
money allocated to the previously chosen course of action. In addition to the study 
described earlier by Staw (1976), studies by Davis and Bobko (1986), Fox and Staw 
(1979) and Schoorman, Mayer, Douglas, and Hetrick (1994) also operationalized 
entrapment as the amount of money invested and did not examine cognitive processes 
leading to the decision. 
The second type of research providing support for the self-justification 
explanation of entrapment explores other manifestations of behaviors (i.e., besides 
escalated commitment) resulting from the self-justification motive (Brockner, 1992). For 
example, Conlon and Parks (1987) found that individuals, to provide self-justification, 
tend to look for retrospectively focused information to make a decision regarding 
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subsequent reallocation. The researchers argue that retrospective focusing results, in part, 
because exoneration and justification necessitate a plausible explanation of how and why 
a negative consequence occurred. 
The third type of studies uses self-report data of psychological states to establish 
that behavioral escalation is indeed related to individuals’ self-justification needs 
(Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Strube & Lott, 1984). For example, findings from the study by 
Brockner and Rubin suggest that individuals who manifest escalation behavior also 
produce self-reports that indicate a need for justification of prior allocation (e. g., “I had 
already invested so much, it seemed foolish not to continue,” or “Once I had invested a 
certain amount, I had to keep going; otherwise all of that previous investment would have 
been a waste” [p. 148]). Ross and Staw (1986) cite the results of an unpublished study by 
Bazerman, Schoorman, and Goodman (1980) who investigated the relationship between 
participants’ behavioral manifestation of escalation and self-reports of other measures 
related to self-justification. The findings indicated that escalation was “associated with 
the perceived importance of a decision, the extent of disappointment with initial losses, 
and the perceived interconnectedness of current and past decisions in the situation” (Ross 
& Staw, 1986, p. 276). These studies focus on psychological states, not cognitive 
processes associated with escalation. None of the escalation studies examined focused 
specifically on cognitive processes. 
In addition, no studies have examined the escalation of commitment phenomenon 
from a communication point of view, namely focusing on messages used in situations in 
which individuals persist with continued commitment to the failing course of action. 
Drummond (1994) analyzed a case study of hiring an incompetent manager. The author 
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used case study research by participant observation that employed “direct observation, 
questioning, diary keeping and unobtrusive methods” (Drummond, 1994, p. 46). The 
scholar used quotes to document the case study, however, no systematic analysis of the 
messages was employed. 
Overall, the discussion above illustrates four gaps and weaknesses in the study of 
the entrapment phenomenon that the current research will address. First, there are only a 
few studies that examine the presence of external audience and its potential to affect 
entrapment. Second, there are no studies that have examined cultural variables and their 
potential influence on the commitment to the failing course of action. Third, there are no 
studies that have analyzed the cognitive processes involved in an escalation of 
commitment. Fourth, there is no research that analyzes messages communicated in an 
escalation situation. This research will address these four gaps: audience effect, cultural 
variables (i.e., types of face concern and personal networks), cognitive processes (i.e., 
internal and external justification needs), and messages used to justify one’s decision to 
escalate.
Entrapment and Negotiation
Entrapment is a cognitive bias that can have a have direct effect on negotiation. 
According to Putnam and Jones (1982), negotiation is a process in which two or more 
parties that hold or believe they hold incompatible goals try to reach a mutually 
acceptable solution by engaging in a give and take interaction. Neale and Bazerman 
(1985) argue that adopting a view of negotiation as a business decision-making process 
could help explain failure to reach agreements. The authors propose that cognitive or 
judgment biases result in reduced negotiator effectiveness in reaching best outcomes and 
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reduced likelihood of attaining agreement. The authors refer to cognitive biases 
(including entrapment bias) as heuristics that are helpful as shortcuts in an effort to 
reduce the amount of information to be processed. At the same time, these heuristics can 
also bias outcomes in systematic ways. In the case of entrapment bias, negotiators tend to 
escalate their commitment to justify their earlier bids, offers, and proposals, and to avoid 
the financial and ego losses of coming in second.
Neale and Bazerman (1985) provide a specific discussion outlining ways in which 
escalation and negotiation are related. The scholars suggest that escalation is likely to 
lead negotiators “to stand firm on their initial offers through the course of successive 
negotiations” (p. 48). One reason for development of such rigid negotiation positions is 
the presence of an external audience or constituency. The researchers maintain:
The pressure from the constituency may lead to the escalation of commitment
[entrapment bias], which impedes the ability of the negotiator to represent their 
best interests. Further, as both sides accrue losses (e.g., during a strike), both sides 
are likely to increase their propensity to “hold out” in order to justify their initial 
positions. (p. 48)
Bazerman (1986) offers three additional reasons for the entrapment bias in 
negotiation. The first reason is that negotiators tend to look for information that is salient 
with their initial commitment to a position. The second reason is that the negotiators’ 
judgment is biased to interpret what they observe at the negotiation table in a way that 
justifies or supports their initial position. The third reason is that the competitive context 
of a negotiation situation fuels the likelihood of entrapment. The negotiators perceive the 
notion of unilateral surrendering of a previously stated position or even making smaller 
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demands as defeat; on the other hand, escalation of commitment or entrapment “leaves 
the future uncertain” (p. 57). Consistent with prospect theory, Bazerman argues that this 
uncertain future is perceived as more desirable by negotiators than a prospect of certain 
loss. 
Bazerman (1986) recommends that, to avoid an entrapment bias in a negotiation 
context, negotiators have to realize their tendency to justify past actions. They have to 
remember to evaluate the benefits and costs of persisting with a chosen course of action. 
He also suggests that awareness of the tendency to escalate can help predict the 
opponents’ actions and thought processes. When individuals are too psychologically 
invested in their positions, they tend to increase their demands or hold out on making the 
concessions for too long. As a result, “a negotiator should avoid pushing opponents into a 
corner, getting them angry or otherwise making them feel that they can’t afford to give up 
the struggle” (p. 57). Other approaches to reducing cognitive biases in a negotiation 
include providing unequivocal feedback regarding one’s performance, improving 
negotiator selection criteria (i.e., identifying an individual’s tendency to be vulnerable to 
decisional biases), and developing training protocols to help negotiators eliminate 
decisional biases.
Because the entrapment bias in a negotiation can lead to failure to achieve desired 
outcomes, this issue is important to understand and empirically explore by examining 
how entrapment can occur during negotiation. The next sections examine variables (i.e., 
accountability and face) that may affect entrapment in a negotiation situation.
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Accountability and Constituency
Normative social influence describes the force that compels people to conform to 
the positive expectations of another. Normative influence implies “real or imagined group 
pressure, and a person may conform to avoid sanctions, to gain approval or simply to 
avoid the embarrassment of being different” (Nail, 1986, p. 202). The desire for social 
approval is related to social normative influence that is associated with compliance 
(Asch, 1951) and consequently with the self-justification process. One condition that 
demonstrates normative influence is accountability, or “the extent to which 
representatives are required to justify their actions, and are going to be evaluated and 
rewarded by their constituents” (Gelfand & Realo, 1999, p. 721). A constituency can 
exert normative influence, which can lead to entrapment bias. 
Accountability and Constituencies in Negotiation Context 
According to Gelfand and Realo (1999), within a context of negotiation, 
accountability is activated when negotiators have to provide justification for their actions 
after the negotiation. Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (1985) maintain that constituencies 
control individuals by administering rewards and punishments. Wall and Blum (1991) 
argue that constituencies tend to exert as strong an influence on negotiators as opponents 
do. These researchers explain, “The reasons are quite clear; constituents are powerful and 
will use their power, bringing pressures to bear that keep the negotiator committed to the 
constituents’—group’s or organization’s position” (p. 282). Lewicki, Saunders, and 
Minton (1985) posit that accountability occurs under two conditions: (a) when the 
constituency can observe and judge the individual’s performance, and (b) when the 
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individual is aware that the constituency depends on him or her to achieve positive 
outcomes. 
Research suggests that accountability to a constituency significantly influences 
negotiators’ behaviors; negotiators accountable to a constituency tend to behave more 
competitively and bargain tougher than those in low- or no-accountability conditions 
(Bartunek, Benton, & Keys, 1975; Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979; Gruder, 1971; 
Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Organ, 1971). For example, findings from Neale (1984) indicate 
that when constituents evaluate negotiators’ bargaining and determine payoffs, the 
negotiators are more likely to reach impasses and less likely to concede. 
Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton (1985) maintain that the individual’s desire for 
consistency is often amplified by a desire to save face and maintain an illusion that he or 
she is in control in front of an audience. The authors suggest that such behavior is a result 
of unwillingness on the part of the individuals to admit an error or failure, particularly 
when the other party might interpret doing so as a weakness. They state, “The mere 
presence of an audience, particularly one that can easily observe the negotiator, motivates 
a negotiator to seek a favorable evaluation from that audience and to avoid an 
unfavorable evaluation” (p. 295). 
Neale and Bazerman (1985) and Rubin, Kim, and Peretz (1990) argue that the 
pressure from the audience may lead to the escalation of conflict (entrapment) and 
impede the negotiator’s ability to represent the best interests of this audience. 
Furthermore, they state that the pressure generated by constituencies toward adherence to 
a certain position may not be in the best interest of either the constituency or the 
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negotiator and may impede the negotiators’ ability to represent the constituency’s best 
interests.
Accountability, Constituency, and Entrapment Bias
A number of studies suggest that accountability contributes significantly to 
entrapment (Fox & Staw, 1979; Staw & Hoang, 1995). Staw (1981) attributes this effect 
to external justification. For example, Staw and Hoang (1995) studied National 
Basketball Association (NBA) draft choices and found that coaches gave greater playing 
time to players who were selected earlier in the draft and who were paid more money 
independent of the individual’s performance. In this case, owners, fans, and media could 
be considered as the external audiences to whom coaches are responsible.
In another study, Fox and Staw (1979) conducted a simulation in which business 
students played the role of business executives who had to make funding allocation 
decisions under high or low conditions of job security. The scholars manipulated the 
popularity of a recently implemented policy at the time that the initial allocation decision 
was made. Fox and Staw hypothesized that those participants whose job was threatened 
or who implemented an unpopular policy would be motivated to protect themselves 
against failure. Judgment by the board of directors regarding allocation simulated the 
accountability condition. The participants in the job insecurity condition were informed 
that they were temporarily assigned the role of a vice president; those participants in the 
job security condition were told that their job was permanent. Half of the respondents 
were told that the board of directors was dissatisfied with their initial funding decision 
(resistance condition) and the remaining half were informed that the board was pleased 
with the initial resource allocation (no resistance condition). The participants were asked 
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to reallocate their funds. The findings indicated that when a course of action led to 
negative results (resistance condition), the participants in the low job security condition 
were more likely to escalate their commitment to the losing course of action by making 
greater subsequent resource allocations. In other words, negative input from the 
constituency (the board of directors) in combination with being dependent on this 
constituency for job security resulted in greater resource allocation. These studies did not 
examine the possibility that one of the underlying reasons for entrapment in the presence 
of constituency is an individual’s need to save face. 
Based on the discussion presented in the sections above, this research puts forth 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Entrapment will be more likely when a constituency is present. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Justification would be greater when respondents are required to 
report their behavior.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): When individuals have to report their behavior, they will have 
greater need for internal and external self-justifications leading to entrapment. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Presence of constituency is likely to lead to greater internal and 
external justification.
Face
Goffman (1955, 1959) introduced the concept of face or the desire to create and 
sustain positive identities in the eyes of significant others. This desire motivates 
individuals to appear strong and capable, and to avoid situations in which they could be 
publicly embarrassed in front of an audience. Goffman argued that people will try to 
prevent loss of face even if they have to incur costs. Facework is communication aimed at 
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enhancing or repairing face that has been damaged. Brown (1968, 1970) adopted 
Goffman’s definition of face and facework and conceptualizes facework as face-saving 
and face-restoration. Face-saving is defined as an attempt to prevent another from 
causing an individual to appear foolish or incapable to significant others and face-
restoration is conceived as an individual’s attempt to seek revenge from another after the 
other has already damaged face.
Brown and Levinson (1987) discuss two types of face: negative face and positive 
face. Negative face is conceived as an individual’s desire to maintain his or her autonomy 
(i.e., the need not to be imposed upon), whereas positive face is conceptualized as the 
need to seek inclusion or approval from significant others. In addition, Brown and 
Levinson (1987) charge that, because of the interdependent nature of social relations, 
individuals can threaten or support other people’s face and protect their own face. Ting-
Toomey (1988) adds another dimension to the concept of face: self and other. Self-face 
implies concern for one’s own image and self-interest, whereas other-face implies 
concern for another’s image and other-interest. Ting-Toomey (1988) proposes four types 
of face maintenance. First, self-negative face is associated with one’s need to protect 
one’s autonomy from other’s infringements. Second, other-negative face implies the need 
to demonstrate respect for other person’s need for autonomy. Third, self-positive face is 
concerned with the need to defend one’s need for inclusion. Fourth, other-positive face is 
defined as the need to support the other person’s need for association. 
Face-Saving and Negotiation
The concept of face has been addressed by scholars examining conflict in the 
negotiation context. Wilson and Putnam (1990) state that face goals exert strong 
22
influence on the negotiation process. These scholars state that, during negotiation, 
negotiators have a certain image of themselves that they would like to preserve. Scholars 
(e.g., Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999; White, Tynan, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004; 
Wilson, 1992) have examined the role of face threats in negotiation. According to White 
et al. (2004), positive face threats include situations in which one of the parties is 
embarrassed, disrespected or criticized. Negative face threats, on the other hand, are 
associated with situations in which one party desires to avoid imposition. White et al. 
(2004) argue that both positive and negative aspects of face could be threatened during a 
negotiation. However, they charge that research conducted by Cupach and Carson (2002) 
and Cupach and Messman (1999) suggests that positive face is more important for 
relationships, and therefore is more likely to be associated with integrative outcomes. 
Some direct face threats include nonnegotiable offers (Tjosvold, 1977), criticizing an 
opponent’s position (Brown & Levinson, 1987), pressure (Thompson, Nadler & Kim, 
1999), and resisting making a concession (Tjosvold & Huston, 1978).
In addition to direct threats to face by an opponent, certain situational factors 
increase face threat in a negotiation (White et al., 2004). One of these factors is 
constituency. The presence of constituency is likely to heighten face concerns. The 
discussion in the previous section illustrates that the presence of an audience can exert 
significant influence on an individual in a variety of contexts. Brown and Garland (1971) 
suggest two reasons why presence of an audience increases face-saving behavior. First, 
audiences can provide evaluative feedback directly to an individual. Second, an audience 
could also communicate its evaluation to others. Brown (1968) maintains that negotiators 
seek to communicate a positive image of themselves not only to the counterparts 
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involved in a bargaining process but also any other audience interested in the outcome. 
According to Brown (1968), “The latter may include the group the bargainer represents 
or in which he holds membership; they may be ‘real’ or imagined, physically present at 
or absent from the setting in which the bargaining occurs” (p. 109). Similarly, Wilson and 
Putnam (1990) argue that face-maintenance goals become more salient when negotiators 
receive feedback from and feel highly accountable to constituents. Stevens (1963) links 
face saving to concession making. He states that bargainers face a dilemma when they 
have to make concessions to reach an agreement. He maintains that the act of making the 
concession itself can be perceived by others as a sign of weakness, which can cause face 
loss and possibly increase attempts of exploitation by the other party. Therefore, the face-
saving and economic motives may require mutually incompatible responses by 
individuals. 
The study conducted by Brown (1968) showed that bargainers are willing to 
sacrifice their own economic gain just to inflict worse losses on their counterparts, 
especially when they have been made to appear foolish in front of a salient audience. 
Brown conducted an experiment in which the face saving was induced by informing the 
participants that they would be observed by an audience while participating in a 
bargaining task. The task was based on a two-person trucking game in which each player 
runs a trucking company and has to move his or her truck over a road system to a final 
destination. The faster one reaches the final destination, the more money the player will 
earn. The game is set up in such a way that for each player to win the most money, they 
have to cooperate. In addition, each player has control over a tollgate through which the 
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counterpart’s truck has to pass. Players are required to either charge the opponent a 
specified toll or grant him or her free passage. 
During the first ten trials, a confederate controlled the tollgate and systematically 
charged the participant high tolls resulting in significant monetary losses for the 
participant. Then, the participants received feedback from the audience members, who 
were supposedly, but not actually, observing the interaction from behind a one-way 
mirror. The participants received feedback that either said that they looked foolish and 
weak (e.g., “Bolt was out to beat Acme and he really made Acme look like a sucker”) or 
that they looked good (e.g., “Bolt made Acme pay a lot of high tolls but Acme looked 
good because he tried hard and played fair). The control group received no feedback. 
In the second round, the participants had control over the tollgate. The participant 
had two choices: He or she could either retaliate against the confederate or increase his or 
her own winnings. The results indicated that those participants who received negative 
feedback from the audience were much more likely to retaliate against their counterparts 
than participants who were provided with positive feedback. Further, participants in the 
negative feedback condition were willing to lose money to restore face. Those in the 
positive feedback condition proceeded to maximize their profits. The results from the 
post-experimental questionnaire showed that the negative feedback participants were 
more concerned with looking strong than were the other participants. 
Face-Saving and Entrapment Bias
Only two studies have explored the relationship between face-saving behavior and 
the entrapment bias. Brockner, Rubin, and Lang (1981) conducted two experiments to 
explore how the presence of an audience affects entrapment. In the first experiment, the 
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participants were told that they are about to participate in a study on decision making. 
The participants were asked to make an investment decision. Half of the participants were 
told about the virtues of investing conservatively (cautious condition) and the other half 
was instructed about advantages of investing a larger amount (risky condition). To 
investigate the role of face saving, experimenters assigned half of the participants to the 
large-audience condition (experimenter plus two confederates who were supposedly 
working for psychology professors, and who were interested in observing the procedures 
because they were considering using them in their own experiments) and the second half
to the small audience condition (just the experimenter). The researchers also 
hypothesized that, because social anxiety is related to self-presentation, the participants 
with low social anxiety would be less influenced by the experimenter’s instructions than 
would those with high social anxiety. The results showed that investments were less than 
half in the cautious condition than in the risky condition. The face-saving analysis 
showed that 
(1) the instructions had a greater effect on subjects with high rather than low 
social anxiety, and (2) individuals with high social anxiety who participated in 
front of a large audience were more influenced by the instructions than were 
individuals with low social anxiety who participated in front of a small audience. 
(p. 68)
In the second experiment, the procedures were the same as the ones in the first 
experiment, except Brockner, Rubin, and Lang (1981) orthogonally varied the 
importance of costs and rewards. In the high-cost-importance condition, the participants 
were given a chart with information regarding their costs at various points in the 
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experiment, and they were asked to plot their progress toward the jackpot. In the low-
cost-importance condition, the participants were not given a chart, and they did not have 
to track their progress. The results showed that the reward importance variable did not 
have any effect. The effect of perceived costs was mediated by participants’ concern 
about how their investment would make them look in front of others. Participants in the 
high-cost-importance condition quit earlier and stated that they became less entrapped to 
make a desirable self-presentation (e.g., “I thought that it would look good to quit”). The 
authors concluded, “Individuals will become more or less entrapped to the extent that 
doing so will portray them in a more favorable light” (p. 78).
The second study exploring face and entrapment was conducted by Brockner, 
Rubin, Fine, et al. (1982). These researchers varied decision makers’ face-saving 
concerns and the point in time at which these concerns arose. The scholars conducted two 
experiments. The first experiment dealt with perceived importance of costs and rewards 
associated with continued investment and did not involve face-saving concerns. In the 
second experiment, the face-saving manipulation was present and was operationalized 
through the presence of an evaluative audience. 
The participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to simulate gas-
line-waiting procedures. The participants were asked to make a decision about whether to 
stop or continue waiting in a gas line. Half of the participants were told that experts in 
decision making would be observing and evaluating their behavior (evaluative condition) 
and the other half were told that they would be watched by a non-evaluative audience  
(non-evaluative condition). In the evaluative condition, the participants were provided 
with a form that the observers would supposedly use to evaluate them. The form included 
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such items as how much participants “appeared to have the situation under control,” 
“were being made to look foolish,” and “were using their money wisely” (p. 258). 
Brockner, Rubin, Fine, et al. also manipulated the timing of observations so that half of 
the participants were observed by the audience from the start of the experiment (early 
condition) and the other half were observed after a significant portion of resources was 
already invested (late condition). The results showed that the presence of an evaluative 
audience had no effect on participants’ resource allocation early in the process, but it did 
have a significant effect on investment behavior later in the process. More specifically:
When the audience was described as “experts in decision making,” subjects high 
in public self-consciousness (or social anxiety) became less entrapped than those 
low on these dimensions. When the audience consisted of individuals who 
“wished to simply observe the experimental procedure,” however, high public 
self-consciousness (or social anxiety) individuals were significantly more 
entrapped than lows. Moreover, these interaction effects occurred when the 
audience was introduced late, but not early, into the entrapment situation. (pp. 
247–248)
Given the small number of studies related to, but not directly testing, face-saving 
behavior in the entrapment situation, further investigation is needed of how the desire to 
save face, particularly in the presence of constituency, can lead to entrapment. The 
current research examines the effect of face on entrapment. Because scholars have 
indicated (White et al., 2004) that concerns for positive face are more important to 
negotiators than the desire to avoid an imposition (concern for negative face), this study 
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will primarily focus on concerns for self- and other-positive face. This research puts forth 
the following hypotheses:
H4: Individuals with greater self- and other-positive face concerns will be more likely to 
become entrapped. 
H5: Concern for saving face will be greater when the individuals have to report their 
behavior.
H6: Overall other- and self-positive face concerns that an individual has will lead to 
greater need to justify one’s actions in a scenario leading to entrapment. 
H7: Concerns for saving face will be greater when constituency is present.
Personal Networks
During the last decades, network analysis has emerged as a way to examine social 
structures (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). According to Valente (1995), networks are 
patterns of support, advice, friendship, and communication that are shared by members of 
a social system. Personal networks include an individual, people who are in contact with 
this individual, social relationships between the individual and other people, and social 
relationships between the people in contact with the individual. 
Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) argue that personal network analysis is “one of 
the most promising currents in sociological research” (p. 1412). In fact, the authors argue 
that network analysis “offers a more powerful way of describing social interactions than 
do other structural perspectives that focus solely on the categorical attributes of 
individuals and collective actors” (p. 1413). According to Wellman (1983), network 
analysis explains social behavior as the result of individuals’ involvement in structured 
social relations as opposed to common attributes and norms they possess. Network 
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analysis looks at patterns of relations (Burt, 1986) as opposed to such individual 
attributes as political affiliation, gender, social status, or ethnicity. 
The study of personal networks benefits not only sociological research; it can also 
be applied to the field of communication. Over the past decades, individualism-
collectivism and independent and interdependent self-construal have dominated cross-
cultural research as explanations for cultural differences in types of relationships. Both 
sets of constructs have been widely used to explain the relationship between individuals 
and their relevant others (Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The concepts of 
collectivism and inter-dependent self-construal emphasize the importance of and 
dependence on relevant others. On the other hand, the concepts of individualism and 
independent self-construal emphasize self-reliance and focus on oneself. 
The concept of face has been closely related to individualism-collectivism. Ting-
Toomey (1988) posits that members of individualistic cultures and people with 
independent self-construals are more concerned with self-face maintenance than 
members of collectivistic cultures or people with interdependent self-construals. On the 
other hand, individuals in collectivistic cultures are more concerned with mutual-face and 
other-face maintenance. Further, Ting-Toomey argues that members of individualistic 
cultures tend to use autonomy-preserving strategies, and members of collectivistic 
cultures tend to use approval-seeking strategies when managing conflict.
However, Fiske (2002) criticized individualism-collectivism research, and Levine 
et al. (2003) offered criticism of the independent and interdependent self-construals 
pointing out that both sets of constructs have significant operationalization and 
measurement drawbacks. Massett (1999) suggested that personal networks provide more 
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accurate representation of the relevant others than the two sets of constructs. Massett 
outlined three advantages of using personal networks as a framework for examining 
individuals’ differences. First, personal networks allow for more accurate representation 
of one’s social interactions with relevant others within a society. Second, examination of 
the individual’s personal networks, when he or she can identify his or her own set of 
significant others, reduces the problems associated with arbitrary definitions of groups. 
Third, examination of personal networks can provide insight into quality and frequency 
of communication among individuals in a given society or culture. 
Networks not only allow for more careful description of relevant others but also 
allow for the measure of range and strength of the relationship with relevant others 
(Granovetter, 1973; Marsden & Campbell, 1984). According to Emirbayer and Goodwin 
(1994), network range is the number of an individual’s ties to other people and strength 
of ties is “the relative frequency, duration, emotional intensity, reciprocal exchange and 
so on which characterize a given tie or set of ties” (pp. 40-41). Granovetter (1982) 
provided an overview of studies that have examined tie strength. Among other 
applications, tie strength was a good indicator of social mobility, in which different 
degrees of tie strength were positively related to the outcomes of job search efforts. The 
most common and best indicator of tie strength is the closeness of a relationship 
(Marsden & Campbell, 1984).
Massett (1999) conducted a study comparing the effects of culture and other-
orientation on personal communication networks and behavioral intentions in the United 
States and Mexico. The study focused on individuals’ health networks and diabetes-
related behaviors. Massett found that Americans were significantly more independent and 
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that Mexican respondents were significantly more interdependent. In addition, the 
comparison of personal networks indicated that, although U.S. participants nominated 
more people in their networks, Mexican respondents nominated more family members, 
communicated with members of networks more often, reported more high-context 
communication with network members and indicated greater degree of closeness with 
network members than did the U.S. respondents. These findings suggest support for using 
personal networks to investigate the relationships between individuals and their 
significant others. More specifically, the results of the network comparison parallel 
closely the characteristics traditionally associated with interdependent (Mexico) and 
independent (U.S.) self-construals; that is, individuals with interdependent self- construal 
are more likely to have strong, close tie networks and individuals with independent self-
construal are more likely to have weak, loose-tie networks. 
Given a plausible relationship between self-construals and networks (Massett, 
1998), and taking into consideration that self-construals have an effect on face concerns 
(Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Ting-Toomey, 1988), it is possible that personal networks 
affect face concerns. In addition, as the previous section established a connection 
between face concerns and entrapment, an indirect relationship may exist between 
personal networks and entrapment bias with face concerns as a moderating variable. 
Further, because a concept of a network range is at the core of network analysis 
(Granovetter, 1973), the size of an individual’s network along with the strength of ties 
within the network is expected to affect face concerns and entrapment bias. 
This research argues that the range and strength of one’s personal networks will 
predict face-saving behavior, which in turn will affect the entrapment bias. The greater 
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the size of the network and the stronger the ties in the network, the more the individual 
should be concerned with protecting self-positive face because of his or her desire to look 
good to the members of the network in order to maintain his or her inclusion in that 
network. In addition, individuals with stronger ties and larger personal networks are 
expected to be more concerned with protecting other-positive face, because they feel 
compelled to protect the other party’s interests. Further, individuals with larger, strong-tie 
personal networks are expected to be more prone to entrapment in the presence of a 
constituency, because members of the constituency are likely to be members of the 
negotiator’s professional network. Therefore, the negotiator may feel that his or her 
reputation, as well as reputation of the constituency, are at stake and persist with a failing 
course of action. Along the same lines of reasoning, these individuals are also more likely 
to feel more compelled to justify their behavior than individuals with smaller, loose tie 
networks. 
Based on the discussion presented above, this research will test the following 
hypotheses:  
H8: Individuals with more expansive and strong ties in their personal networks will be 
more concerned with their self-positive face.
H9a: When participants have expansive personal networks, entrapment will be positively 
associated with protecting the constituency’s positive face.
H9b: In the presence of constituency, individuals with larger, strong-tie personal 
networks will be more prone to entrapment than the individuals with smaller, weak-tie 
networks.
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H10: In the presence of constituency, individuals with larger personal networks and 
strong ties would report greater justification for making their decisions.
Luck
Although unrelated to the theoretical rationale of this research, the concept of luck 
is discussed here, because luck was used in the method to foil the nature of the study; that 
is, the participants were told that the study is about luck. It was necessary not to disclose 
the nature of the research so as not to bias the outcomes. To identify measures of luck 
suitable to be employed in this research, a literature review of studies examining luck was 
conducted. Summarized below is a brief overview of luck research. Luck measures used 
in this dissertation are discussed in chapter 2.
Traditionally, luck is discussed within the framework of conditions related to 
expectations of control and success (Darke & Freedman, 1997a). According to Darke and 
Freedman (1997a), “luck is a random, uncontrollable factor which should have little 
effect on future expectations” (p. 487). Luck is typically considered to be an external, 
unstable factor that can explain achievement outcomes or social events (Darke & 
Freedman, 1997b). Social learning theory of personality developed by Rotter (1955) 
posits that perceptions of control decrease if events are attributed to luck or other people 
(external locus of control) and increase when events seem to be a result of a person’s own 
actions (internal locus of control). Overall, individuals deceive themselves as having less 
control if they believe that luck is involved.
 An attributional model explaining the origin of perceived control identifies four 
causal factors to which failure or success is usually attributed: luck, task difficulty, effort, 
and ability (Weiner et al., 1972). In addition to the locus of control aspect specified by 
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the social learning theory, attributional theory introduces stability—a degree of 
consistency across time and situations. According to the attributional model, luck is 
considered to be an external and unstable factor. That is, the model predicts that any 
success attributable to luck should be regarded as uncontrollable; in addition, future 
successes cannot be predicted on the basis of luck. 
Both the social learning theory and the attributional model assume that 
individuals have rational views about causes of luck; they see luck as unstable and 
external. However, studies conducted by Darke and Freedman (1997a) suggest that not 
all people have rational views about luck, some hold irrational beliefs that luck is a stable 
factor that influences events in their favor. Individuals who hold the latter view of luck 
tend to have positive expectations for the outcome of future events. This result supports 
findings from another study conducted by Darke and Freedman (1997b) that 
demonstrates that those who believe in luck are more confident and positive about future 
success. Further, a study conducted by Wohl and Enzle (2002a) shows that individuals 
who believe they are lucky also believe that they can use their luck intentionally to 
influence the outcome of chance events. For example, research participants acted “as 
though luck could be transmitted from themselves to a wheel of fortune and thereby 
positively affect their perceived chance of winning” (p. 1388). Another study conducted 
by Wohl and Enzle (2002b) indicates that individuals’ differences in self-perceived luck 
influence their future behaviors. More specifically, Wohl and Enzle (2002b) conducted 
an experiment in which participants were assigned to either near win or near loss 
conditions. The experimental task consisted of playing a computerized slot-machine style 
wheel of fortune game. In the near-loss condition, the wheel appeared to almost stop at 
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the Bankrupt section but inched forward towards a small payoff section. In the near-win 
condition, the wheel appeared ready to stop at the Jackpot section, but came to a 
complete stop at the small payoff section. The near escape of big loss led participants to 
deem themselves lucky. As a result, they were more prone to gamble more in comparison 
to participants who experienced a near big win.
The discussion above suggests that luck is a plausible disguise to be used in this 
research. Specifics of the experimental procedures are detailed in the chapter 2: Methods.
Summary of Research Hypotheses
Figure 2 provides visual representation of study hypotheses and relationships 
among study variables. Circles represent constructs that incorporate more than one 
variable. For example, personal networks are comprised of the size of the network and 
influence of network members have on the person or tie strength.
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Figure 2. Research Hypotheses.
Overall, this research attempts to provide support for the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Entrapment will be more likely when a constituency is 
present. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Justification would be greater when respondents are 
required to report their behavior.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): When individuals have to report their behavior, they will 
have greater need for internal and external self-justifications leading to entrapment. 























Hypothesis 4 (H4): Individuals with greater self- and other-positive face concerns 
will be more likely to become entrapped.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Concern for saving face will be greater when the individuals 
have to report their behavior. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Overall other- and self-positive face concerns that an 
individual has will lead to greater need to justify one’s actions in a scenario leading to 
entrapment.
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Concerns for saving face will be greater when constituency is 
present.
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Individuals with more expansive and strong ties in their 
personal networks will be more concerned with their self-positive face.
Hypothesis H9a (H9a): When participants have expansive personal networks, 
entrapment will be positively associated with protecting the constituency’s positive face. 
Hypothesis 9b (H9b): In the presence of constituency, individuals with larger, 
strong-tie personal networks will be more prone to entrapment than the individuals with 
smaller, weak-tie networks.
Hypothesis 10 (H10): In the presence of constituency, individuals with larger 
personal networks and strong ties would report greater justification for making their 
decisions.
Research Question
Finally, because currently there are no known studies that have examined the 
entrapment phenomenon from a communication point of view—that is, no studies have 
examined messages used by individuals in situations potentially leading to entrapment—
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this study poses the following research question: In a situation leading to entrapment, are 
individuals likely to use social accounts to explain their behavior?
Bies (1987) defines social account as “a verbal strategy employed by a person to 
minimize the apparent severity of the predicament or convince the audience that the 
wrongful act is not a fair representation of what the actor is ‘really like’ as a person” (p. 
294). Sitkin and Bies (1993) state that social accounts are used to influence an 
individual’s perception of responsibility for an action and motivation for an action, and to 
paint the unfavorability of an action. 
Sitkin and Bies (1993) identify three broad categories of accounts: (a) mitigating 
responsibility, (b) legitimizing the action by appealing to some higher-order values or 
norms, and (c) reframing outcomes. Mitigating, or causal, accounts suggest that the 
situation forced the individual to take the action. Sitkin and Bies state, “by suggesting 
that the offending party had no other alternatives to the chosen action, a social account 
claiming mitigating circumstances should reduce the amount of blame attributed to the 
party” (p. 350). When individuals use the second type, exonerating accounts, they try to 
explain their actions by placing them within a broad normative framework that will give 
legitimacy to their motives. The third type, the reframing account, attempts to put the 
actions in the best possible light by suggesting to the offended party the appropriate 
context for interpretation. To this end, this research will examine the messages produced 
by the research participants to determine whether they are likely to be social accounts and 




This chapter describes the process of developing research questionnaires and data 
collection procedures. The first section presents describes the experimental design. The 
second section provides a description of the study sample. The third section describes in 
detail the recruitment procedures. The fourth section discusses the experimental 
procedures and manipulations. Finally, the fifth section provides a detailed discussion of 
the development of study measures. 
Experimental Design
One of the purposes of this research is to examine whether the presence of 
constituency leads to entrapment. The presence of constituency is expected to pose face 
threats that lead to entrapment. The research also hypothesizes that accountability, in this 
case reporting in person to the constituency, will pose greater face threat than non-
accountability. In addition, face concerns are expected to be moderated by the size and 
strength of personal networks. 
There are three conditions essential to simulate accountability (Gelfand & Realo, 
1999). First, constituents need to have control over rewards. Second, individuals must 
justify their performance. Third, individuals must be evaluated by the constituency. For 
the purposes of this study, accountability is manipulated using two requirements in the 
accountability condition: (a) presence of a constituency who has control over rewards and 
evaluates performance, which meets the requirements of the first and third conditions; 
and (b) reporting, so that individuals have to explain their behavior to the constituency in 
person, meeting the requirement of the second condition. To this end, two experimental 
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conditions are employed: presence of constituency and reporting on the outcomes of the 
experiment. Overall, the respondents were assigned to one of the four conditions (see 
Table 1):
1. Working in groups and reporting in-person to the group (COND I: constituency; 
reporting).
2. Working in groups, with no reporting (COND II: constituency; no reporting).
3. Working individually and reporting in-person to the researcher (COND III: no 
constituency; reporting).
4. Working individually (COND IV: no constituency; no reporting).
The research design is 2X2 (constituency [yes/no] by reporting [yes/no]), with 
face and justification as mediating variables, personal networks as a moderating variable, 
and entrapment as a dependent variable. 
Table 1.
Study Design (N = 236)
Constituency
Yes No
Yes n = 57 n = 59
Reporting
No n = 58 n = 62
Study Sample
The study sample consisted of 236 undergraduate students majoring in 
communication enrolled in a large East Coast university (N = 236). The overwhelming 
majority of the participants (97.4%) were full-time undergraduate students. The 
remaining 2.6% were part-time undergraduate students. Of the participating students 
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2.5% were freshmen, 33.9% were sophomores, 39.4% were juniors, and 23.7% were 
seniors. Ethnic composition of the sample was as follows:  White, non-Hispanic or 
Caucasian (64.4%), African American or Black (14%), Hispanic (6.4%), Asian or Asian-
American (6.8%). In addition, 6.8% of the respondents reported their ethnicity as 
“Other.” Participants were between 17 and 33 years old (M = 20.3 years, SD = 1.86, 
median = 20). Female participants constituted 80.9% of the sample and male participants 
constituted the remaining 19.1%. Such an imbalance in female to male student ratio is not 
unusual, as this is a growing trend in communication classes, where the majority of 
majors are female. A slight majority of the participants (53%) reported being employed. 
The most often-cited categories of employment were sales, administrative/clerical (e.g., 
secretary, administrative assistant, account clerk), and service industry (e.g., waiter, 
nanny, chef) positions.
Recruiting Procedures and Research Assistants
Participants volunteered to take part in the experiment. They received extra credit 
in their communication courses for their participation. In addition to extra credit, each 
participant received ten raffle tickets for four raffle drawings; each drawing was worth 
$50. Each ticket was worth $1. Participants were not allowed to purchase tickets outside 
of the study. When the study was completed, the researcher administered one lottery and 
awarded $50 to the winner.
The study was announced by each class instructor (see Appendix B). The 
announcement was made several times during the course of the semester. The prospective 
participants were told that if they would like to receive extra credit for the class, one 
option available to them was to participate in an experiment investigating an individual’s 
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luck and decision-making processes. An alternative written assignment was offered to 
those students who wanted extra credit but did not want to participate in research. The 
instructor passed around the sign up sheet. Those individuals who chose to participate in 
the study received an informed consent form (see Appendix D) and a number of 
questionnaires that they were asked to fill out prior to arriving at the experimental 
laboratory. The questionnaires included demographic information (see Appendix E), a 
personal network instrument (see Appendix F), a network influence instrument (see 
Appendix G), and a face scale instrument (see Appendix H). 
Two female undergraduate students were recruited to help the researcher and act 
as the “confederate constituency” in conditions in which constituency was present. 
Several hours were spent training the undergraduate students on how to act and “exert 
pressure” on a participant. The confederates were encouraged to put full responsibility for 
deciding to continue or withdraw from the task on the research participant. Sample 
statements used by the confederates included the following: “It is all up to you, but it sure 
would be nice to win some money,” “Win us some money,” “I hope you win, I can use 
some extra cash” and “If you think it is time to withdraw, it is your call, but extra cash for 
Christmas presents would be nice.” In addition, on several occasions, the confederates 
also acted as research assistants, administering instruments to the participants in the no-
constituency conditions. During their training the undergraduate assistants also received 
instructions on how to use the instruments, and they practiced administering them. In 
addition, the researcher sat in during the first four experiments conducted by the 
assistants. The researcher was available for questions when the research assistants 
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administered the study. The undergraduate students helping the researcher received three 
independent-study credits for their involvement in this research project.
Data Collection and Experimental Procedures
Data were collected between June and December 2004. Prior to starting the 
experimental task, the participants received an information packet that included details of 
the task (see Appendix J) and an informed consent form (see Appendix D). In addition, 
they were asked to fill out the following questionnaires: manipulation check and luck (see 
Appendices K and L, respectively). After participating in the experiment, the participants 
were asked to provide a narrative explaining the experiment outcomes and complete the 
entrapment bias questionnaire and the face-work scale instrument (see Appendices M, N, 
and O). 
At the beginning of each experiment, the researcher explained the procedures (see 
Appendix I) and distributed the information packet (see Appendix J). The participants 
were informed that the experiment was designed to study luck. Prior to participation in 
the study, the respondents were told that the purpose of the experiment was to study luck 
“but some features of the research will not be revealed until the research is completed. 
This will ensure that study results are not biased” (see Appendix I). 
During the pre-experiment instructions, the researcher also mentioned that results 
of many past studies investigating luck indicate that how well one performs in this 
particular experimental task is “a strong indicator of how lucky one is in other areas of 
life, such as finding a good job, finding a partner for life, etc.” After participants 
completed the pre-task instruments, the researcher mentioned, “Even though some people 
feel unlucky, their performance on this task does not depend on it. And, furthermore, 
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even if you feel that you are unlucky, there is still about one in ten chances that you will 
be successful in accomplishing the task.” This statement was designed to preclude 
participants from quitting too early because they consider themselves unlucky.
In social research, not fully disclosing the nature of the study is not uncommon 
and sometimes is necessary to prohibit biases and confounding variables (Schrag, 2003). 
According to Schrag (2003), this type of deception is justified when validity of research 
is at stake, when risk to participants is minimal, and when the researcher has a debriefing 
plan. In this research, all three criteria were met. First, the researcher could not disclose 
that the investigation concerns entrapment, because then the participants would have been 
aware of the potential for escalation of commitment and would be unlikely to become 
entrapped. Second, the risk to the participants was indeed minimal, and they were not 
likely to object once they were told about how they were deceived. Third, at the end of 
the experiment the researcher debriefed the participants and explained to them the true 
purpose of the experiment, defined entrapment, and identified the experimental 
conditions and manipulated factors. The debriefing also stressed that the experiment did 
not “have anything to do with luck and your [participant’s] performance is not indicative 
of how lucky you are as a person.” The debriefing form can be found in Appendix O. 
Task Description 
The participants were told that the task would consist of drawing ping-pong balls 
out of a box. The experimenter explained that the box contained 100 ping-pong balls, of 
which 90 were white and 10 were red, and that the participant’s luck would be measured 
by the number of red balls he or she drew from the box. In fact, there were no red balls in 
the box. The participants were told that the goal of the task is to draw five out of the ten 
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red balls that are mixed in with white balls. The participants were informed that they 
could make up to 20 attempts to draw five red balls. It was also emphasized that the 
experiment was structured so that only drawing five red balls counted as a successful 
completion of the task; in other words, drawing one, two, three, or four red balls 
constituted failure to complete the task. All of the participants received extra credit for 
participation regardless of their performance and were reminded that their performance 
would not affect receiving extra credit. All of the participants started the experiment with 
ten raffle tickets. The participants were told that if they successfully completed the task 
(i.e., drew 5 red balls) they would receive an additional 20 raffle tickets, bringing the 
total number of raffle tickets to 30. However, because there were no red balls to draw, it 
was impossible for anyone to receive 30 tickets.
Constituency Manipulation
Half of the participants were told that they would be working on their own (no 
constituency). In the no constituency condition, the respondents were told that after they 
received instructions, they would be escorted into the experiment room where they would 
perform the drawing task. They received a pay-off sheet reflecting potential gains and 
losses (see Appendix J). More specifically, the pay-off sheet detailed that for every white 
ball drawn, the participant would lose one raffle ticket (of the ten tickets he or she started 
with) and for every red ball drawn he or she would win two raffle tickets. Each 
participant was informed that if he or she were to get “in the negative,” he or she would 
have to pay for the number of negative points accumulated, such that one point was worth 
one dollar. Because the participants started with ten raffle tickets each and could make up 
to 20 draws, the maximum penalty possible was $10. However, no money was actually 
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collected in the end. The participants were also informed that regardless of how many 
points he or she lost, if all 5 red balls were drawn by the end of the task, the person would 
receive 20 raffle tickets with no penalties. For example, if the respondent had negative 
points at the time of drawing all 5 balls, she or he would not have to pay and would 
receive all 20 raffle tickets for successfully completing the task.
The other half of the participants were told that they would be working in groups 
of three participants (constituency condition). These groups actually consisted of two 
confederates (constituency) and one participant. By the time the participant arrived at the 
lab, the confederates were already waiting. The researcher pretended that she did not 
know them and took down their names and classes they were enrolled in along with the 
participant’s information for the purposes of providing this information to his or her 
instructor to notify the instructor that the student should receive extra credit for 
participating in the study.
In the constituency condition, the participants were told that, although they were 
working as a group, only one person would be performing the task, and that person would 
be decided by number drawing. The participants in the constituency condition were told 
that the experimenter was interested in investigating “how an individual’s luck affects 
groups; particularly, because there have been studies that have shown that not only 
individuals could be lucky, but also groups.”  
To vote on the person to perform the task, the participants were asked to draw a 
number out of a hat; the person who got number “3” had to perform the drawing. To 
ensure that the participant was the one who would be performing the task, all of the 
folded pieces of paper had the number “3.” The confederates had an agreement that one 
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would always say that she had “1” and the other one would always say that she had “2.” 
Because of these arrangements the participant was always the one to perform the task. 
Each participant in the constituency condition was instructed in front of the 
confederates that, for every round in which the participant failed to draw a red ball, the 
constituency would lose one raffle ticket per person and the participant would also lose 
one raffle ticket. On the other hand, for every round in which the participant did draw a 
red ball, the constituency would win two tickets each, and the participant would win two 
tickets. If the participant got “in the negative,” losing more raffle tickets than the number 
held by each person, the number of points that the constituency would lose would be the 
same as the number of points lost by the participant. For example, if the participant drew 
eleven white balls—that is, one negative point—he or she would lose $1, and each 
member of the constituency would also lose $1. The maximum penalty for each member 
of the constituency and the participant was $10. 
Furthermore, to meet the requirement that the constituency control rewards, the 
participants were instructed that, at the conclusion of the task, the constituency would 
determine an amount (from $0 to $5) to be awarded to the participant for his or her 
performance (this award is in addition to the extra credit that all participants would 
receive regardless of their performance). The experimenter told the participants that she 
would pay him or her the amount indicated by the constituency. Modeling after the 
procedures used by Organ (1971), the participant was told that the constituency would 
also receive compensation, but the amount or payment structure was “left unspecified so 
as not to bias their decisions on how much to award.” 
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Reporting Manipulation
In each accountability condition, half of the participants were asked to report on 
their performance in the task (reporting condition). The other half of the participants were 
told that, after they finished the experimental task, they would complete some 
questionnaires and would be free to go (no reporting condition). Thus, prior to the 
experiment, half of the participants were informed that they would report in person either 
to the constituency (one-fourth of the participants) or to the researcher (one-fourth of the 
participants) at the end of the task. All participants were asked to write a paragraph 
justifying his or her strategy and statements he or she would use to explain the success or 
failure in performing the task (outcome narrative). Respondents in the reporting condition 
were told that they would have to complete the outcome narrative before facing the 
constituency or the researcher. In fact, the participants did not have to report to the 
constituency or researcher. As soon as the respondents completed the post-experimental 
questionnaires they were debriefed by the researcher and were free to go.
The information packet for the reporting/constituency condition read: “As a group 
representative you will perform the drawing task on behalf of your group. At the 
conclusion of the task, you will write a short essay (one or two paragraphs) summarizing 
the outcome of the task and explaining your strategy and the results. You will use this 
essay to report to the group members after you are finished with the drawing. After the 
explanation is presented to the group members, they will carefully weigh the information 
and decide how much money to award you for your performance.” The information 
packet for the reporting/no constituency condition read: “You are to perform the 
experimental task on your own. At the conclusion of the task, you will write a short essay 
49
(one or two paragraphs) summarizing the outcome of the task and explaining your 
strategy and the results. You will use this essay to report to the researcher after you are 
finished with the drawing.”
In the no reporting/constituency condition, each participant was told that the 
experimenter would inform the group members of the outcomes of the task and the group 
members would make a decision regarding the monetary reward to be received by the 
participant. In the no reporting/no constituency condition, the respondent was told that 
after completion of the task and the post-experimental questionnaires the participant 
would receive a debriefing and would be free to go. 
The statements produced by the participants were collected by the experimenter 
and analyzed for the types of messages most often used by the respondents in an attempt 
to explain their behavior. 
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study was the entrapment bias. For the purposes of 
this study, the entrapment bias was conceived of as a participant’s commitment to 
continuing the task. It was operationalized by the number of drawing rounds (the greater 
number of rounds, the greater the entrapment bias) the participant chose to conduct. 
Analysis of descriptive statistics of the total number of draws shows M = 9.78, SD = 5.17 
and median = 9.00. Number of draws ranged from 0 (2.5% of the respondents) to 20 
(12.7% of the sample). About 75% of the participants withdrew by the 10th round. 
Approximately 8% of the sample lost all 10 tickets, and about 31% stopped at round nine 
and thus, were left with just one raffle ticket. The remaining 25% continued the task 
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incurring the monetary penalty, with approximately 18% (of the total sample) incurring a 
penalty over $5. 
Final Materials and Development of Measures
For anonymity purposes, each participant selected a unique four-digit number that 
he or she wrote on all study instruments (see Appendix C). When the respondents handed 
back their questionnaires, the researchers made sure that all surveys had the matching 
identification numbers. The respondents filled out the materials in the following order: 
(1) prior to arriving to the lab, the respondents signed an informed consent form and 
completed the demographics questionnaire, personal network questionnaire, network 
influence instrument, and face scale; (2) after receiving the experimental instructions, the 
respondents signed another informed consent form and completed pre-task questionnaires 
including the manipulation check and luck scale; (3) after finishing the experimental task, 
the participants completed a series of post-task questionnaires, which included an 
outcome narrative, an entrapment scale, and face scale (identical to the one they 
completed prior to participating in the research study); and (4) after the respondents 
turned in their post-task questionnaires they read a debriefing form and received 
explanations about the study from the researcher. Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval was received to conduct this study. The IRB approval letter can be seen in 
Appendix A. The discussion of measures used in the study (presented below) follows the 
order in which each instrument was administered. Table 3 summarizes reliability 
coefficients (Cronbach’s α) for the scales used in this study.
Informed consent form. The informed consent form assured the respondents of the 
confidentiality of their performance, informed them that there were no long-term effects 
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associated with this research, and explained that they were free to terminate the session at 
any time without penalty (see Appendix D). In other words, if a participant chose to 
withdraw from the task, he or she would still receive extra credit for participation. The 
respondents were asked to sign the form twice. The first time, the participants received 
the form along with other questionnaires when they signed up for the study. They were 
asked to bring the signed form and completed questionnaires to the lab on the day of their 
participation in the study. The second time, the participants were given the form and 
asked to sign it after they received experimental task instructions. 
Demographic  questionnaire. The demographics questionnaire contained 
questions regarding participant gender, age, employment status, student status and 
standing, and race (Appendix E). 
Personal networks questionnaire. Prior to arriving at the lab, the participants were 
asked to complete a personal networks questionnaire (see Appendix F). The questionnaire 
used items developed by McAllister and Fischer (1978). The questionnaire included a 
total of 11 items. Items 1 through 8 covered various aspects of an individual’s life. 
Examples of questions included in the instrument are “Who would care for your home if 
you were to go out of town?”; “With whom do you talk about school or work 
decisions?”; “With whom do you engage in social activities?”; and “From whom would 
or could you borrow a large sum of money?” Descriptive statistics for these questions are 
summarized in Table 2. Item 9 asked respondents to provide the number of all adult 
members in their household. As the respondents identified members of various networks, 
they were asked to indicate either the name of the network member or the relationship of 
the person to the participant (e.g., my father). The questionnaire allowed the respondents 
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to nominate up to 15 network members for each of the questions. However, in case there 
was anyone else important to them that they would have liked to nominate, item 10 
offered them an opportunity to list those people. The final question asked the respondents 
to count the total number of people they named on all of the lists and asked them not to 
count a person multiple times. However, only 79% of the sample provided answers to this 
question, reporting 15 people as an average number of network members (M = 14.64, SD
= 6.69 and median = 14). The number of members in the network ranged from 1 to 38. 
Because about 20% of the respondents failed to indicate the total number of people 
nominated in their networks, a new variable NETWORK was created in which a total 
number of people nominated in the network was calculated such that every person 
nominated, even if they were nominated more than once, were counted (Massett, 1999). 
The range of the network size for this new variable was 78, with minimum of 9 and 
maximum of 87 people and with the mean of 39.94 (M = 39.94, SD = 15.18, median = 
39). In addition, for analysis purposes the NETWORK variable was dichotomized, with 
the network size between 1 and 39.9 considered as small and network size between 40 
to100 was considered large. This variable was called NETSIZE.
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Table 2
Network Questionnaire: Summary of Descriptive Statistics for Total Number of People 
Nominated in the Networks for Items 1 through 8
Question 




Who would care for your 
home if you were to go out 
of town?
4.46 2.90 4.00
With whom do you talk 
about school or work 
decisions?
4.75 2.41 5.00
Who, if anyone, has helped 
with household tasks in the 
last three months?
2.85 1.84 3.00
With whom do you engage in 
social activities (e.g., going 
to a movie, having dinner)?
6.70 3.63 6.00
Whom do you talk with 
about your interests or 
hobbies?
5.39 3.12 5.00
With whom do you talk 
about personal worries?
4.36 2.43 4.00
Whose advice do you 
consider in making important 
decisions?
3.87 1.98 4.00
From whom would or could 
you borrow a large sum of 
money?
2.60 2.00 1.36
Because closeness is an important predictor of strong ties, three items were added 
to the questionnaire (Marsden & Campbell, 1984). Two of these questions, “Please 
indicate how well do you know each of the people you mentioned?” and “How close do 
you feel to the person?”, were used by Massett (1999). Responses to these questions were 
not used in the final analysis; instead, the influence scale (see section below) was used to 
measure strength of the relationships within the network. The third question, used by 
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Marsden and Campbell (1984), read, “How would you characterize this person?” In other 
words, the respondents were asked to indicate whether each person named was a relative, 
an acquaintance, a good friend, or a very close friend. Overall, the respondents nominated 
mostly their close friends (M = 18.01, SD = 10.09, median = 17) and relatives (M = 
16.75, SD = 7.85, median = 16) as members of their networks. The friends category (M = 
2.76, SD = 3.58, median = 1) received just a few nominations, and almost no one 
nominated acquaintances (M = .71, SD = 1.57, median = 0) as part of their network.
Influence scale. In addition to the personal network questionnaire, an influence 
scale was also administered. The scale was developed to measure how close the 
participants were to the members of their network by asking them how much influence 
people nominated in their network have on the respondent’s life. This 12-item instrument 
used a 7-point Likert scale in which 1 indicated “no influence” and 7 indicated “strong 
influence.” The respondents were asked to indicate how much influence people 
nominated in the networks would have on their job choice, education choice, social life, 
personal life decisions, social habits, outward appearance, interests and hobbies, 
neighborhood choice, ways to resolve conflict, political position, and decision to undergo 
a serious medical procedure. Reliability analysis indicated that the scale had strong 








Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on a type of 
job you might choose (e.g., 
type of company, position)?
4.83 1.36 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 
decision to pursue education 
beyond college?
5.08 1.57 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 
social life (e.g., choice of 
friends)?
5.23 1.41 6.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on personal 
development (e.g., books you 
read, music you listen to)?
4.61 1.52 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 
personal life decisions (e.g., 
whom to date, sex conduct)?
4.78 1.58 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 
social habits (smoking, 
alcohol consumption)?
4.85 1.63 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 







Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 
interests and hobbies?
4.27 1.48 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 
neighborhood choice?
4.26 1.75 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on ways you 
choose to resolve conflict?
4.49 1.58 5.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on political 
position you might take (e.g., 
support a candidate, party, 
voting behavior)?
3.69 1.84 4.00
Overall how much influence 
do people you listed in Q1 
through 10 have on your 
decision to undergo a serious 
medical procedure (e.g., 
surgery)?
4.93 1.78 5.00
According to Levine (2005), in communication research confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) is preferred to exploratory factor analysis (EFA) because in comparison 
to exploratory factor analysis, “CFA provides stronger evidence for dimensionality than 
EFA because EFA can under-factor correlated constructs and because model fit is 
typically tested with CFA” (p. 337).  Therefore, throughout this research CFA was used 
to confirm scales employed by the study.  CFAs were performed using principal 
components extraction and varimax rotation. To this end, confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) was used to confirm a composite measure of influence that people nominated in 
the networks have on the participants’ lives (INFLUENC). This initial factor analysis 
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yielded three factors. However, loadings for the two of the factors were weak. To create a 
factor score, the items were forced into one factor. The resulting factor score was used in 
analyses discussed in the chapter 3, Results. 
The overall combined network size (NETWORK) was then multiplied by the 
overall influence measure (INFLUENC) to create an overall measure of the size and 
strength of the nominated network (NTWRKINF).
Face scale. The participants were asked to complete a face scale developed 
specifically for this experiment (see Appendix H). The scale was administered twice, 
once prior to arriving to the lab and the second time after the experiment. The scale was 
adapted from the instrument developed by Wilson and Kunkel (2000), who examined 
face threats in relationship issues using a series of scenarios with follow-up questions. 
For the purposes of this research, instead of scenarios, one-sentence items were created. 
The instrument was developed using four dimensions: self-positive face, other-positive 
face, self-negative face, and other-negative face. The 24-item instrument used a 7-point 
Likert scale in which 1 indicated “strongly disagree” and 7 indicated “strongly agree.”  
 Among items examining self-positive face were questions such as “I worry about 
how other people judge me when it comes to my physical appearance” and “In general, it 
is important to me that people do not think that I am nosy.” The reliability analysis of 
items measuring this dimension yielded strong reliability (Cronbach’s α = .73). In 
addition for the purposes of analysis, confirmatory factor analysis was used to create a 
composite measure of self-positive face (SELFPOS). The initial factor analysis yielded 
one factor with all of the loadings above .50. The resulting factor score was used in 
analyses using self-positive face discussed in the Results chapter. 
58
Examples of items looking at other-positive face included “Overall, when I talk to 
people, it is important to me that what I say does not make them look inadequate” and “I 
don’t like to get into arguments with people because it might make them look 
uncooperative.” The reliability analysis of items measuring this dimension yielded strong 
reliability (Cronbach’s α = .74). Review of the reliability of specific scale items 
suggested that one item, “When I talk to people, I want to make them feel comfortable 
discussing issues with me,” should be deleted. The new reliability analysis yielded 
stronger reliability (Cronbach’s α = .75). Confirmatory factor analysis was used to create 
a composite measure of other-positive face (OTHERPOS). The initial factor analysis 
yielded one factor with all of the loadings above .50. The resulting factor score was used 
in analyses discussed in the Results chapter. 
Items “In general, it is important to me that others feel that I’m an independent 
person” and “When my close friend does me a favor, I worry about the fact that I will be 
obliged to return the favor in the future” illustrate examples of questions measuring self-
negative face. Review of the reliability of specific scale items measuring this dimension 
suggested that one item, “Overall, I dislike when people give me an advice when I did not 
ask for it,” should be deleted, resulting in an improved reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s 
α = .71). Confirmatory factor analysis was used to create a composite measure of self-
negative face (SELFNEG). The initial factor analysis yielded two factors. However, 
loadings for one of the two factors were weak. To create a factor score, another 
confirmatory factor analysis was performed in which the items were forced into one 
factor. All of the new loadings were above .50. The resulting factor score was used in 
analyses discussed in the Results chapter. 
59
Finally, examples of items examining other-negative face included “When I ask 
my close friend for a favor, I worry that he/she might find it hard to say ‘no’” and “When 
I ask my close friend to do something for me, I worry that he/she might feel pushed into 
agreeing with what I want.” Original reliability analysis of items measuring this
dimension revealed that item “In general, I do not feel comfortable sharing my problems 
with other people because I’m afraid I’m going to overburden them” should be deleted, 
resulting in an improved reliability (Cronbach’s α = .96). Confirmatory factor analysis 
was used to confirm a composite measure of other-negative face (OTHENEG). The 
initial factor analysis yielded one factor solution with strong loadings, all above .70. The 
resulting factor score was used in analyses discussed in the Results chapter. 
 Overall, for the purposes of analysis, four new variables were created: SELFPOS, 
OTHERPOS, SELFNEG, and OTHERNEG.  Table 4 summarizes descriptive statistics 
for the scale items.
Table 4




When I ask my close friend 
for a favor, I worry that 
she/he might feel obliged to 
comply with my request
3.84 1.66 4.00
When I ask my close friend 
for a favor, I am concerned 
that he/she might feel like 
they have to say "yes" to my 
request
3.69 1.67 3.00
When I ask my close friend 
for a favor, I worry that 







When I ask my close friend 
to do something for me, I'm 
concerned that she/he might 
feel like she/she has to go 
along with my request
3.54 1.61 3.00
When I ask my close friend 
to do something for me, I 
worry that she/he might fee 
pushed into agreeing with 
what I want
3.30 1.60 3.00
In general, I do not feel 
comfortable sharing my 
problems with other people 
because I'm afraid I'm going 
to overburden them
3.00 1.79 3.00
In general, it is important to 
me that others feel that I'm an 
independent person
5.24 1.36 5.00
When I ask somebody for a 
favor, I worry about the fact 
that I will feel indebted to the 
person
3.49 1.65 3.00
In general it is important to 
me to be self-sufficient 
because I do not like owing 
anything to other people
5.13 1.53 5.00
In general it is important to 
me that people in my life 
realize that I'm capable of 
making decisions myself
5.73 1.17 6.00
When my close friend does 
me a favor, I worry about the 
fact that I will be obliged to 
return the favor in the future
2.98 1.59 2.98
Overall, I dislike when 
people give me an advice 






Overall, when I talk to 
people, it is important to me 
that what I say does not make 
them look inadequate
4.71 1.41 5.00
In general, when I give 
advice to a person, it is 
important to me that she/he 
does not feel like I'm 
implying that she/he has 
difficulty handling the 
situation
4.83 1.41 5.00
Overall, when I give an 
advice to my friend, it is 
important to me that my 
friend does not feel like I'm 
implying that she/he does not 
understand the consequences 
of his/her actions
4.66 1.50 5.00
In general, when my friend 
inadvertently breaks promise, 
I don't want him/her to feel 
like I think that she/he is 
person who never honors 
his/her commitments
4.17 1.47 4.00
I do not like to get into 
arguments with people 
because it might make them 
look uncooperative
3.18 1.37 3.00
When I talk to people, I want 
to make them feel 
comfortable discussing issues 
with me
6.04 1.08 6.00
I worry about how other 
people judge me when it 
comes to my physical 
appearance
4.76 1.59 5.00







In general, when a group of 
colleagues is having a 
conversation, I like to be 
included in the conversation
5.66 1.20 6.00
In general, it is important to 
me that people do not think 
that I am nosy
4.86 1.50 5.00
In general, it is important to 
me to make a positive 
impression on people
6.29 .80 6.00
In general, it is important to 
me that people think that I am 
smart and capable
6.29 .89 6.00
Manipulation check. Manipulations were checked through questions in the 
information packet given to the participants prior to performing the experimental task. 
After reading the materials, the participants were asked questions to evaluate their 
understanding of the instructions (see Appendix K). The questionnaire included such 
items as “Will you be evaluated?” (1 = yes, 2 = no); “How closely do you believe your 
actions will be examined?” (1 = not at all closely to 7 = very closely); “How much will 
you be required to justify your outcomes and strategy?” (1 = not at all required to 7 = 
very much required); “To receive 20 extra raffle tickets at the end of the task, how many 
red balls do you have to draw?” (“please circle the appropriate answer: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5”);  
“What is the maximum number of drawing rounds you can conduct?” (“please circle the 
appropriate answer: 3, 7, 10, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, or as many as I want”); “If you receive 
two negative points, what will be the monetary penalty you will incur?” (“please circle the 
appropriate answer: $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10”), and only for the constituency 
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condition “If you receive three negative points, what will be the monetary penalty 
incurred by each group member?” (“please circle the appropriate answer: 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10”).
Two of the experimental manipulations, reporting Yes/No and constituency 
Yes/No, were checked using an independent-samples t-test. The t-test was performed on 
items designed to show meaningful differences based on the assigned conditions. 
Question one (“Will you be evaluated?”) contrasted the difference between the conditions 
in which the participants had to report in person to either constituency or the researcher 
(M = 1.07, SD = .26) with the conditions with no reporting (M = 1.38, SD = .49). Results 
indicated a significant difference between these two conditions t(231) = 6.17, p < .01. In 
addition, significant differences were also observed in reporting (M = 4.96, SD = 1.43) 
versus no reporting (M = 4.28, SD = 1.75) conditions on question 2, “How closely do you 
believe your actions will be examined?” (t[233] = 3.25, p < .01). Furthermore, the results 
showed that those participants in the no reporting conditions (M = 3.36, SD = 1.78) 
indicated that they believed that they would not have to justify their outcomes and 
strategy (question 3) in comparison to those in reporting conditions (M = 4.90, SD = 
1.48; t[232] = 7.14, p < .01). For the constituency (M = 1.05, SD = .22) versus no 
constituency conditions (M = 1.39, SD = .49), only one item (“Will you be evaluated?”) 
was hypothesized to show significant differences between the conditions. The null 
hypothesis was rejected (t[231] = 6.70, p < .01), such that those participants in the 
constituency conditions knew that they would be evaluated. 
The majority (94.40%) of the individuals assigned to the constituency/reporting 
condition accurately reported that they would be evaluated by the group members. All 
(100%) individuals assigned to the no constituency/reporting condition correctly 
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indicated that they would be evaluated by the researcher. In addition, 98.70% of the 
participants correctly indicated that they would need to draw five red balls to receive 20 
extra raffle tickets. Approximately 94% of the respondents reported that they could 
conduct a maximum of 20 rounds of drawing, as they were instructed. Furthermore, 83% 
of the participants accurately pointed out that if they were to lose 12 raffle tickets, they 
would incur a $2 monetary penalty. The results also suggested that the majority of the 
participants (89.30%) understood that if, on the first four tries, they were to draw only 
white balls, they would be left with 6 raffle tickets. The data indicated that 81.60% of the 
individuals assigned to the constituency conditions understood that if they were to lose 13 
raffle tickets, each group member would incur a $3 monetary penalty.
Luck scale and scenarios. Because the participants were told that the experiment 
was about luck, to make the situation more believable the participants were asked to fill 
out a number of luck scales and scenarios borrowed from studies investigating luck 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Wohl & Enzle, 2002a). The items from these studies were 
placed into one instrument called “Luck Questionnaire” (see Appendix L). Although luck 
was not part of the experimental manipulation, reliability of the scales was assessed. 
The first scale included in the Luck Questionnaire was called Belief in Good Luck 
(BIGL), a 12-item-scale developed by Darke and Freedman (1997a). This scale was 
designed to measure the belief that luck is a stable and personal trait. The questionnaire 
consisted of 6-point Likert scale items ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly 
disagree). For example, items 1, 4, and 10 respectively asked, “Luck plays an important 
part in everyone’s life,” “I believe in luck” and “Even the things in life I can’t control 
tend to go my way because I’m lucky.” Darke and Freedman reported strong reliability 
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(Cronbach’s α = .85). The reliability analysis using data from the current research study 
also yielded good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .78). The review of the scale items 
suggested that item 7, “It’s a mistake to base any decisions on how lucky you feel,” and 
item 12, “Luck is nothing more than random chance,” should be deleted. The reliability 
analysis was conducted without items 7 and 12 resulting in higher reliability (Cronbach’s 
α  = .88).
To make the case that this was a study about luck more convincing, three short 
scenarios about luck were also included in the experimental materials. The scenarios 
were borrowed from Darke and Freedman (1997a). Originally, the scenarios were used to 
establish the external validity of the BIGL scale. For example, scenario number 1 read, 
“If you were walking down a street that was full of people and someone dropped a $20 
bill in the middle of the crowd, do you feel that you would: (1) most certainly find it; (2) 
probably find it; (3) have a slightly better than even chance of finding it; (4) have no 
feeling one way or the other; (5) have a slightly better than even chance of not finding it; 
(6) probably not find it; (7) most certainly not find it.” Reliability analysis of these 
scenarios, however, showed that they were not reliable (Cronbach’s α = .26).
In addition to the BIGL scale and luck scenarios, a questionnaire developed by 
Wohl and Enzle (2002a) was adopted and slightly modified for this study. This 
questionnaire consisted of four 7-point scale items, which included such items as “When 
it comes to games of chance (gamble), usually my chances of winning are” (1 = very bad 
to 7 = very good); “How often do you play games of chance (gamble)?” (1 = never to 7 = 
more than once a week); “To what extent do you feel that luck is a quality of the person 
or a quality of the situation?” (1 = quality of situation to 7 = quality of the person), and 
66
“If you were to say that you were ‘lucky’ in terms of some event, to what extent do you 
mean that you a lucky type of person or that a lucky thing happened to you?” (1 = A 
lucky thing happened to me and 7 = I am a lucky type of person). These items were 
poorly interrelated (Cronbach’s α = .50). 
Low reliabilities for the scenarios and Wohl and Enzle’s (2002a) questionnaires 
had no implications for the results of the study, because luck was not the focus of this 
research and there were no research hypotheses associated with luck. However, because 
the BIGL scale did have strong reliability, for exploratory research purposes, a luck 
factor score was computed on that scale (LUCKSCAL) using confirmatory factor 
analysis. First, the analysis yielded two components. However, only two items in the 
second factor had a loading above .50, so another principal component analysis was 
performed forcing items to load as one factor. All of the new loadings were above .50, 
and the factor score from this analysis was used for analyses performed for the current 
research.  Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics for the BIGL scale items.
Table 5




Luck plays an important part 
in everyone's life
4.30 1.55 4.00
Some people are consistently 
lucky, and others are unlucky
4.30 1.55 4.00
I consider myself to be a 
lucky person
3.94 1.40 4.00
I believe in luck 4.34 1.54 5.00
I often feel like it's my lucky 
day
3.45 1.41 3.00





It's a mistake to base any 
decision on how lucky you 
feel
4.67 1.54 5.00
Luck works in my favor 3.58 1.25 4.00
I don't mind leaving things to 
chance because I'm a lucky 
person
2.77 1.23 3.00
Even the things in life I can't 
control tend to go my way 
because I'm lucky
3.11 1.27 3.00
There is such a thing as luck 
that favors some people, but 
not others
3.78 1.60 4.00
Luck is nothing more than a 
random chance
4.76 1.62 5.00
Outcome narrative. This instrument asked participants to summarize the results of 
the task and explain the strategy that he or she chose to pursue while performing the 
drawing (see Appendix M). The respondents were first asked, “What was the color of the 
ball you drew?” Then, they were asked, “What did you choose to do next?” to which they 
could respond that they chose to withdraw from the task or continue drawing. If the 
respondents chose to continue to draw, they were asked in an open-ended question to 
explain why they made this decision. Participants were asked the same set of questions 
for each round of drawing. At the end of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to 
identify some specific statements that they might used to explain what happened during 
the drawing task. These data were collected to explore whether individuals are likely to 
use social accounts to explain their behavior. Coding procedures and analysis of the 
open-ended questions will be discussed in the Results chapter.
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Entrapment bias scale. The scale measuring cognitive processes contributing to 
conflict escalation was constructed specifically for this study. It was administered after 
the participants completed the experimental task (See Appendix N). The instrument used 
a 7-point Likert scale in which 1 indicated “strongly disagree” and 7 indicated “strongly 
agree.” The questionnaire was administered to participants in all conditions. The 
instrument consisted of 20 items for the constituency conditions and no 
constituency/reporting condition and 18 items for the control condition. For the control 
condition, two items were omitted because they were not applicable to the respondents.
The scale was developed using four factors: internal self-justification, external 
self-justification, and other- and self-positive face goals. The internal self-justification 
measured the need to appear to be a rational decision maker (Aronson, 1968). This 
portion of the scale consisted of six items (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 16) including “I feel that 
my strategy choice was rational,” “I made my decision to continue drawing 
unemotionally,” “I weighted potential risks and gains carefully prior to making each 
round of drawing,” “I calculated my odds prior to each drawing,” “I felt that my 
investment in the process will be justified by the eventual pay off,” and “It was important 
for me to do well on this particular task.” Review of the reliability coefficients 
(Cronbach’s α = .60) for this dimension revealed that one item, “I made my decision to 
continue (or stop) drawing unemotionally,” should be omitted, which improved the 
reliability for this factor (Cronbach’s α = .67). Confirmatory factor analysis was used to 
create a composite measure of internal self-justification (INTRNJS). The initial factor 
analysis yielded one factor with all factor loadings above .50.
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The external self-justification measured the desire to appear rational to others and 
to demonstrate to them that persisting in a failing course of action was a correct decision 
in the long term (Staw, 1976). The external self-justification items (i.e., 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
included five questions, among them were such items as “In general, it was important to 
me that the group members see me as a rational person” and “I wanted the other group 
members to understand the logic used in choosing my course of action.” Items 
administered to the participants in the no constituency condition were adapted for 
relevancy. For example, “I wanted my group members to feel that my choices were well-
calculated” was adapted to read “If I were to perform this task in a group in which I was a 
group representative, I would want the group members to feel that my choices were well-
calculated.” To improve reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s α = .79) on this dimension, 
two items, “Under the circumstances, I believe that the course I pursued had the best 
potential for earning the most extra raffle tickets for my group members” and “I felt it 
was important to perform well inn this task for my group members,” were omitted 
resulting in stronger reliability score (Cronbach’s α = .83). Confirmatory factor analysis 
was used to create a composite measure of external self-justification (EXTRNJS). The 
initial factor analysis yielded one factor with strong factor loadings, all of them above 
.50. 
In addition, the discussion in the preceding sections regarding face argues that 
participants who have expansive personal networks are likely to be concerned with 
protecting group image (other-positive face). Five items (i.e., 11, 12, 13, 14, 15) were 
developed to measure other-positive face goals. Sample items included “I felt it was 
important to perform well in this task for my group members” and “I was concerned for 
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my group’s needs.” Again, items were adapted to be applicable to all conditions. For 
example, the item “I wanted to help my group” was administered to the participants in 
constituency present conditions; for the no constituency conditions the item was adapted 
to read, “When working in a team, I want to help my group.” Reliability analysis resulted 
in strong reliability (Cronbach’s α = .87), but also suggested that item 15, “I was worried 
what the group members will think about me after the task was completed,” should be 
removed, which resulted in even greater reliability (Cronbach’s α = .91). Confirmatory 
factor analysis was used to create a composite measure of other-positive face goals 
(OTHRPENT). The initial factor analysis yielded one factor with strong factor loadings, 
all of them above .50. 
Items measuring the self-positive face dimension (i.e., 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22) 
included “I was worried what [the researcher/group members] will think about me after 
the task was completed,” “It was important for me to do well on this task,” “I wanted to 
perform well to make a positive impression on [the researcher/group members],” “I don’t 
want my group members to be mad at me for loosing some of their raffle tickets and/or 
money,” “I think this was an unfair task” and “I didn’t want [the researcher/group 
members] to think that I’m unable to calculate the odds.” However, because the items 
were largely inapplicable to the control group—that is, by definition, this condition (no 
reporting/no constituency) did not include any threats to self-positive face—this 
condition was excluded from the analysis for the control group. Reliability analysis on 
items for conditions I, II, and III revealed that reliability of the scale for this dimension 
could be improved (Cronbach’s α = .67) if items 19, 21 and 22 were omitted (Cronbach’s 
α = .80). Confirmatory factor analysis was used to create a composite measure of self-
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positive face goals (SELFPENT). The initial factor analysis yielded one factor with 
strong factor loadings, all of them above .50. 
Overall, to measure how much internal and external self-justification and other-
and self-positive face goals contributed to the entrapment bias and to distinguish which of 
the factors contributed to the entrapment, four new variables were created: INTRNJS 
(measure for internal justification); EXTRNJS (measure for external justification); 
OTHRPENT (measure for other positive face), and SELFPENT (measure for own 
positive face). Again, the self-positive face factor score (SELFPNET) did not include 
COND IV.  Tables 6 through 9 summarize descriptive statistics for the entrapment bias 
scale items by each condition.
Table 6 




I feel that my strategy was 
rational
5.38 1.60 6.00
I made my decision to 
continue (or stop) drawing 
unemotionally
5.05 1.89 6.00
I weighed potential risks and 
gains carefully prior to making 
each round of drawing
3.87 1.96 4.00
I calculated my odds prior to 
each drawing
2.91 1.87 3.00
I felt that my investments in 
the process will be justified by 
the eventual pay off
3.96 1.90 4.00
Under the circumstances, I 
believe that the course I 
pursued had the best potential 
for earning most extra raffle 






I wanted the other group 
members to understand the 
logic used in choosing my 
course of action
4.91 1.58 5.00
I wanted my group members 
to feel that my choices were 
well-calculated
4.80 1.48 5.00
In general, it was important to 
me that the group members see 
me as a rational person
4.65 1.76 5.00
I felt it was important to 
perform well in this task for 
my group members
4.94 1.56 5.00
I was concerned for my 
group’s needs
4.75 1.52 5.00
I wanted to help my group 5.40 1.24 5.00
I did not want to let my group 
down
5.24 1.42 5.00
When performing the task it 
was important to me to 
consider the consequences my 
behavior might have for my 
group
5.04 1.52 5.00
I was worried what the group 
members will think about me 
after the task was completed
3.73 1.60 4.00
It was important for me to do 
well on this task
4.44 1.60 4.00
I wanted to perform well to 
make a positive impression on 
my group members
4.27 1.72 4.00
I don’t want my group 
members to be mad at me for 
loosing some of their raffle 
tickets and/or money
5.35 1.51 5.00
I think this was an unfair task 3.93 1.84 4.00
I didn’t want my group 
members to think that I’m 






I don’t think I understood the 
instructions well
3.00 1.89 3.00
I believe that any person in my 
position would have behaved 
the same way I did
4.89 2.00 5.00
Table 7




I feel that my strategy was 
rational
5.55 1.49 6.00
I made my decision to 
continue (or stop) drawing 
unemotionally
5.40 1.45 6.00
I weighed potential risks and 
gains carefully prior to making 
each round of drawing
4.43 2.04 5.00
I calculated my odds prior to 
each drawing
3.29 1.95 3.00
I felt that my investments in 
the process will be justified by 
the eventual pay off
4.48 1.72 4.00
Under the circumstances, I 
believe that the course I 
pursued had the best potential 
for earning most extra raffle 
tickets for my group members
4.28 1.79 4.00
I wanted the other group 
members to understand the 
logic used in choosing my 
course of action
5.02 1.63 5.00
I wanted my group members 
to feel that my choices were 
well-calculated
4.83 1.71 5.00
In general, it was important to 
me that the group members see 






I felt it was important to 
perform well in this task for 
my group members
5.09 1.48 5.00
I was concerned for my 
group’s needs
4.86 1.56 5.00
I wanted to help my group 5.45 1.38 6.00
I did not want to let my group 
down
5.55 1.37 6.00
When performing the task it 
was important to me to 
consider the consequences my 
behavior might have for my 
group
5.21 1.39 5.00
I was worried what the group 
members will think about me 
after the task was completed
4.29 1.68 4.00
It was important for me to do 
well on this task
4.57 1.54 5.00
I wanted to perform well to 
make a positive impression on 
my group members
4.33 1.46 4.00
I don’t want my group 
members to be mad at me for 
loosing some of their raffle 
tickets and/or money
5.07 1.58 5.00
I think this was an unfair task 4.14 1.89 4.00
I didn’t want my group 
members to think that I’m 
unable to calculate the odds
4.03 1.73 4.00
I don’t think I understood the 
instructions well
2.60 1.85 2.00
I believe that any person in my 
position would have behaved 








I feel that my strategy was 
rational
5.13 1.63 5.00
I made my decision to 
continue (or stop) drawing 
unemotionally
4.95 1.89 5.00
I weighed potential risks and 
gains carefully prior to making 
each round of drawing
4.36 1.93 5.00
I calculated my odds prior to 
each drawing
3.32 1.98 3.00
I felt that my investments in 
the process will be justified by 
the eventual pay off
4.13 1.61 4.00
Under the circumstances, I 
believe that the course I 
pursued had the best potential 
for earning most extra raffle 
ticket
3.63 1.90 4.00
I wanted the researcher to 
understand the logic used in 
choosing my course of action
3.89 1.74 4.00
I wanted the researcher to feel 
that my choices were well-
calculated
3.91 1.71 4.00
In general, it was important to 
me that the researcher sees me 
as a rational person
3.75 1.70 4.00
In general, when performing in 
a group/team environment, it 
is important to me to perform 
well for my group members
6.04 0.97 6.00
When working in a team, I’m 
concerned for my group’s 
needs
5.95 .90 6.00
When working in a team, I 
want to help my group
6.11 1.06 6.00
When working in a group, I do 






When working in a group, it is 
important to me to consider 
the consequences my behavior 
might have for my group
6.20 .92 6.00
When working in a group, I 
worry what the group 
members will think about me 
after the project is completed
5.25 1.47 6.00
It was important for me to do 
well on this particular task
4.11 1.65 4.00
I wanted to perform well to 
make a positive impression on 
the researcher
3.57 1.72 4.00
I don’t want the researcher to 
think less of me for losing 
raffle tickets and/or money
3.34 1.67 3.00
I think this was an unfair task 3.41 1.91 3.00
I didn’t want the researcher to 
think that I’m unable to 
calculate the odds
3.34 1.62 3.00
I don’t think I understood the 
instructions well
2.14 1.45 2.00
I believe that any person in my 
position would have behaved 
the same way I did
4.20 1.35 4.00
Table  9




I feel that my strategy was 
rational
5.60 1.66 6.00
I made my decision to 







I weighed potential risks and 
gains carefully prior to making 
each round of drawing
4.15 2.29 5.00
I calculated my odds prior to 
each drawing
2.93 1.91 2.00
I felt that my investments in 
the process will be justified by 
the eventual pay off
3.82 1.70 4.00
Under the circumstances, I 
believe that the course I 
pursued had the best potential 
for earning most extra raffle 
ticket
4.00 1.77 4.00
In general, when I do 
something it is important to 
me that others understand the 
logic I used in choosing my 
course of action.
4.47 1.73 4.00
If I were to perform this task 
in a group in which I was a 
group representative, I would 
want the group members to 
feel that my choices were 
well-calculated.
5.63 1.21 6.00
In general, when working in 
groups, it is important to me 
that group members see me as
a rational person
5.88 1.04 6.00
In general, when performing in 
a group/team environment, it 
is important to me to perform 
well for my group members
6.13 0.89 6.00
When working in a team, I’m 
concerned for my group’s 
needs
5.95 1.05 6.00
When working in a team, I 
want to help my group
6.27 0.86 6.00
When working in a group, I do 






When working in a group, it is 
important to me to consider 
the consequences my behavior 
might have for my group
6.08 0.94 6.00
When working in a group, I 
worry what the group 
members will think about me 
after the project is completed
4.43 1.57 5.00
It was important for me to do 
well on this particular task
3.90 1.89 4.00
When working in a group, it is 
important to me to perform 
well to make a positive 
impression on my team 
members
5.72 1.20 6.00
I think this was an unfair task 3.48 1.89 4.00
I don’t think I understood the 
instructions well
2.47 1.64 2.00
I believe that any person in my 
position would have behaved 

















Self-positive face (only conditions I, 




This chapter presents the results of the study. This research explores a number of 
factors affecting entrapment bias.  The discussion below presents the findings for each of 
the hypotheses and research question.
Data Preparation
A number of transformations were performed in attempts to correct skewness in 
the data while maintaining variance homogeneity. However, no transformation was found 
that would eliminate skewness.
Overall, most variables had no or less than three missing values. Missing values 
were a result of respondents leaving the items blank, apparently because they either 
refused to or forgot to answer the questions.

























Constituency (present or 
not)
0.02
Reporting (yes or no) 0.13* 0.01
Overall face concern: 
Other negative face
-0.01 0.01 0.06
Overall face concern: 
Self negative face
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.47**
Overall face concern: 
Other positive face scale
-0.10 0.10 -0.12 0.26** 0.33** .
Overall face concern: 
Self positive face scale
0.07 0.02 0.04 0.15* 0.30** 0.34**
Network size multiplied 
by strength of network 
influence
-0.03 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.13
Luck 0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.07 0.08 0.13* 0.02
Entrapment scale: 
Internal justification
-0.23** 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05
Entrapment scale: 
External justification
-0.23** 0.09 -0.30** 0.10 0.10 0.20** 0.16*
Entrapment scale:  
Other Positive Face
-0.20** -0.41** -0.05 0.07 0.04 0.13* 0.25**
Entrapment scale:  Self 
positive face 
(Conditions 1,2 and 3)











Entrapment scale:  








Entrapment scale:  Other 
Positive Face
0.13 0.09 0.31** 0.42**
Entrapment scale:  Self 
positive face 
(Conditions 1,2 and 3)
0.15* 0.15* 0.41** 0.60** 0.33**
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 12
Independent Variables:  Factor Score Descriptive Statistics for Condition I
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Total Number of Draws 10.52 4.72
Overall face concern: Other 
negative face 
0.15 1.04
Overall face concern: Self 
negative face scale
-0.01 1.00
Overall face concern: Other 
positive face scale
-0.01 1.00
Overall face concern: Self 
positive face scale
-0.07 1.04
Network size multiplied by 
strength of network influence
5.80 35.89
Luck -0.03 0.86
Entrapment scale: Internal 
justification 
-0.09 0.97
Entrapment scale: External 
justification
.019 1.00
Entrapment scale: Other 
positive face 
-0.49 1.06





Independent Variables:  Factor Score Descriptive Statistics for Condition II
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Total Number of Draws 10.41 5.13
Overall face concern: Other 
negative face 
-0.02 0.98
Overall face concern: Self 
negative face scale
0.03 1.04
Overall face concern: Other 
positive face scale
-0.23 0.91
Overall face concern: Self 
positive face scale
0.14 0.99
Network size multiplied by 
strength of network influence
-0.39 40.79
Luck -0.03 1.10
Entrapment scale: Internal 
justification 
0.00 0.94
Entrapment scale: External 
justification
-0.63 1.05
Entrapment scale: Other 
positive face 
0.38 0.68





Independent Variables:  Factor Score Descriptive Statistics for Condition III
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Total Number of Draws 10.52 4.72
Overall face concern: Other 
negative face 
0.15 1.04
Overall face concern: Self 
negative face scale
-0.01 1.00
Overall face concern: Other 
positive face scale
-0.01 1.00
Overall face concern: Self 
positive face scale
-0.07 1.04
Network size multiplied by 
strength of network influence
5.80 35.89
Luck -0.03 0.86
Entrapment scale: Internal 
justification 
-0.09 0.97
Entrapment scale: External 
justification
.019 1.00
Entrapment scale: Other 
positive face 
-0.49 1.06





Independent Variables:  Factor Score Descriptive Statistics for Condition IV
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Total Number of Draws 9.03 5.49
Overall face concern: Other 
negative face 
-0.01 0.99
Overall face concern: Self 
negative face scale
-0.07 1.07
Overall face concern: Other 
positive face scale
1.03 1.16
Overall face concern: Self 
positive face scale
-0.13 1.07
Network size multiplied by 
strength of network influence
1.52 42.61
Luck -0.11 1.08
Entrapment scale: Internal 
justification 
-0.12 1.06
Entrapment scale: External 
justification
0.41 0.72




Test of the Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (H1) posited that entrapment will be more likely when a 
constituency is present then when it is not present. To test this hypothesis, a one-way 
ANOVA was performed, with constituency (present versus not present) as the 
independent variable, and entrapment—measured by the number of balls drawn— as the 
dependent variable. Presence of constituency did not affect entrapment, F(1, 235) = .07, 
n.s. Therefore, H1 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a) posited that internal and external justification would be 
greater when respondents are required to report their behavior. Two ANOVAs were 
performed with reporting conditions dichotomized (i.e., reporting yes or no) as the 
independent variable, and internal and external justification factor scores, derived from 
the entrapment scale, as the dependent variables. The results indicated no significant 
effect for internal self-justification, F(1, 228) = .45, n.s. However, a significant main 
effect was found for external self-justification, F(1, 228) = 22.11, p < .01. That is, 
although requiring an individual to report his or her behavior had no effect on the need to 
internally self-justify behavior, the requirement to report did affect individuals’ need to
appear rational to others. Therefore, H2a was partially supported.
Hypothesis 2 (H2b) stated that when individuals have to report their behavior, 
their need for internal and external self-justifications will lead to greater entrapment. To 
test this hypothesis, only cases in which reporting was required were selected (n = 116). 
A regression analysis was performed with internal and external self-justification factor 
scores derived from the entrapment scale serving as independent variables, and the total 
number of draws—or entrapment—as the dependent variable. The results showed that the 
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overall analysis was significant, F(2, 110) = 7.30, p < .01. However, consistent with the 
finding presented above, only the effect of internal justification was significant, with a 
negative relationship to entrapment, t(110) = 3.47, ß = -1.94, p < .01. That is, among the 
individuals who had to report their behavior, the greater need for internal self-
justification led to lower levels of entrapment. The external justification had no effect on 
entrapment, t(110) = .46, n.s. Therefore, H2b was partially supported.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) posited that the presence of constituency would lead to greater 
internal and external justification. Two ANOVAs were performed with constituency 
dichotomized (i.e., present or not) as the independent variable, and internal and external 
justification as the dependent variables. The results demonstrated no significant main 
effects for either test (internal justification: F[1, 228] = .83, n.s.; external justification: 
F[1, 228] = 1.83, n.s.). Therefore, H3 was not supported.
Hypothesis 4 (H4) stated that individuals with greater self- and other-positive face 
concerns would be more likely to become entrapped. Prior to testing this hypothesis, a 
regression analysis was performed using self- and other-positive and self- and other-
negative face scale scores derived from the face scale instrument administered prior to 
the experimental task as the independent variable and total number of draws as the 
dependent variable. The regression analysis was performed to test if general concern for 
face affects entrapment. The overall relationship was non-significant, F(4, 232) = 1.24, 
n.s. However, the results provided marginal support for the relationship between other 
positive face goals and entrapment, which approached significance, t(114) = 1.86, p = 
.06, β = -.71. That is, the results suggest that the greater the person’s concern for other’s 
positive face, the less likely the person is to become entrapped.
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Next, to test the hypothesis that individuals’ face-saving goals affect entrapment, 
two regression analyses were performed using self-positive and other-positive face goal 
(derived from the entrapment scale administered after participants completed the 
experimental task) as independent variables and the total number of draws as the 
dependent variable. It should be noted that the analysis for self-positive face was 
performed only on experimental conditions 1, 2, and 3. The control group (condition 4) 
was excluded from the analysis because the experimental design was such that 
individuals in this condition should not have experienced any threats to self-positive face. 
Because individuals in this condition should not have experienced any threats to self-
positive face, questions about self-positive face differed for this group and this analysis 
could not be run.
The results showed that other-positive face goals were negatively associated with 
entrapment, F(1, 228) = 9.20, p < .01; β = -1.03. This result is consistent with the finding 
reported above regarding individuals’ general other-positive face concerns and 
entrapment. That is, the results indicated that the individuals were less likely to get 
entrapped if they had significant concerns for other-positive face. However, self-positive 
face goals did not affect entrapment, F(1, 168) = .35, n.s. Therefore, H4 was partially 
supported.
Hypothesis 5 (H5) posited that concern for saving self- and other-positive face 
would be greater when the individuals have to report their behavior. To test this 
hypothesis, two ANOVAs were performed with reporting conditions dichotomized 
(yes/no) as the independent variable and self- and other-positive face factor scores for 
entrapment as dependent variables. In self-positive face analysis, only constituency 
90
present and reporting conditions (i.e., conditions 1, 2, and 3) were used, because, in the 
control condition, the participants should have not experienced any threats to self-positive 
face. The results revealed a reliable main effect across experimental conditions, F(1, 168) 
= 4.30, p < .05, such that concern for saving self-positive face was greater when 
individuals had to report their behavior. However, a similar two-way ANOVA with 
reporting conditions dichotomized (yes/no) as the independent variable and other-positive 
face as the dependent variable, using participants in all of the conditions, demonstrated 
no significant main effect, F(1, 228) = .53, n.s. Therefore, H5 was partially supported. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6) posited that overall other- and self-positive face concerns (as 
opposed to face concerns related to the experimental manipulation) would lead to greater 
need to justify one’s action in a situation that could lead to entrapment. To test this 
hypothesis, four separate regression analyses were performed with self- and other-
positive face, derived from the face scale instrument administered prior to the 
experimental task, as the independent variables and internal and external justification as 
dependent variables. The results indicated that face concerns did not affect internal 
justification (self-positive face: F[1, 226] = .48, n.s.; other-positive face F[1, 225] = .96, 
n.s.). However, the relationships between external self-justification and other- and self-
positive face were significant (other-positive face F[1, 225] = 9.08, p < .01; self-positive 
face F[1, 226] = 5.67, p<.05). Both, other- and self-positive face concerns had a positive 
effect on external justification, ß = .20 and ß = .16, respectively. More specifically, the 
greater concern one had for protecting either self- or other-positive face, the more 
important it was to the person to appear rational to others. Thus, H6 was partially 
supported.
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Hypothesis 7 (H7) stated that concerns for saving face would be greater when 
constituency was present. To test the hypothesis, a two-way ANOVA was performed 
with constituency dichotomized (i.e., present or not) as the independent variable and self-
positive face from the entrapment scale as the dependent variable. Once again, the control 
condition was excluded from the analysis. The results revealed a significant main effect 
across experimental conditions, F(1, 168) = 22.23, p < .01. A similar test with other-
positive face, derived from the entrapment scale, also yielded a significant main effect, 
F(1, 228) = 46.96, p < .01. That is, the presence of constituency led to greater self- and 
other-positive face concerns. Therefore, H7 was supported. 
Hypothesis 8 (H8) posited that individuals with more expansive and strong ties in 
their personal networks would be more concerned with their self-positive face. To test 
this hypothesis, first, a regression analysis was performed using network size multiplied 
by the influence score as the independent variable and self-positive face factor score 
(derived from the entrapment scale) as the dependent variable. Here, again, the control 
condition was excluded because the participants in this experimental condition should not 
have experienced any self-positive face threats. The results indicated that the size and the 
influence of the network members had a positive effect on self-positive face, F(1, 167) = 
4.02, p < .05; β = .003. That is, the greater the size and the stronger the influence of an 
individual’s network, the greater were his or her self-positive face concerns.
Next, a regression analysis was performed using network size multiplied by the 
influence score as the independent variable and other-positive face factor score (derived 
from the entrapment scale) as the dependent variable. This analysis included all cases. 
The results were marginally significant; the size and influence of an individual’s personal 
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network positively affected concern for others’ positive face F(1, 227) = 3.71, p = .055; β
= .003. That is, the greater the size of one’s network and the stronger its influence, the 
greater were this person’s concerns for other-positive face.
In addition, regression analyses were performed using the total combined number 
of people in the network as the independent variable and self- and other-positive face 
scores as respective dependent variables to test if the network size alone would affect 
face saving goals. The results indicated that the network size by itself had no effect on 
face saving goals (self-positive face t[168] = .31, n.s., and other-positive face t[228] = 
.93, n.s.). In other words, the size of the network alone did not affect face-saving goals, 
but size and influence of personal networks affected both self- and other-positive face 
concerns. Therefore, H8 was supported.
Hypothesis 9a (H9a) posited that, when participants have expansive personal 
networks, entrapment would be positively associated with protecting the constituency’s 
(other) positive face. To test this hypothesis, a series of regression analyses were 
performed. First, cases in which constituency was present were selected (n = 115). Then, 
only cases in which participants reported having large network size (over 40 people in the 
network) were selected from the constituency present conditions (n = 60). A regression 
analysis was performed using other-positive face derived from the entrapment scale as 
the independent variable and total number of draws as the dependent variable. The results 
indicate no overall significant relationship, F(1, 58) = 1.73, n.s., and no effect of other 
positive face goals, t(58)  = 1.31, n.s. Next, a regression analysis was performed using all 
cases (i.e., all four conditions) in which participants reported having large network sizes 
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(n = 110). Here, again, the results were nonsignificant, F(1, 107) = 1.60, n.s.; t(107) = 
1.26, n.s. 
To further investigate the relationship between other-positive face goals and 
entrapment, a two-step regression analysis was performed using network size multiplied 
by the influence score as the independent variable in the second step. For the purposes of 
this analysis, again, only cases with large personal networks were selected (n = 110). The 
results showed that the regression was a moderately good fit (R2 = .53), such that other-
positive face significantly affected entrapment (F[1, 111] = 6.20, p < .01), which supports 
findings reported above, but network size and influence of the network did not affect 
entrapment, F(1, 110) = .47, n.s. The effect of other-positive face goals was significant 
(t[112] = 2.46, β = -1.06, p < .01), such that the more concern for other-positive face the 
less likely an individual was to be entrapped, which is opposite than the relationship 
posited between other-positive face and entrapment. Overall, H9a was not supported.
To further examine the relationship between network size and influence and face, 
additional regression analyses were performed using network influence, network size (all 
members combined) and networks multiplied by influence as independent variables and 
overall face concerns (self- and other-positive and self- and other-negative) measured 
prior to participating in the experiment as dependent variables. The results indicated that 
network size, network influence, and interaction of size and influence affected only self-
positive face concerns. More specifically, the greater the influence of the network on an 
individual, the greater were his or her self-positive face concerns, F(1, 232) = 7.03, 
p < .01; ß = .17. The larger the size of an individual’s network, the greater were his or 
her self-positive face concerns, F(1, 232) = 3.61, p < .06; ß = .12. The greater the size of 
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the networks and the network’s influence, the greater were the individual’s self-positive 
face concerns, F(1, 232) = 3.76, p < .05; ß = .13.
Hypothesis 9b (H9b) posited that, in the presence of constituency, individuals 
with larger, strong-tie personal networks will be more prone to entrapment than the 
individuals with smaller, weak-tie networks. To test this hypothesis, only those cases in 
which constituency was present were selected. Then, a one-way ANOVA was performed, 
with network size (high vs. low) as the independent variable and entrapment, measure by 
the number of balls drawn, as the dependent variable. The size and strength of the 
personal network did not affect entrapment, F(1, 114) = 1.59, n.s. 
To further test this hypothesis, still using only those cases in which constituency 
was present, a regression analysis was performed using network size multiplied by the 
influence score as the independent variable and entrapment as the dependent variable. 
Again, the size and strength of the personal network did not affect entrapment, F(1, 114) 
= .82, n.s. Another regression analysis was performed using just influence score with 
total number of draws as dependent variable. This analysis was also performed on those 
cases where constituency was present. Once again, the influence members of the network 
have on the individual did not affect entrapment, F(1, 114) = 1.41, n.s.  Therefore, H9b 
was not supported.
Hypothesis 10 (H10) posited that, in the presence of constituency, individuals 
with larger personal networks and strong ties would report greater justification for 
making their decisions. To test this hypothesis, only those cases in which constituency 
was present were selected (n = 115); then, a regression analysis was performed using 
network size multiplied by the influence factor score as the independent variable and 
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internal justification derived from the entrapment scale as the dependent variable. 
Network size and network influence did not affect internal justification, F(1, 112) = .68, 
n.s. Next, a regression analysis using external justification factor score as the dependent 
variable was performed. Similarly, network size and network influence did not affect 
external justification, F(1, 112) = 1.75, n.s.
To further examine the relationship between networks and reported justification in 
the presence of constituency, two additional regression analyses were conducted using 
total network size (with all members combined) as the independent variable and factor 
scores for internal and external justification as dependent variables. These analyses were 
also conducted using only cases in which constituency was present. The results appeared 
marginally significant for internal self-justification, F(1, 112) = 3.07, p = .08. That is, it is 
possible to suggest that, in the presence of constituency, individuals with large personal 
networks seem to be less likely to use internal self-justification. However, no significant 
effect was observed for external self-justification, F(1, 112) = .05, n.s. Therefore, H10 
was largely unsupported.
Luck and Entrapment
In addition to the specific hypotheses posited for this study, the relationship 
between luck and other variables examined in the research was explored. A series of 
regression analyses were performed to examine whether luck affected need for 
justification, entrapment, or face concerns. 
Justification. To examine a relationship between luck and justification needs, two 
regression analyses were conducted with luck, derived from the BIGL scale serving as 
the independent variable and internal and external self-justification as dependent 
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variables. The results indicated that luck had no effect on external self-justification, F(1, 
227) = .84, n.s. However, luck had a positive effect on internal self-justification, F(1, 
227) = 6.60, p < .01; ß = 1.70. That is, the luckier a person felt, the more the person was 
likely to self-justify his or her behavior. 
Entrapment and internal justification. To examine whether luck had an effect on 
entrapment, a regression analysis was performed with luck as the independent variable 
and entrapment (i.e., total number of draws) as the dependent variable. The results 
showed that luck had no effect on entrapment, F(1, 234) = 1.09, n.s. 
To further investigate relationship between internal justification, entrapment and 
luck, using the rationale that if individuals believed they were lucky, they were more 
likely to internally justify their entrapment attributing it to luck, a two-step regression 
analysis was performed. In this regression analysis, luck factor score was the independent 
variable, internal justification factor score was the independent variable in the second 
step, and total number of draws was the dependent variable. The results indicated that the 
regression was a poor fit R 2 = .06.  However, there was a significance in R 2 change, F(1, 
225) = 15.08, p < .01. The overall relationship for the second step was significant, F(2, 
227) = 8.30, p < .01. However, although the effect of luck approached significance, 
t(227) = 1.90, ß = .64, p < .06, the effect of internal justification was the only significant 
effect, t(227) = 3.90, ß = -1.32, p < .01, suggesting an indirect relationship between luck 
and entrapment, in which an individual who feels lucky had a greater need for internal 
justification, which helped to prevent the person from becoming entrapped. 
Other- and self-positive face concerns. Regression analyses were also performed 
to investigate the relationship between luck and face concerns. In the first regression 
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analysis, luck was the independent variable and other-positive face, derived from the 
entrapment scale was the dependent variable. The results indicated that luck had no effect 
on other-positive face goals, F(1, 227) = 1.76, n.s. 
In the second analysis, luck was the independent variable and self-positive face, 
derived from the entrapment scale, was the dependent variable. Again, data from the 
control condition were excluded. The results showed that luck had positive effect on self-
positive face F(1, 167) = 4.07, p = .05; ß = .16. That is, the luckier the person felt, the 
more she or he was concerned with protecting self-positive face. 
Overall face concerns. Finally, four regression analyses were performed to 
examine the relationship between luck and overall face concerns measured prior to the 
experiment. In these analyses luck was the independent variable, and self- and other-
positive and self- and other-negative face factor scores were dependent variables. The 
only significant relationship observed was between luck and other-positive face concerns, 
suggesting a positive effect, F(1, 231) = 4.05, p < .05; ß = .13. Relationships between 
luck and other-negative face, self-negative face, and self-positive face were all non-
significant, F(1, 234) = 1.2, n.s.; F(1, 234) = .07, n.s., and F(1, 232) = .12, n.s., 
respectively.
Research Question
The Research Question posed in this study asked whether, in a situation leading to 
entrapment, individuals would be more likely to use social accounts to explain their 
behavior. To this end, participants were asked qualitative, open-ended questions that were 
designed to explore messages that individuals used to explain their performance during 
the experimental task. Specifically, two sets of questions were posed. First, after each 
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round, the respondents were asked to explain why they chose to continue to draw (if they 
did); and, second, at the end of the experimental task, the respondents were asked to 
produce some specific statements that they “might use to explain what happened during 
the drawing task.”
Coding scheme and procedures
Qualitative approaches are ideal for questions that require an answer about 
understanding participants’ views, for questions that address the meanings or 
interpretations of experiences or information, or for rich descriptions of complex 
phenomena. Because qualitative data is subjective and open to interpretation, two 
independent coders were used to increase reliability. The open-ended statements were 
first reviewed by the researcher and coders to develop a coding scheme. 
The theoretical framework for this study suggested that the coders should be 
looking for the following four themes: (1) internal justification (i.e., rationalization of 
why one did not win); (2) external justification (i.e., when participants mentioned a 
group’s “plan” as a reason for continuing or withdrawing from the task); (3) protecting 
self-positive face (i.e., participants expressed concern about group being upset with them 
for losing); and (4) protecting other-positive face (i.e., participants expressed concern for 
the group). In addition to these four themes, (5) luck also emerged as a theme during the 
initial coding of the open-ended questions. Statements that did not fall into any of the 
above categories were coded as (6) other. Statements that had more than one theme were 
coded with more than one code. For example, the statement “I realize there was a low 
probability of me choosing a red ball. Although I kept picking I knew there wasn’t a good 
chance of me picking a red ball, never mind 5. I stopped at sixth round so that I and my 
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group would have at least a few raffle tickets” was coded as 1 and 4. Or in another case, 
the statement, “There were more white balls than red. I am not a lucky person. I didn’t 
feel around the box a lot,” was coded as 1 and 5.
When themes were identified, the statements were coded by assigning a unique 
label that contained references to particular categories of information (Bernard, 1994; 
Miles & Huberman 1994). After the initial read, a draft codebook was developed. The 
codebook, discussed in more detail in the section below, included the code, a brief 
definition, a full definition, guidelines for when to use the code, and examples (see Table 
4). 
The initial review of open-ended data indicated that statements generated as 
explanations of a person’s decision to continue or withdraw from the task produced after 
each round did not contribute to the understanding of the entrapment phenomenon. The 
overwhelming majority of comments were process-oriented (e.g., “[I] needed [a] red 
[ball],” “[I] have to finish [the task],” “[I] decided to try two more times”), and often the 
respondents provided identical explanations for each round (e.g., statements “[I will 
continue drawing] for fun,” “I felt lucky,” “[I’m] willing to lose one dollar” used as an 
entry for each round). Because most of the statements did not contribute to the 
understanding of the entrapment phenomenon, they were omitted from the analysis. The 
following discussion focuses on the final strategy explanation statement provided by the 
respondents. 
Codebook. A total of five themes were used to code the open-ended statements. In 
addition, statements that did not reflect any of the themes were coded as “other.” This 
section provides a detailed discussion of each coding category. 
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The items coded as (1) internal justification included statements containing 
expressions in which respondents provided excuses and explanation for why they did not 
win, including rationalizations about why or how the task was difficult, predetermined 
strategies, offering non-emotional reasons for continuing to draw (e.g., goal completion, 
wanting to make a profit). All of the items that included references to “odds,” 
“probabilities,” “chances,” and “percentages” were coded as internal justification. 
Examples of statements coded as (1) include:
“I wanted to get a red ball, but I didn’t get one—I didn’t want to lose any of my 
own money so I stopped at 10 tries.”
 “There may have been all white balls in the box. I just didn’t pick any of the red 
balls. 10% of the balls was not enough to by chance pick a red ball.”
“The chances are very slim of drawing a red ball so I’m not surprised I didn’t 
draw anything.”
 “The guide on the task instructions make it appear as though completion is easy, 
however finding 5% of a population of balls is quite difficult.”
The items coded as (2) external justification were statements that included 
expressions that would indicate that the participants wanted their group members to 
understand their decision and that they followed the group’s plan or strategy. To this end, 
all of the items that included words “group,” “our” as well as “plan,” “strategy,” or 
“decision” in one statement were coded as (2). Examples of statements coded as (2) are:
“Since I didn’t draw a single red ball, I am wondering if there actually were any 
red balls, but I continued just to be sure because that is what the group decided on, 
and I didn’t want to go back on my word.”
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“I have a sinking feeling that there probably were no red balls in the task. I 
decided to draw until we lost the 10 raffle tickets, because those were not even 
guaranteed anyway.”
“Was ‘unlucky,’ and followed plan established before experiment.”
“I had a strategy, I began to think what would be a fair outcome for everybody.” 
“Followed plan established before experiment.”
Review of the open-ended items did not reveal any statements that would include 
an expressed concern about the group being upset with the participant for losing; that is, 
there were no items expressing the need to protect self-positive face in a traditional 
definition of the term: “the need to defend and protect one’s need for inclusion and 
association” (Ng, 1999, p. 6). However, there were a number of items that could be 
interpreted as a participant’s desire to do well on the task as well as responses using 
emotions to describe decisions to stop or persist. The emotional responses were coded as 
self-positive face because they were related to a person’s identity; that is, the way the 
person saw him or herself. Statements that included words such as “hoping,” “still,” 
“believing,” and “determined” were coded in this category (3). In addition, statements 
including “emotional excuses” (e.g., “felt insecure” or “stubborn”) were coded as part of 
(3) self-positive face. Some sample statements include: 
“I kept drawing and kept picking up white balls. I was determined to draw a red 
ball so I kept going.”
“After having no luck whatsoever in drawing a red ball early on, I felt that there 
was nothing for me to lose, except a few dollars, in hoping to draw a red ball to 
gain back some of the tickets.”
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“I became greedy, believing that I would eventually draw a red ball.”
“I think the reason is I still have chances even though this ball is the last one.”
Items coded as (4) other-positive face were statements that indicated that the 
respondent was taking group members into consideration (expressed concern for the 
group) while making the decision to proceed or stop with the task. Statements that 
included such words as “everyone,” “everybody,” “we,” “worried about the group,” “no 
one,” and “responsibility” were assigned to other-positive face category. The following 
statements are representative of this theme:
 “Then on the 11th try I had a feeling I was going to draw another white ball but 
figured one dollar was worth the try. Then I stopped because now I was gambling 
the group’s actual money.”
“I decided to go up to 10 whites so that no one would owe any money—this way 
we just broke even.”
“I completely blew it for the team. We all have no money. I didn’t draw any red 
balls out of the 10 items attempted. All balls were white.”
“I was worried about the group.”
In addition to the four themes described above, luck also emerged as a prominent 
theme. Statements referring to luck could be interpreted as an extension of external self-
justification theme because in part, external justification is blaming the act on a 
situational factor (Aronson, 1999). In the context of the current study, luck can be seen as 
a situational factor. However, because of the prominence of the theme, statements 
including references to “luck,” “being lucky,” or “unlucky” were coded (5) as a separate 
category. Some sample statements include:
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“I didn’t get lucky.”
“I did not draw any red balls. I have no luck. I owe money.”
“I didn’t get any red balls. I am not that lucky today. There’s no chance of 
winning.”
“Luck is just a chance you come across.”
In addition, statements that included guesses about the experimental procedures, 
expressions of frustration, factual accounts of the outcomes were coded as (6) other. 
Some examples include:
“I drew 8 white balls from the box.”
“I felt horrible when I saw the white ball and decided to not take any more 
chances.”
“No red balls were drawn.”
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desire for: goal 
completion or 
making a profit.
“I wanted to get a red ball, but I didn’t get one—I didn’t 
want to lose any of my own money so I stopped at 10 
tries.”
“There may have been all white balls in the box. I just 
didn’t pick any of the red balls. 10% of the balls was not 
enough to by chance pick a red ball.”
“The chances are very slim of drawing a red ball so I’m 
not surprised I didn’t draw anything.”
“The guide on the task instructions make it appear as 
though completion is easy, however finding 5% of a 
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the participants 
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members to 
understand their 
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they followed the 




group and plan 
combined with 
strategy or decision
“Since I didn’t draw a single red ball, I am wondering if 
there actually were any red balls, but I continued just to 
be sure because that is what the group decided on, and I 
didn’t want to go back on my word.”
“I have sinking feeling that there probably were no red 
balls in the task. I decided to draw until we lost the 10 
raffle tickets, because those were not even guaranteed 
anyway.”
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“I kept drawing and kept picking up white balls. I was 
determined to draw a red ball so I kept going.”
“I became greedy, believing that I would eventually 
draw a red ball.”
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worried about the 
group, no one, and 
responsibility
“I completely blew it for the team. We all have no 
money. I didn’t draw any red balls out of the 10 items 
attempted. All balls were white.”
“I was worried about the group.”
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attributions 
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luck, being lucky 
or unlucky
“I didn’t get lucky.”
“I did not draw any red balls. I have no luck. I owe 
money.”













factual accounts of 
the outcomes
“I drew 8 white balls from the box.”
“I felt horrible when I saw the white ball and decided to 
not take any more chances.”
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Inter-coder agreement. Because initial coding can yield poor agreement, 
qualitative researchers stress the importance of pre-testing and revising codebooks 
(Carey, Morgan, & Oxtoby, 1996;  Miles & Huberman, 1994). After a draft of the 
codebook was developed, the next step was to ensure that all coders (including the 
researcher) could independently replicate each other’s work using the same instructions. 
To pretest the codebook and make estimates of the final inter-coder agreement, 48 
statements comprising the responses given by the first 12 participants in each condition 
were selected. This group of responses represented approximately 22% of 214 strategy 
explanation statements. Two coders each coded the 48 statements twice. The first round 
of coding was conducted to identify the problems with the codebook. After the problems 
were identified and remedied, to estimate the achieved degree of inter-coder reliability, 
the same two coders used the revised codebook to independently recode the same 48 
statements. 
After the first round of coding, the sets of codes that each coder assigned to each 
of the 48 statements were compared. A statement was deemed as coded identical only if 
both coders used the same set of codes. For example, to be considered in agreement, if 
one coder marked the statement as 1 and 5, the other coder had to assign that statement 
the same two codes. A coding discrepancy was noted if one of the coders did not assign 
both of these codes or assigned a third one. Using this method, comparison of the 
codebook pretest results showed that approximately 30 (62.5%) statements out of the 48 
were coded the same by both coders. This level of replicability suggested the need to 
refine the codebook and the need for additional coder training. The two coders and the 
researcher discussed the reasons for disagreements and identified and corrected problems 
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with the codebook. In addition, the application of the coding scheme by the coders was 
discussed. The discrepancies were often the result of vague and somewhat overlapping 
code definitions and the lack of shared understanding in the procedures for using specific 
codes. For example, the original definition for self-positive face included the allusions to 
“unfair task” or “difficult task”—similar themes appeared under the explanation of 
internal justification category, which resulted in a great number of coder discrepancies. 
To remedy this problem, clarifications were introduced to define the “self-positive face” 
category as only those in which respondents indicated their desire to successfully 
complete the task. Any statements referring to the difficulty of the task were to be 
considered internal self-justification; that is, using the difficulty of the task as an excuse 
for failure. Another instance of coder disagreement was the confusion as to whether to 
code statements articulating emotional reasons for continuing to draw as “internal 
justification” or “self-positive face.” Based on the discussion, it was decided that the 
emotional responses that were related to how a person saw him- or herself (i.e., identity-
related statements such as “I got more stubborn in picking the white balls so I 
continued”) were considered “self-positive face,” whereas statements rationalizing a 
participant’s decision were coded as internal justification (e.g., “During the drawing task, 
I realized my chances of getting a red ball was [sic] not good. There was no reason I 
should continue since I could not get 5 red balls after 7 attempts without losing money.”)  
After clarifying the problem areas and revising the codebook, the two coders 
recoded the same 48 responses a second time using the revised code categories. The final 
level of agreement between the coders showed improvement. With the revised codebook, 
the agreement was achieved in coding 39 (81.25%) of the 48 statements. 
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Inter-coder agreement was computed using Cohen’s Kappa, a statistic used to 
assess inter-rater reliability in analyzing qualitative data (Cohen, 1960). To calculate the 
statistic, first, the observed percentage agreement among coders was calculated (89%). 
Next, the proportion of chance agreement was computed (.167). Then, the statistic was 
calculated using the formula presented by Folger, Hewes, and Poole (1984). The resulting 
Kappa was .87, suggesting substantial agreement between the coders. 
In addition, Guetzkow’s U was calculated to assess the level of agreement 
between the coders in assigning the same number of codes across the responses. This 
index is based “on the premises that two independent, equally skilled coders unitize a text 
each into same specifiable number of units” (Folger et al., 1984, p. 119). For the purposes 
of this research, Guetzkow’s index was calculated to determine the coder agreement in 
the number of themes assigned to each statement. The resulting statistic (U = .02), 
indicating high agreement among the coders.
Analysis
The number of times each theme appeared in the responses was counted. The 
most prominent theme was (1) internal justification (47%), followed by (6) other 
category (21.96%). Luck had the third number of codes (17%). Self-positive face 
accounted for 12.15% and other-positive face theme accounted for 7.5%. Finally, 
external justification appeared in only 4.2%; however, as mentioned earlier, luck could be 
considered as an external justification, attributing failure to a situational factor, namely 
being “unlucky.” If luck is combined with external justification, these responses account 
for 21.96% of the statements. 
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When analyzed by condition (see Table 5), it appears that individuals in the 
constituency/reporting condition were almost twice as likely (64.30%) to cite other-
positive face concern as a reason for explaining their strategy than those individuals in 
the constituency/no reporting condition. Individuals in the constituency/no reporting 
condition cited most often the external justification (50%) strategy. In the no 
constituency/reporting condition, the most often-cited strategy was concern for self-
positive face (41%). And, the control group had no clear preference for any of the 
explanation themes, just slightly favoring “internal justification” (30.5%).
Table 17












25.30 15.80 28.40 30.50
External 
Justification
50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00
Other-
Positive Face
64.30 35.70 0.00 0.00
Self-Positive 
Face
6.90 24.10 41.40 27.60
Luck 23.70 31.60 21.10 23.70
Other 25.50 31.40 17.60 25.50
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Among those individuals who did get entrapped (i.e., continued past tenth attempt 
to draw a ball), many (39.30%) used self-positive face concerns as a strategy to explain 
their behavior. The “other” category also received 39.20%. 
Table 18
Percent of People Entrapped or Not Who Used Specific 













82.40 100.00 92.30 60.70 78.40 60.80
11–20 
Draws
17.60 0.00 7.70 39.30 21.60 39.20
In addition, logistic regression analysis was performed to examine whether 
experimental conditions to which participants were assigned affected the type of social 
accounts used by the participants. Six separate regression analyses were performed in 
which constituency (dichotomized yes/no) and reporting (dichotomized yes/no) were the 
independent variables and one of each themes (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6) was the dependent 
variable. The results were significant only for the internal justification and self-positive 
face themes. Both internal justification and self-positive face were affected only by the 
constituency condition; reporting condition had no significant effect. More specifically, 
the results suggest that when constituency is present, internal justification decreases 
(Wald test statistic [1, N = 236] = 3.78, β = -.52 [SE = .27], p < .03). In addition, the 
results indicate that when constituency is present, self-positive face concerns also 
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decrease (Wald test statistic [1, N = 236] = 4.00, β = -.85 [SE = .46], p < .03].  Finally, as 
mentioned earlier, luck could be considered an external justification explanation because 
an individual attributes failure to a situational factor, namely being “unlucky.” To this 
end, luck and external justification themes were recoded into one theme.  The logistic 
regression analysis in which constituency (dichotomized yes/no) and reporting 
(dichotomized yes/no) were the independent variables and the new theme was the 
dependent variable was performed.  The results indicate that when constituency is present 
the statements of external justification increase (Wald test statistic [1, N = 236] = 5.89, β
= .86 [SE = .34], p < .01).
Findings
Statements that fell within the theme of self-positive face could be interpreted as 
goal-driven messages that are often colored by one’s emotions. For example, one 
participant wrote, “I felt compelled risking my raffle tickets/money because I felt that 
with each white ball I took out of the box, my chances of picking a red one would be 
higher.” Or, in the words of another participant, “I got angered I was losing so I 
continued to keep drawing hoping I could win.” 
On the other hand, statements that are attributed to concerns for other-positive 
face, internal or external justification, and luck can be considered social accounts defined 
as strategies designed to minimize the impact of an individual’s behavior or to persuade 
the audience that the behavior is not an accurate representation of what the person truly is 
(Bies, 1987). 
As mentioned earlier, Sitkin and Bies (1993) identified three broad categories of 
accounts: mitigating responsibility, legitimizing the action by appealing to some higher-
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order values or norms, and reframing outcomes. The majority of the messages produced 
by the participants that were coded as concerns for other-positive face, internal or 
external justification, and luck could be classified as “causal accounts,” because many of 
these messages indicated that the participants felt they had little or no choice in the 
matter. According to the participants, the real cause for continuing to draw was not their 
own preference and intention but something beyond their control; that is, the task was 
difficult, they were down on their luck, or it was the group’s decision. In the words of the 
participants:
“Since I didn’t draw a single red ball, I am wondering if there actually were any 
red balls, but I continued just to be sure because that is what the group decided on, 
and I didn’t want to go back on my word.”
“I realize there was a low probability of me choosing a red ball. Although I kept 
picking I knew there wasn’t a good chance of me picking a red ball, never mind 5. 
I stopped at sixth round so that me and my group would have at least a few raffle 
tickets.”
 “I didn’t get any red balls. I am not that lucky today. There is no chance of 
winning.”
 “I was unlucky. However, there was only 10% chance I would get a red ball each 
time.”
Implications, directions for future research, and significance of these findings are 




This chapter presents a summary of the study, discusses the results and their 
implications, and identifies limitations of the research. In addition, directions for future 
research are provided in this chapter. Finally, the theoretical significance of this research 
is addressed.
Summary of the Study Design and Gaps Addressed by the Research
This dissertation examined a number of factors affecting entrapment. The 
research examined whether accountability, mediated by face concerns (self- and other-
positive) and justification (internal and external self-), leads to entrapment. 
Accountability was manipulated by the presence of constituency and the requirement to 
report to the constituency. In addition, the dissertation explored whether personal 
networks affected face concerns and contributed to entrapment. Personal networks were 
operationalized as size of the network and influence members of the network have on an 
individual. The dissertation also examined the direct effects that face concerns and 
justification have on entrapment. In addition, the study examined the effect of the size 
and influence of personal networks on self- and other-positive face concerns. The 
research also explored whether overall face concerns have an effect on internal and 
external self-justification. Furthermore, the study examined the effect of accountability 
on individuals’ self- and other-positive face concerns and internal and external 
justification. Finally, the study explored messages used by individuals in a scenario 
potentially leading to a failing course of action.
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Entrapment is an individual’s tendency to assume that the greater the resources 
expended, the closer the person is to achieving the goal (Rubin, Kim, & Peretz, 1990). To 
simulate a situation leading to entrapment the following conditions had to be present: 
negative consequences, commitment to behavior, perceived degree of freedom in 
commitment to the behavior, responsibility for the negative circumstances and desire for 
goal completion (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Cooper, 1971; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; 
Rubin & Brockner, 1975; Staw, 1976). These conditions, as well as variables and 
relationships explored in this dissertation, were identified through examination of theory 
and research from the fields of social psychology, business, cross-cultural 
communication, and conflict management and negotiation. 
The negative consequences condition was simulated by the study’s stipulation 
that, as a participant pursued the experimental task, he or she continued to lose one’s own 
money, and, in conditions in which the constituency was present, the constituency’s 
money. More specifically, the rules of the experiment specified that if the participant 
continued to draw beyond 10 attempts, he or she would have to pay $1 for each failed 
attempt by pursuing the failing course of action. By pursuing beyond 10 attempts, the 
participants were also imposing the same financial penalty on the members of 
constituency. 
Commitment to behavior was operationalized as a potential for winning one of 
four $50 lottery drawings, and, in the conditions in which constituency was present, a 
potential for receiving a $5 reward for one’s own performance on the task. Similarly, the 
anticipation of potential pay off was conceived to stimulate the desire for goal 
completion. The perceived degree of freedom in commitment to the behavior was 
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operationalized by instructing the participants that they could stop the drawing task at any 
time. Likewise, the participant’s responsibility for negative consequences was 
operationalized as the individual’s freedom to make a choice of whether to pursue or 
withdraw from the drawing task 
To further simulate an entrapment situation and increase responsibility for 
negative consequences, this study employed accountability conditions manipulated by the 
presence of constituency and the requirement to report on one’s behavior to either the 
researcher or to the constituency after the task (Asch, 1951; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). 
This method is a significant contribution to the study of entrapment bias because past 
studies have either employed a paper constituency (Fox & Staw, 1979; Staw, 1981), to 
whom respondents had to pretend to report, or a live constituency whose role was merely 
to observe the participant (Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981; Brown, 1968). To this end, in
this study live members of the constituency had control over the rewards by evaluating 
the participants’ performance; that is, the participants were told that after they complete 
the task the constituency would review the outcomes and make a decision about how 
much money to award to the participants for their performance (maximum award was 
$5). Also, the participants were required to report to the members of the constituency 
either in person or via a written statement. Overall, one of the significant contributions of 
this dissertation is that the research design takes into account all of the conditions 
essential for creating entrapment.
Another contribution of this dissertation is the introduction of two important 
variables, face and personal networks, to examine their effect on entrapment. Although 
few studies (Brockner et al, 1982; Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981; Brown, 1968) 
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examined how face concerns contribute to entrapment, there is some evidence that face 
concerns become more prominent in the presence of an audience and can increase the 
likelihood of entrapment. According to Brockner et al. (1981), face concerns contribute 
to entrapment because of individuals’ desire to appear socially appropriate. However, 
previous studies have addressed the concept of face in its totality without examining how 
different aspects of face may affect entrapment. To this end, this research distinguished 
between self- and other-positive face concerns and explored how each type may affect 
entrapment. In addition, to investigate whether face concerns unrelated to an entrapment 
situation have any effect on individuals’ justification needs, this study examined how 
overall face concerns affected these needs.
Because the notion of face is a social concept—it is dependent on and affected by 
others—this research used personal networks to examine how networks, and more 
specifically their size and strength of influence, affect face concerns and may contribute 
to entrapment. The use of personal networks as a variable affecting face concerns is 
significant contribution because it provides a potentially new explanation for motivations 
that may underlie face goals and, in turn, affect entrapment. Traditionally, the tendency 
for having stronger or weaker self- and other-face maintenance goals has been explained 
using individualism and collectivism or independent and interdependent self-construals. 
By focusing on networks, this research looks at the relational strength and breadth of 
networks as a measure of relational focus and values.
Finally, although not discussed as a part of the theoretical framework, by virtue of 
the study design, this research introduced luck as a variable with potential to affect 
entrapment and examined its effect on justification needs and face concerns.
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Research Hypotheses
Respondents in the study were 236 undergraduate students. Participants were 
assigned to four conditions: reporting/constituency; no reporting/constituency; no 
constituency/reporting, and no reporting/no constituency. First, prior to participating in
the study, all participants completed questionnaires; at a later date, they participated in 
the experimental task, before and after which they completed additional instruments. All 
data were collected between June and December 2004.
The study posed 10 hypotheses and one research question. Figure 3 summarizes 
the significant relationships found in the study.
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Figure 3. Research Findings.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) posited that entrapment would be more likely when a 
constituency was present. Surprisingly, contrary to studies suggesting a relationship 
between presence of constituency and entrapment (Brockner et al., 1982; Brockner, 
Rubin & Lang, 1981; Fox & Staw, 1979; Staw & Hoang, 1995), presence of constituency 
did not directly affect entrapment. This result can potentially be explained by the design 






























passive observer, in this study, constituency was made up of active participants who 
shared mutual interests with the respondents in the form of winning extra raffle tickets 
and avoiding monetary penalties. In addition, the constituency controlled the reward for 
the participant’s performance; that is, the participants were told that the constituency
would review the participant’s performance on the experimental task and would 
determine a monetary award for the performance (maximum $5). This finding has 
significant implications for negotiation. That is, the findings suggest that if a negotiator is 
a member of the group on whose behalf he or she is conducting negotiations and the 
negotiator’s goals are aligned with the group, the negotiator will be less likely to become 
entrapped. However, further research is needed to identify whether the presence of a
neutral third party or a distant constituency may have greater effect on the negotiator 
becoming entrapped. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a) posited that internal and external justification would be 
greater when respondents are required to report their behavior. Although the results 
indicate no significant effect for internal self-justification, the effect for external self-
justification was significant. That is, when reporting is required individuals feel 
compelled to appear rational to the judging party: they want the party to understand their 
decision making process and they want the party to believe that the pursued course of 
action was in the best interest of the group. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b) stated that, when individuals had to report their behavior, 
they would have greater needs for internal and external self-justifications, which would 
lead to entrapment. However, analysis performed only on cases in which reporting was 
required, revealed that only the effect of internal justification was significant. The results 
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indicated that the greater one’s need to appear rational, the less likely he or she is to get 
entrapped. This finding is surprising because it contradicts the majority of past research 
on entrapment (e.g., Fox & Staw, 1979; Staw, 1976; Staw & Ross, 1978), which suggests 
that individuals who experience failure are likely to pursue the failing course of action 
because they feel compelled to demonstrate the rationality of their original decision. 
Review of open-ended questions supports these findings; that is, internal self-justification 
was the most prominent category of responses in the explanations participants provided 
for why they decided to stop drawing as opposed to continue with the task. Overall, these 
findings suggest that the reporting requirement has an indirect positive rather than 
negative effect on entrapment.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) posited that the presence of constituency would lead to greater 
internal and external justification. H3 was not supported; the presence of constituency did 
not influence individuals’ need for justifying a decision to pursue a course of action. This 
finding is particularly interesting when related to the results from H7, that constituency 
affected the relational and identity aspects of one’s image (i.e., face concerns) but not the 
rational aspect—that is, the need for justification. On the surface, these results contradict 
those reported by Fox and Staw (1979) and Staw and Hoang (1995), who state that the 
presence of constituency contributes significantly to entrapment and explain this outcome 
to be a result of external justification. However, the presence of constituency alone may 
not increase a person’s need for justification; instead, reporting to the constituency may 
be essential to motivate the need to justify behavior. In the present study, accountability 
was simulated by both the presence of constituency and the need to report to it. To 
examine whether there is an interaction effect between constituency and reporting 
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conditions, a two-way ANOVA was performed with constituency present (yes or no) and 
reporting (yes or no) as independent variables and the external justification factor score 
as the dependent variable. The results indicate a significant interaction effect between 
reporting and constituency (F [3, 228] = 12.98, p < .01) on external justification, such 
that constituency had an effect on external justification when no reporting was required. 
But, when reporting was required, constituency had no effect on external justification.  
See Table 7 for the summary of the means. 
Table 19
Interaction of Reporting (Yes/No) and Constituency (Yes/No)
on External Justification:  Mean Summary
Reporting (M)
Constituency  (M) YES NO
YES .09 .41
NO -.63 .16
Another noteworthy finding is that examination of qualitative data revealed that 
when external justification and luck themes were recoded into one theme, results of 
logistic regression analysis indicated that presence of constituency has a positive effect 
on the combination of luck into external justification.  Overall, the importance of this 
finding was that it furthers understanding of mechanisms underlying the need to justify 
one’s behavior, ruling out constituency alone as a motivating factor for the need for 
external justification.  
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Hypothesis 4 (H4) stated that individuals with greater self- and other-positive face 
concerns would be more likely to become entrapped. This hypothesis was partially 
supported. The results show that other-positive face goals negatively affect entrapment. 
However, self-positive face goals did not affect entrapment. An additional regression 
analysis, using only constituency present conditions, also showed that concern for other-
positive face prevent an individual from becoming entrapped (F[1, 112] = 6.19, p < .01; 
ß = -1.06). These findings indicate that the presence of constituency does affect 
entrapment indirectly. Again, contrary to the results of previous research, it actually 
reduces propensity for entrapment, not increases it. Another potential interpretation of 
this finding could be that individuals can become more or less entrapped depending on 
what they believe will portray them in a more favorable light (Brockner et al., 1981). Yet 
another reason for why concern for other-positive face prevented participants in this 
study from becoming entrapped could be that the majority (80.90%) of the study 
participants were women. According to Kolb and Williams (2000), women negotiators 
tend to be more aware of other’s feelings, to be more devoted to others and to show more 
concern for others. Future research should explore whether women and men behave 
differently in a situation leading to entrapment. Within the negotiation and conflict 
management contexts this finding implies that the presence of constituency may lead 
individuals to be more cautious, guarding the constituency’s interests. Finally, this 
finding provides support for distinguishing between various dimensions of face.
Hypothesis 5 (H5) posits that the concern for saving face will be greater when 
individuals have to report their behavior. The results indicate that the reporting 
requirement affects self-positive but not other-positive face concerns. This finding 
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suggests that when individuals have to explain their actions, they are more concerned 
about how they are perceived by a judging party than they are concerned about protecting 
the image (i.e., other-positive face) of others. In a negotiation situation, constituency 
should take into account that a negotiator may put his or her own needs and image first 
and try to minimize threats to the negotiator’s self-positive face. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6) posited that overall other- and self-positive face concerns that 
an individual has would lead to a greater need to justify one’s action (i.e., internal and 
external justification). The results indicate that face concerns did not affect internal 
justification. However, the relationship between external self-justification and both other-
and self-positive face was significant. Both other- and self-positive face concerns were 
positively associated with external justification. That is, the need to appear rational to 
others seems motivated by the concerns for protecting own image and needs as well as 
those of others because it is important to the person to look good in the others’ eyes and 
to demonstrate to them that the individual had their interests at heart when the decision 
was made. Although not related to entrapment, this finding provides an insight into 
motivations underlying self-justification that has implications for negotiation and conflict 
management. In the presence of an audience, individuals’ need to prove to others that 
they were correct in their action or decision could be communicated using messages 
affirming one’s expertise and experience as well as insisting that they acted in the 
interests of the constituency.
These findings are especially interesting in relation to the results derived from 
H2a, which suggest that reporting affects external self-justification, and H5, which 
indicates that reporting affects self-positive face. Thus, based on these results, it seems 
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that the reporting requirement motivates an individual’s need for external justification 
(the need to prove to the constituency that an error was a correct decision in the long 
term) due to the desire to maintain a positive image (greater face concerns).
Hypothesis 7 (H7) stated that concerns for saving face would be greater when 
constituency was present. The hypothesis was supported; the results provided a reliable 
main effect for both self-positive and other-positive face concerns. This finding supports 
past studies suggesting that the presence of constituency affects face concerns (e.g., 
Brown, 1970; Wilson & Putnam, 1990). The results regarding other-positive face suggest 
an indirect relationship between constituency and entrapment. That is, presence of 
constituency affects concerns for other-positive face, which in turn has a negative effect 
on entrapment. However, as mentioned earlier, this finding is surprising in that past 
studies have indicated that the presence of constituency leads to entrapment. Again, this 
finding can be explained in a number of ways: the presence of live constituency; the fact 
that individuals want to please the constituency and will do what they think would make 
the constituency happy (Brockner et al., 1981); and, potentially, the fact that the majority 
(80.90%) of the study participants were women, who usually tend to show more concern 
for others when negotiating (Kolb & Williams, 2000). 
Although the study did not simulate a negotiation situation, these results have 
implications for negotiations, because negotiation is inherently a decision-making process 
in which a negotiator could become entrapped (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). In a 
negotiation situation, to look strong to their constituents, negotiators may act against their 
constituents’ best interest in order to protect self-positive face (Bazerman, 1986). 
However, this study found no link between self-positive face and entrapment. According 
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to previous research, if negotiators are committed to their constituency’s interests, then 
they may commit to a course of action that lacks the flexibility in compromising that is 
necessary for ensuring the welfare of the constituency (Neale & Bazerman, 1985). In 
other words, the pressure from the constituency may lead to the escalation of 
commitment, which impedes the ability of the negotiator to represent the constituency’s 
best interests. However, this argument is not supported by the current research. One 
potential explanation for why this expectation was not supported could be that the 
participants were not directly observed by the constituency. Studies have shown that 
surveillance by the constituents leads negotiators to be more competitive and often less 
successful (Klimoski & Asch, 1974; Lamm & Kogan, 1971; Neale, 1984; Organ, 1971). 
The question of whether the physical presence of constituency as opposed to the 
psychological presence leads to greater likelihood of entrapment should be examined in 
future research.
Hypothesis 8 (H8) posited that size and strength of individuals’ networks would 
affect face concerns related to entrapment. The results indicate that the size and influence 
of the network members have a positive effect on both self- and other-positive face. 
These findings are important in that they support the use of personal networks as a 
framework for examining structure of individuals’ relationships. The findings also 
provide insight into factors affecting face concerns. Often, types and direction of face 
concerns are predicted based on cultural dimensions, such as individualism-collectivism, 
or based on an individual’s national culture. Individuals with predominantly independent 
self-construals or those coming from individualistic cultures are thought to be more 
concerned with self aspects of face, whereas those with predominantly interdependent 
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self-construals or those coming from collectivistic cultures are believed to be more 
concerned with other aspects of face (Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Ting-Toomey, 
1988). However, the current research findings suggest that the larger and more influential 
one’s network is, the more likely the person is to have increased concerns for protecting 
both self- and other-positive face. These results provide support for the use of size and 
influence of personal networks as a measure for differences in relationships in future 
research.
Hypothesis 9a (H9a) stated that when participants have expansive personal 
networks, entrapment would be positively associated with protecting the constituency’s 
positive face. This hypothesis was not supported, suggesting that network size alone does 
not contribute to entrapment. The results from the two-step regression analysis performed 
to further investigate the relationship between personal networks, face, and entrapment 
with other-positive face as the independent variable in the first step—and network size 
multiplied by the influence score as the independent variable in the second step—and 
total number of draws as the dependent variable, reinforce findings from H4 and H8. The 
results indicate that (in the presence of a constituency) although size and influence of the 
networks affect face concerns, the network size and its influence are not related to 
entrapment. More significantly, similar to the findings in H8, these results provide bases 
for exploring networks as an alternative measure of individuals’ social interactions with 
relevant others within a society. That is, given the criticism associated with the 
measurement of independent-interdependent self-construals (Levine et al., 2003) and
individualism-collectivism (Fiske, 2002), networks could be considered a plausible 
alternative for operationalizing these theoretical constructs. Both individualism-
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collectivism and independent-interdependent self-construals measures rely on self-reports 
about individuals’ psychological orientation using arbitrary definitions of relevant others. 
By asking individuals to identify their own set of significant others and asking them to 
report quality and frequency of communication with significant others, personal networks 
provide one alternative for moving away from psychological reporting and moving 
toward examining structural features of relationships, such as how large are the 
individuals’ networks and how important are relationships in these networks. 
Although not part of the study hypotheses, additional analyses examining the 
relationship between overall face concerns and networks were performed (see chapter 3: 
Results). The results indicate that the size and influence of networks positively affect 
self-positive face concerns. The greater the size and influence of the network, the greater 
is the need to protect self-positive face. This finding is somewhat surprising given that, 
within the context of the experiment, networks’ size and influence affected positively 
both self- and other-positive face concerns, suggesting that networks and their size and 
influence affect face based on some situational factors. Future research is needed to 
examine in greater detail the effects of networks on overall face concerns.
Hypothesis 9b (H9b) posited that, in the presence of a constituency, individuals 
with larger and more influential personal networks would be more prone to entrapment 
than individuals with smaller, less influential networks. Research findings suggest no
relationship between networks and entrapment. The implication of this finding for 
negotiation is that, when a person is negotiating on behalf of constituency, an individual’s 
social connectedness has no apparent direct effect on conflict escalation.
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Hypothesis 10 (H10) posited that, in the presence of constituency, individuals 
with larger and stronger personal networks would report greater justification (internal and 
external) for making their decisions. This hypothesis was not supported, ruling out 
networks as a contributing factor to the need to justify one’s decisions. 
Finally, the research question asks whether in a situation leading to entrapment, 
individuals will be more likely to use social accounts to explain their behavior. The 
majority of messages produced by the participants were social accounts, more 
specifically, causal or mitigating accounts whereby the respondents claimed that they had 
no alternative to the chosen action; that is, the task was difficult, they were unlucky, or it 
was the group’s decision. This is consistent with an attribution theory. According to Lee 
(1977), the fundamental attribution error is human tendency to overestimate the role of 
dispositional versus situational causes of behavior. That is, individuals tend to attribute
things that are wrong with another person to the person’s disposition and their own 
wrong-doing to situational causes. Within the negotiation context, these findings suggest 
that, in the event that the negotiation was unsuccessful, invested parties should not be 
surprised to hear excuses blaming the negative outcome on external factors. 
Entrapment can contribute to a conflict, because when individuals make a 
commitment to their initial position, they are more likely to notice information that 
supports their initial evaluation of the situation. Their judgment is biased to interpret what 
they see and hear in a way that justifies their initial position, ignoring the other’s point of 
view, resulting in a conflict situation. As Sitkin and Bies (1993) pointed out, the tactic of 
explaining why an action was taken is much more readily available and commonly used 
than other conflict management techniques (e.g., compromise or collaboration). Research 
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question findings are particularly relevant to negotiation and conflict management, 
suggesting that one way of preventing entrapment is to keep the parties accountable, and 
not to the outcome but to the process (Simonson & Staw, 1992), so that the constituency 
can possibly break the inertia of pursuing a failing course of action perhaps by re-framing 
the situation or other means (Fox & Hoffman, 2002).
In addition to the hypotheses and the research question examined in this 
dissertation, analyses were performed to explore the effect of self-perception of how 
lucky one is on cognitive processes presumably underlying entrapment and entrapment 
itself. The results indicate that luck has no direct effect on entrapment. However, it does 
have positive relationships with internal self-justification and self-positive face. These 
results suggest that the luckier the person feels, the more compelled the individual is to 
appear rational and the greater is person’s desire to protect his or her image. Although 
there was no indirect relationship between luck and entrapment via self-positive face 
concerns, luck had a marginally negative effect on entrapment via internal self-
justification. That is, luck contributed positively to the desire to appear rational and this 
desire prevented individuals from getting entrapped. It could be that those individuals 
who did not feel lucky stopped the drawing task because they generally perceived 
themselves as not lucky—that is, there was no purpose to continue because they would 
not be able to win anyway, due to their perception of own unluckiness. On the other 
hand, those individuals who do believe that they are lucky may have had greater need for 
justification because they were not able to pick any red balls, and therefore they needed 
to justify their action. However, because the respondents were primed to think about luck, 
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future research should be conducted to examine the role of self-perception of luck in a 
situation leading to entrapment. 
Implications
This research addressed four gaps in the theoretical study of entrapment. First, 
because few social factors contributing to entrapment have been explored (Brockner et 
al., 1982; Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981; Fox & Staw, 1979; Staw & Hoang, 1995), this 
study was designed to provide support and expand the existing body of knowledge by 
further examining the presence of audience, or constituency, and its effect on entrapment, 
and to introduce personal networks as a social explanation for why some people maybe 
more or less prone to becoming entrapped. Second, this study examined face concerns 
and how they moderate the entrapment bias. Third, because previous studies did not 
directly measure cognitive processes affecting entrapment, this dissertation examined the 
effect of the need for internal and external self-justification on entrapment. Finally, 
because none of the studies examined the escalation of commitment from a 
communication perspective, this study looked at the types of messages participants used 
to explain their decision in a situation potentially leading to entrapment.
This study is unique in that it combines the elements essential to simulating 
entrapment within the self-justification paradigm and measures processes previously 
expected to contribute to entrapment. Surprisingly, none of the factors employed in the 
study positively contributed to entrapment. The results indicate two paths linking 
conditions required for entrapment to occur to two of the four cognitive processes 
examined in this study. Presence of constituency influenced other-positive face concerns, 
which in turn negatively influenced the likelihood of entrapment. Also, the reporting 
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requirement influenced the need for internal self-justification needs, which negatively 
influenced the likelihood of entrapment. The relationship between the processes and 
entrapment were negative: Concerns for other-positive face and internal self-justification 
led to a decrease in entrapment, not to its increase, as previous studies would have 
suggested. Therefore, one of the main contributions of this research is that it identified 
processes that may prevent entrapment.
Overall, because none of the elements essential to simulating entrapment within 
the self-justification paradigm contributed positively to entrapment, these findings 
provide support for the need to identify another framework for examining entrapment. 
Perhaps one of the alternative perspectives is to view conflict-escalation as a goal-driven 
activity as suggested by Fox and Hoffman (2002). Fox and Hoffman argue that escalation 
behavior is a specific instance of the broader and more encompassing phenomenon of 
persistence, a behavioral tendency that arises in all goal-directed activities. The scholars 
propose that escalation should be viewed as a continuation of the same psychological 
motivating forces that govern the inception and maintenance of all forms of goal-directed 
behavior. According to Fox and Hoffman, persistence is measured by the total number of 
trials the person continues to make prior to stopping or changing a course of action. 
Traditionally, people do not stop their efforts after a single incident of the initial failure; 
they stop after multiple failures or learning that the goal cannot be attained. Future 
research is needed to examine whether escalation as a goal-driven activity can provide a 
viable explanation of the phenomenon. 
Future research should also consider the relationship between attribution theory 
and the likelihood of entrapment. For example, McCain (1986) argues that persisting with 
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a chosen course of action in the face of other plausible alternatives results from an 
individual making an attribution that the previous failure was or was not caused by some 
unstable factors. If the same decision fails repeatedly, its failure could be attributed to 
stable causes. Results of the study conducted by McCain indicate that escalation tends to 
diminish at a fairly constant rate following initial trials. Results of the present study 
substantiated McCain’s findings in that many participants cited ether luck or difficulty of 
the task as explanations for their decision to stop the experimental task. Both reasons are 
attributable to external, unstable factors. 
Another explanation for this dissertation’s findings, namely that neither internal 
self-justification nor concern for other-positive face led to entrapment, may be that the 
diagnostic value of repeated failures could not be ignored by participants as it was 
mounting in direct proportion to sunk cost. That is, similar to the results from the study 
conducted by Garland, Sandefeur, and Rogers (1990), this study was structured in such a 
way that the participants could not ignore their failure to complete the task, because they 
were asked to track and record their gains and losses on a separate sheet which served as 
a constant reminder of their success or failure. Because there were no red balls in the box, 
success was improbable. Thus, with each additional draw, a participant’s situation 
worsened. This line of reasoning is consistent with Staw and Ross (1987), who assert that 
one of the major factors contributing to withdrawal from a failing course of action is that 
the “objective situation increasingly worsens over time, making it economically clear that 
persistence is more costly than withdrawal” (p. 69). If the impossibility of ignoring the 
failure is an explanation for these findings, then this dissertation provided empirical 
support for some ways to reduce escalation. For one, providing explicit data regarding the 
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low (or no) return rate if one continues with a chosen course of action seems to reduce 
the likelihood of entrapment (Heath, 1995; Fox & Hoffman, 2002). In addition to 
instructing the participants to track their performance, the design of the current study also 
allowed the participants to stop the experimental task at any time, a feature that, 
compounded by a tracking requirement, could have contributed to preventing entrapment. 
Future research could compare conditions in which participants record or do not record 
their successes or failures to examine whether ongoing tracking of an individual’s 
performance on a task reduces the likelihood of entrapment. 
In this study, the role of constituency indirectly influenced participants’ decisions 
to stop with the experimental task due to concerns about protecting other-positive face. 
Future studies should investigate the conditions under which planning a strategy with the 
members of constituency would indeed lead to preventing entrapment. Also, setting 
limits before outcomes are known (Brockner & Rubin, 1985) or setting a stopping rule
prior to making the initial commitment (Boulding, Morgan, & Staelin, 1992) can reduce 
the likelihood of entrapment, “possibly reflecting the role of limits as psychological 
contracts that bind decision makers to behave in a manner consistent with their goals” 
(Brockner & Rubin, 1985, p. 85).
Support of the hypothesis that size and influence of individuals’ personal 
networks affect face-saving behavior suggests a number of implications for cross-cultural 
communication research. In particular, in light of recent criticism of the individualism-
collectivism and independent-interdependent self-construal paradigms (Fiske, 2002; 
Levine et al., 2003), these results suggest that personal networks may be helpful for 
gaining insight into social relations across cultures. Personal networks can provide a 
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more specific and informative way to operationalize differences in social relationships 
with relevant others than the individualism-collectivism and independent-interdependent 
self-construals. Although the results of this study indicate no direct relationship between 
personal networks and entrapment, further research examining entrapment in inter-
cultural settings would have to be conducted to explore relationships between networks, 
self- and other-positive face concerns and entrapment.
Limitations of the Study
This research has several limitations related to the participant sample, 
experimental design and manipulations, and personal network measures that should be 
noted.
Sample
One limitation of the study is the use of college students as participants for the 
study. A major criticism of using college students as research participants is based on the 
belief that students are likely to be significantly different from non-students, and these 
differences can affect the external validity of an experiment (Sears, 1986). Attitudes, 
peer-group relationships, cognitive skills, personality traits, age, and experience are some 
of the factors that may distinguish students from non-students (Ashton & Kramer, 1980; 
Sears, 1986). However, use of students as research participants is common practice in 
social sciences. For example, in 1999, 86% of the samples for participant-based articles 
published in the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin were made up of students. 
Student samples were also used in 63% of studies published in the Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology. Furthermore, since its first issue in 1992, the Journal of 
Consumer Psychology has included college samples in 86% of its empirically based 
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articles (Sherman, Buddie, Dragan, End, & Finney, 1999). Therefore, the use of the 
students as study participants in this research is in line with practices acceptable in the 
field. Undoubtedly, it would be interesting to examine whether the results of the study 
could be replicated with a non-student sample, because individuals’ professional 
experience may affect the way they behave in a situation potentially leading to 
entrapment. In addition, size and influence of networks as well as types of networks 
(personal versus professional) of professionals are likely to differ from those of students 
and may affect face concerns and contribute to entrapment differently. 
Another limitation associated with the study sample is that the majority of the 
sample (80.90%) was female. As mentioned earlier, such sample composition may have 
affected the results of the study in that women tend to be more concerned about others 
then men, and, therefore, the concern for others may have led them to become less 
entrapped. Future studies should compare male and female performance in a comparable 
study.
Experimental Design and Manipulation
This study addressed some of the past limitations in entrapment research 
regarding constituency by introducing a physically present constituency that interacted 
with the participants, which is different from past studies that have employed a paper 
constituency or passive observers. The limitation of this approach is that the confederates 
were not able to form a long-term relationship with the participant, given that they spent 
only 10 to 15 minutes together. Results should be compared to similar situations in which 
an individual represents a group with which he or she has longer relationships. Still, 
regardless of the fact that the individuals were not intimately familiar with members of 
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the constituency and did not have a real relationship with them, the results of this study 
suggest that the concerns for constituency needs (i.e., other-positive face) deterred the 
participants from getting entrapped. 
Another limitation of experimental manipulation is operationalization of 
entrapment (i.e., the number of balls drawn by participants). Because the box did not 
contain any red balls, some participants might have withdrawn from the task because they 
consistently drew only white balls. Although none of the participants guessed the true 
nature of the study, as evidenced by a few verbal comments made to the researcher after 
completing the experimental task, some did guess that there were no red balls in the box. 
Future studies may incorporate baits for success (e.g., red balls in a smaller number than 
needed to win) in the design. In addition, the fact that participants were told that the study 
is about luck may have affected the final results. The individuals’ belief regarding how 
lucky or unlucky they are might have prevented those who believe that they are unlucky 
from pursuing the task and encouraged those who believe that they are lucky to continue 
with the task. 
Another potential limitation of the study is the manipulation of entrapment using 
raffle tickets and dollars lost. A penalty of $1 might have not been perceived as a serious 
one. However, past studies employing dollar auction methodology, in which individuals 
compete against each other in bidding for $1 bill, have suggested that dollar amount is 
not what drives people to pay more than $1 for a dollar; it is the desire to win that drives 
them to overbid (Brockner, 1977). Nonetheless, future research could examine the effect 
of the value being sunk into persistence. 
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Finally, although the implications for negotiation and conflict management are 
provided, the simulation in this experiment did not involve negotiation or conflict. In fact, 
most past studies of entrapment used neither simulations. However, scholars interpret 
findings from these past studies to be applicable to negotiation context (e.g., Bazerman, 
1986; Neale & Bazerman, 1985). Future studies should employ negotiation scenarios 
when examining entrapment to identify how the presence of a counterpart could affect 
entrapment.
Personal Networks Measures
The context for generating the networks spanned a wide variety of everyday 
activities, from borrowing money to making health decisions, but did not focus on any 
area in particular. If participants were asked about their work or health networks, a 
different set of individuals may have been nominated. Further, the type of network 
activated is likely to vary from one situation to another. For example, in a family setting, 
a person is likely to be much more concerned about family and friends, whereas in a 
work setting, the person may be more concerned about the opinion of colleagues than of 
family members. This study did not ask participants to identify which set of networks 
was activated or gained prominence in an individual’s mind when the person was facing a 
situation potentially leading to entrapment. Investigating a number of different network 
contexts and their salience to the situation studied should provide greater insight into the 
effect of network types. Because the scenario used in this study did not focus on a 
specific context (e.g., business or health care) a broad network was used. Future studies 
should use context-specific scenarios (e.g., negotiation) in which participants represent 
138
real life organizations and involve individuals with whom the participants have true 
relationships to examine network activations and how they affect cognitive processes. 
For example, network shifts may affect individuals’ concerns for self- or other-face. 
When networks are small, an individual’s concerns for protecting self-face may be 
predominant, whereas when the networks are large, concerns for protecting other-face 
dominate. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this study. A longitudinal study 
could address these issues and examine causes that lead to changes in network size and 
potentially network member influence. 
Directions for Future Research
In addition to the future directions for research already suggested, future studies 
should explore other frameworks for investigating the entrapment bias, including concern 
for goal-completion and attribution paradigms. A study using goal-completion framework 
could identify additional mechanisms that contribute to entrapment and provide insight as 
to whether the desire to achieve a future goal, combined with past failure and sunk cost of 
the investments, leads to entrapment. Future studies also should investigate whether 
causal accounts are effective strategies for explaining behavior in an entrapment 
situation; that is, does the constituency accept them as a viable explanation of an 
individual’s behavior. 
Future studies should also focus on the salience of negotiator and constituency 
goals, especially comparing teams of individuals who know each other in real life with 
the experimental team selected to perform an experimental task simulating an entrapment 
situation. Prior to commencing the task, goals of the individual carrying out the task and 
team-member goals should be measured to explore whether they are aligned to determine 
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whether salience of goals decreases the propensity for entrapment. 
One of the key contributions of this study is that it demonstrates a relationship 
between individuals’ networks and face concerns. However, future studies are needed to 
explore whether the relationship exists in other, non-entrapment related contexts and the 
implications of this relationship for communication. With further development, personal 
networks could become an alternative description of individuals’ relationships with 
relevant others usually assumed in measures of individualism-collectivism and 
independent-interdependent self-construals. Future cross-cultural comparisons should 
examine individuals from traditionally individualistic or independent self-construal 
cultures and from traditionally interdependent or collectivistic cultures to identify 
whether behaviors predicted by individualism-collectivism could be also predicted by the 
size and strength of personal networks. 
Future research should also explore types and interconnectedness of various 
network types in different cultures. For example, in cultures typically described as 
individualistic, individuals may have non-overlapping, large, work-related networks and 
small family networks, whereas in cultures typically described as collectivistic, people 
may have larger family networks and smaller work-related networks that overlap. This 
comparison of network types provides more specific information about the webs of 
relationships people in those cultures have, which can provide the basis for more specific 
knowledge about communication flow and the salience of different network types in 
various kinds of communication situations. Studies could also explore whether 
individuals’ values are related to the size and strength of the network in which they are 
connected. For example, do individuals with smaller, less strong networks value 
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competition, freedom, autonomy, and achievement more than those with larger and 
stronger networks? Future research should address how these aspects of network 
differences contribute to encouraging or preventing entrapment.
This study shows that accountability may stimulate more accurate decision-
making. Future research should further explore this possibility. Future studies could 
examine whether regular de-briefing with members of constituency and establishing a
common rule for stopping (Brockner & Rubin, 1985), combined with explicit data 
regarding the rate of return on additional investments (Heath, 1995) and explicit 
performance goals (Kernan & Lord, 1989), can result in decreased entrapment. 
Future studies also should use more than one network-generating context and use 
a less generic entrapment situation (e.g., business, family, health). Additional information 
about individuals’ networks would allow making within-subject comparisons to identify 
patterns in the types of networks. Future studies should employ non-student samples to 
investigate whether professionals, because of their life experience, behave differently in a 
situation leading to entrapment, and the type and implicit or explicit influences of 
networks among professionals when dealing with situations that could lead to 
entrapment. And, future studies should also present participants with real-life situations 
(e.g., negotiating a contract, working on a failing project). 
The results of this study indicate that, although the psychological self-reports 
indicate that presence of constituency increases individuals’ concern for self-positive 
face, the analysis of actual messages produced by the participants suggests that 
individuals report less concern for self-positive face. Future research should examine 
potential incongruence between reported psychological processes and physical 
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explanations or messages produced by individuals in a situation leading to entrapment 
and its implications for communication. 
Finally, future studies should be conducted to replicate the results of this study 
and identify other cognitive variables that could lead to entrapment. For example, future 
research could examine whether a negotiators’ degree of cognitive complexity (i.e.,
people’s ability to put themselves into the opponent’s shoes in a conflict situation) might 
contribute to entrapment. That is, individuals who routinely put themselves into other 
people’s shoes may be less prone to entrapment in a negotiation or conflict situation.
Significance of the Study
This study provides additional insight into the investigation of the entrapment 
bias, cognitive processes identified from previous research as leading to entrapment bias, 
and messages communicated in an entrapment situation. In addition, it investigated the 
role of personal networks and their effects on face concerns. The findings regarding 
personal networks have implications for future research in the field of cross-cultural 
communication. 
The current investigation does not support the findings from previous studies that 
suggest that justification processes and face concerns lead to entrapment. This study 
found that only internal self-justification and other-positive face concerns are related to 
entrapment, but instead of contributing to entrapment, these aspects prevent individuals 
from becoming entrapped. 
Methodologically, this study provides empirical support for the value of using 
personal networks as a predictor of face goals. In light of criticism associated with the 
measurement of independent-interdependent self-construals (Levine et al., 2003) and 
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individualism-collectivism (Fiske, 2002), this study showed that networks could be 
considered a plausible alternative for operationalizing these theoretical constructs. Both 
individualism-collectivism and independent-interdependent self-construals measures rely 
on self-reports about individuals’ psychological orientation using arbitrary definitions of 
relevant others. By allowing individuals to nominate people who were relevant to them 
and asking them to report quality and frequency of communication with these people, this 
study moved away from psychological reporting and examined structural features of 
relationships (i.e., how large are the individuals’ actual networks and how important are 
relationships in these networks?). In addition, an original measure of the strength of 
influence of a network on an individual was developed. This research used the interaction 
between size and influence of networks, and found this measure to predict other-positive 
face goals. This measure should be validated in future research using networks to 
understand communication. 
Furthermore, this study measured individuals’ cognitive processes identified in 
the past literature as those that potentially contribute to entrapment. Past studies have not 
directly measured these processes rather they attributed the entrapment to them. Finally, 
the study examined messages used by individuals in a situation leading to entrapment, 
suggesting that when individuals try to explain their behavior, they tend to use causal 
accounts. 
Overall, this study has made a contribution to the field of communication by 
identifying processes and conditions (e.g., concern for other-positive face, internal self-
justification, reporting requirement, direct observation by constituency, keeping clear 
record of performance success or failure) that may prevent entrapment bias from 
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occurring. These processes and conditions could potentially improve the outcomes of 
negotiation with the use of effective communication strategies. For example, the results 
indicate that the reporting requirement has a positive effect on entrapment, because it 
increases individuals’ needs to rationalize their behavior—preventing them from 
becoming entrapped. In addition, the requirement to report also leads individuals to be 
more concerned about protecting their own positive face than they are about protecting 
the image of others. Both issues could be addressed through communication, by setting 
up clear reporting guidelines and providing encouraging feedback to minimize threats to 
the negotiator’s face.
This research also has several practical implications for minimizing entrapment 
during a negotiation or conflict situation. The results indicate that, in the constituency-
present conditions, the participants become less entrapped because of the concern for 
other-positive face. One plausible explanation for this finding is that the constituency was 
not physically present when participants performed the task, because in the presence of 
constituency, individuals tend to be more competitive and often less successful (Klimoski 
& Asch, 1974; Lamm & Kogan, 1971; Neale, 1984; Organ, 1971). Therefore, from the 
practitioners’ point of view, limiting the physical presence of constituency during a 
negotiation or in a conflict situation may lead to more effective outcomes. The results 
indicate that the reporting requirement prevents entrapment; however, it increases 
concerns for self-positive face. To this end, the constituency should try to minimize these 
concerns by providing encouraging feedback. The results also suggest that keeping an 
explicit track record of success or failure may also contribute to de-biasing effect. Thus, 
constituency should instruct the negotiator to keep a record of his or her successes and 
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failures. Finally, because the results of the study indicated that individuals tend to use 
causal accounts as message strategies to explain their failure to complete the task, to 
minimize the attribution error the constituency should keep the negotiators accountable to 
the process of negotiation, not just the final outcome.
Overall, this dissertation demonstrated the negative relationships between the 
entrapment bias and other-positive face and entrapment and internal self-justification. It 
demonstrated that the presence of constituency and the requirement for reporting, 
respectively, affect positive-face concerns and justification processes, suggesting that 
both are essential for entrapment to occur through indirect processes of other-positive 
face and internal justification. In addition, this research demonstrated that the size and 
influence of personal networks are positively associated with face-saving behaviors. 
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APPENDIX A




[TO BE MADE IN CLASS]
Dear Students,
If you are interested in receiving extra credit for [INSERT COURSE NUMBER], you can 
participate in an experiment investigating an individual’s luck and decision-making 
processes.  If you chose to participate, you will receive [INSERT NUMBER] of extra credit 
points.  In addition to receiving extra credit, those of you who decide to participate will receive ten 
raffle tickets for four drawings of $50.  
If you are interested in extra credit but do not want to participate in research, your instructor will offer 
you an alternative written assignment.





You will notice that the surveys you are about to fill out require an 
ID code.  To ensure confidentiality, we are not assigning ID codes, 
instead we are asking you to come up with your own FOUR 
DIGIT code that would be EASY FOR YOU TO REMEMBER.  
It could be any four numbers.  Here are some suggestions:
• Last four digits of your social security number
• Combination of the month, day or year of your birthday
• Your MARS pin code









Please take a few moments to answer the following questions:
1. Gender (check one) Female________ Male_____________
2. Age (in years) ___________________________________
3. Are you currently employed?  (check one)  Yes_________ No_______
If “Yes,” what is your occupation? ______________________
4. Which of the following most accurately describes your student status?
I’m a full-time undergraduate student   _____
I’m a part-time undergraduate student   _____
I’m a full-time graduate student   _____
I’m a part-time graduate student   _____
5. Which of the following most accurately describes you current status?
___ Freshman ___ Sophomore ___ Junior ___ Senior
___ Master’s student ___ Doctoral student
6. Are you (check one)…
White, Non-Hispanic or Caucasian ____
African-American or Black ____
Hispanic ____






Questions below will ask you to list people that you know. In the allotted space please 
provide complete list of relevant people.  Please note that the space allotted might be 
significantly larger than you might need.
1. Who would care for your home if you were to go out of town? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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2. With whom do you talk about school or work decisions? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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3. Who, if anyone, has helped with household tasks in the last three months? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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4. With whom do you engage in social activities (e.g., going to a movie, having dinner)? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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5. Who do you talk with about your interests or hobbies? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= Relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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6. With whom do you talk about personal worries? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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7. Whose advice do you consider in making important decisions? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A good friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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8. From whom would or could you borrow a large sum of money? 
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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9. Please enumerate all adult member of your household.
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
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10. Is there anyone else who is important to you who does not appear on the above lists?  
(Check one)
Yes_________ (if your answer is “Yes”, please list people who you did not 
mention in the table below)
No__________
Initials/First Name of the person On a scale of 1 to 5, where 
1 is “not well at all” and 
“5” is “very well,” please 
indicate how well do you 
know this person.
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
is “not at all close” and “5” is 
“very close,” how close do 
you feel to the person?
(Enter a number from 1 to 
5)
How would you 
characterize this person?
1= An acquaintance   
2= A friend
3= A close friend
4= A relative
(Enter a number that 
describes your 
relationship with the 
person)
11. What is the total number of people that you named on all of the above lists?  (Enter a 





Questions below refer to people that you listed in Questions 1 through 10
Answer the following questions using a scale from “1” to “7” where “1” is “no influence” 
and “7” is “strong influence.”
Overall, how much influence do people you listed in Questions 1 through 10 have on:
12. A type of job you might choose (e.g., type of company, position)?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
13. Your decision to pursue education beyond college?
1   2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
14. Your social life (e.g., choice of friends)?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
15. Your personal development (e.g., books you read, music you listen to)?
 1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
16. Your personal life decisions (e.g., whom to date, sex conduct)?




Overall, how much influence do people you listed in Questions 1 through 10 have on:
17. Your social habits (e.g., smoking cigarettes, alcohol consumption)?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
18. Your outward appearance (e.g., clothing)?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
19. Your interests and hobbies?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
20. Your neighborhood choice?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
21. Ways you choose to resolve a conflict?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
22. Political position you might take (e.g., support a candidate, party, voting behavior)?
1       2 3     4        5 6      7
no strong
influence influence
23. Your decision to undergo a serious medical procedure (e.g., surgery)?







We want to know if you agree or disagree with the following statements. Read each 
statement carefully.  Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statement by 
using the following scale: 1 is “strongly disagree” and 7 is “strongly agree.”  
Please answer ALL of the questions below.  CIRCLE the number that best reflects your 
answer. 
1. When I ask my close friend for a favor, I worry that she/he might feel obliged to comply 
with my request.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2. When I ask my close friend for a favor, I am concerned that he/she might feel like they 
have to say “yes” to my request.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3. When I ask my close friend for a favor, I worry that he/she might find it hard to say “no.”
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. When I ask my close friend to do something for me, I am concerned that he/she might 
feel like she/he has to go along with my request. 
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5. When I ask my close friend to do something for me, I worry that he/she might feel 
pushed into agreeing with what I want. 




6. In general, I do not feel comfortable sharing my problems with other people because I’m 
afraid I’m going to overburden them. 
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
7. In general, it is important to me that others feel that I’m an independent person.
      1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. When I ask somebody for a favor, I worry about the fact that I will feel indebted to the 
person. 
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. In general, it is important to me to be self-sufficient because I do not like owing anything 
to other people.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. In general, it is important to me that people in my life realize that I am capable of making 
decisions myself
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
11. When my close friend does me a favor, I worry about the fact that I will be obliged to 
return the favor in the future
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
12. Overall, I dislike when people give me an advice when I did not ask for it.




13. Overall, when I talk to people, it is important to me that what I say does not make them 
look inadequate.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
14. In general, when I give advice to a person, it is important to me that he/she does not feel 
like I’m implying that he/she has difficulty handling the situation.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
15. Overall, when I give an advice to my friend, it is important to me that my friend does not 
feel like I’m implying that he/she does not understand the consequences of his/her 
actions.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
16. In general, when my friend inadvertently breaks promise I don’t want him/her to feel like 
I think that he/she is person who never honors his/her commitments.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
17. I do not like to get into arguments with people because it might make them look 
uncooperative.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
18. When I talk to people, I want to make them feel comfortable discussing issues with me.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
19.  I worry about how other people judge me when it comes to my physical appearance. 




20. I want people to find me physically attractive.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
21. In general, when a group of colleagues is having a conversation, I like to be included 
          in the conversation.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
22.  In general, it is important to me that people do not think that I am nosy.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
23. In general, it is important to me to make a positive impression on people.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
24. In general, it is important to me that people think that I am smart and capable.





Experimental Conditions: Participant Instructions
Condition I:  Constituency; reporting.
RESEARCHER INSTRUCTIONS
Hello, my name is ___________________________.  Thank you for volunteering to 
participate in this experiment.  You will receive an extra credit for your participation.  Also, 
in addition to extra credit, here are 10 raffle tickets for four drawings of $50.  Each ticket is 
worth $1.  I also want to stress that the results of this experiment are strictly confidential.  
Please feel free to ask questions or withdraw from participation at any time.  By quitting you 
will just forfeit the raffle tickets but you will not lose the extra credit points.
The experiment you are about to participate in is designed to study decision making 
and luck.  I will provide you with more background on this experiment after you complete 
the experimental task.  I just don’t want to bias the outcomes of the research by giving you 
too much detail.  
So, as I just mentioned, the study is about luck.  The results of many past studies 
investigating luck indicate that how well one performs in this particular experimental task is a 
strong indicator of how lucky one is in other areas of life—e.g., finding a good job and 
finding a partner for life. 
The experimental task will consist of drawing ping-pong balls out of a box. The box 
contains 100 ping-pong balls, of which 90 are white and 10 are red. The measure of luck is 
the number of red balls an individual is able to draw.
You will be working as a group. I’m interested in how an individual’s luck affects 
groups.  There have been studies that have shown that not only individuals could be lucky, 
but groups also can be lucky.
Although you are going to be working as a group, only one person will be performing 
the task and the three of you have to decide who this person will be.  To decide on the person 
to perform the task you will draw a number out of a hat—the person who gets number “3” 
will have to perform the drawing. We’ll do the drawing after I will explain the experimental 
procedures to you.
The ultimate goal of the task is to draw only 5 out of the 10 red balls that are mixed 
in with white balls.   You can make up to 20 attempts to draw all 5 red balls but you can stop 
at any time.  And I want to stress this—drawing only all 5 balls counts as a successful 
completion of the task; drawing one, two, three or four red balls constitutes failure to 
complete the task. You are all starting the experiment with 10 raffle tickets and all of you will 
receive extra credit for participation regardless of your performance.  If you successfully 
complete the task—draw 5 red balls—you will receive additional 20 raffle tickets—bringing 
167
the total to 30. For every red ball you draw in addition to 5 you need to successfully complete 
the task, you will receive another raffle ticket.
For every white ball drawn you will lose one raffle ticket (of the 10 tickets you 
started with) and your group members will also lose one raffle ticket each.  If you draw a red 
ball you gain two raffle tickets and members of your group also gain two tickets each.  If you 
get “in the negative” (maximum minus 10 raffle tickets), you will have to pay $1 for each 
ticket and your group members will also have to pay $1 each.  So, the maximum penalty for 
the person who draws is $10 and the maximum penalty for each group member is $10. 
But I want to stress that regardless of how many points the person who performs the 
drawing loses, if all 5 red balls are drawn by the end of the task, you and your group 
members will receive 20 raffle tickets each with no penalties.  For example, if the person who 
is drawing had negative points at the time of drawing all 5 red balls, neither this person nor 
group members have to pay any penalties and everyone will receive all 20 raffle tickets for 
successfully completing the task.   
After the drawing task is completed, the individual who does the drawing will report 
in-person to the group members and explain his or her success or failure.  Upon reviewing 
the outcomes, group members will determine an amount (from $0 to $5) to be awarded to the 
person performing the task. I will pay the amount indicated by the group members. Group 
members will also receive compensation, but I don’t want to disclose the pay structure so as 
not to bias their decisions on how much to award. While one of you is performing the 
drawing task, the other group members will be asked to fill out additional questionnaires.
Do you have any questions regarding the procedures that we just covered?
Now, let’s decide who is going to perform the drawing task.  [DO THE HAT DRAWING]
AFTER THE PARTICIPANT IS SELECTED, THE RESEARCHER WILL TAKE 
HIM/HER TO THE EXPERIMENT ROOM AND GIVE THE PARTICIPANT THE 
INSTRUCTIONS AND PAY-OFF SHEET.  THE RESEARCHER WIL ASK THE 
PARTICIPANT TO SIGN THE CONSENT FORM, FILL OUT DEMOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION, MANIPULATION CHECK AND LUCK QUESTIONNAIRES.
AFTER THE PARTICIPANT COMPLETES QUESTIONNAIRES, THE RESEARCHER 
WILL MENTION:
I forgot to mention that even though some people feel unlucky, their performance on this task 
does not depend on it.  And, furthermore, even if you feel that you are unlucky, there is still 
about one in 10 chances that you will be successful in accomplishing the task.
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Condition II: Constituency; no reporting
RESEARCHER INSTRUCTIONS
Hello, my name is ___________________________.  Thank you for volunteering to 
participate in this experiment.  You will receive an extra credit for your participation.  Also, 
in addition to extra credit, here are 10 raffle tickets for four drawings of $50.  Each ticket is 
worth $1.  I also want to stress that the results of this experiment are strictly confidential.  
Please feel free to ask questions or withdraw from participation at any time and without 
penalty.  By quitting you will just forfeit the raffle tickets but you will not lose the extra 
credit points.
The experiment you are about to participate in is designed to study decision making 
and luck.  I will provide you with more background on this experiment after you complete 
the experimental task.  I just don’t want to bias the outcomes of the research by giving you 
too much detail.  
So, as I just mentioned, the study is about luck.  The results of many past studies 
investigating luck indicate that how well one performs in this particular experimental task is a 
strong indicator of how lucky one is in other areas of life—e.g., finding a good job and 
finding a partner for life. 
The experimental task will consist of drawing ping-pong balls out of a box. The box 
contains 100 ping-pong balls, of which 90 are white and 10 are red. The measure of luck is 
the number of red balls an individual is able to draw.
You will be working as a group. I’m interested in how an individual’s luck affects 
groups.  There have been studies that have shown that not only individuals could be lucky, 
but groups also can be lucky.
Although you are going to be working as a group, only one person will be performing 
the task and the three of you have to decide who this person will be.  To vote on the person to 
perform the task you will draw a number out of a hat—the person who gets number “3” will 
have to perform the drawing. We’ll do the drawing after I will explain the experimental 
procedures to you.
The ultimate goal of the task is to draw only 5 out of the 10 red balls that are mixed 
in with white balls.   You can make up to 20 attempts to draw all 5 red balls but you can stop 
at any time.  And I want to stress this—drawing only all 5 balls counts as a successful 
completion of the task; drawing 1, 2, 3 or 4 red balls constitutes failure to complete the task. 
You are all starting the experiment with 10 raffle tickets and all of you will receive extra 
credit for participation regardless of your performance.  If you successfully complete the 
task—draw 5 red balls—you will receive additional 20 raffle tickets—bringing the total to 
30. For every red ball you draw in addition to 5 you need to successfully complete the task, 
you will receive another raffle ticket.
For every white ball drawn you will lose one raffle ticket (of the 10 tickets you 
started with) and your group members will also lose one raffle ticket each.  If you draw a red 
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ball you gain two raffle tickets and members of your group also gain two tickets each.  If you 
get “in the negative” (maximum minus 10 raffle tickets), you will have to pay $1 for each 
ticket and your group members will also have to pay $1 each.  So, the maximum penalty for 
the person who draws is $10 and the maximum penalty for each group member is $10. 
But I want to stress that regardless of how many points the person who performs the 
drawing loses, if all 5 red balls are drawn by the end of the task, you and your group 
members will receive 20 raffle tickets each with no penalties.  For example, if the person who 
is drawing had negative points at the time of drawing all 5 red balls, neither this person nor 
group members have to pay any penalties and everyone will receive all 20 raffle tickets for 
successfully completing the task.   
After the drawing task is completed, the individual who does the drawing will give 
me the tally sheet.  I will share the tally sheet with other members of the group.  Upon 
reviewing the outcomes, group members will determine an amount (from $0 to $5) to be 
awarded to the person performing the task. I will pay the amount indicated by the group 
members. Group members will also receive compensation, but I don’t want to disclose the 
pay structure so as not to bias their decisions on how much to award. While one of you is 
performing the drawing task, the group members will be asked to fill out additional 
questionnaires.
Do you have any questions regarding the procedures that we just covered?
Now, let’s decide who is going to perform the drawing task.  [DO THE HAT 
DRAWING]
AFTER THE PARTICIPANT IS SELECTED, THE RESEARCHER WILL TAKE 
HIM/HER TO THE EXPERIMENT ROOM AND GIVE THE PARTICIPANT THE 
INSTRUCTIONS AND PAY-OFF SHEET.  THE RESEARCHER WIL ASK THE 
PARTICIPANT TO SIGN THE CONSENT FORM, FILL OUT DEMOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION, MANIPULATION CHECK AND LUCK QUESTIONNAIRES.
I forgot to mention that even though some people feel unlucky, their performance on this task 
does not depend on it.  And, furthermore, even if you feel that you are unlucky, there is still 
about one in ten chances that you will be successful in accomplishing the task.
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Condition III:  No constituency, reporting
RESEARCHER INSTRUCTIONS
Hello, my name is ___________________________.  Thank you for volunteering 
to participate in this experiment.  You will receive an extra credit for your participation.  
Also, in addition to extra credit, here are 10 raffle tickets for four drawings of $50.  Each 
ticket is worth $1.  I also want to stress that the results of this experiment are strictly 
confidential.  Please feel free to ask questions or withdraw from participation at any time 
and without penalty.  By quitting you will just forfeit the raffle tickets but you will not lose 
the extra credit points.
The experiment you are about to participate in is designed to study decision making 
and luck.  I will provide you with more background on this experiment after you complete 
the experimental task.  I just don’t want to bias the outcomes of the research by giving you 
too much detail.  
So, as I just mentioned, the study is about luck.  The results of many past studies 
investigating luck indicate that how well one performs in this particular experimental task is a 
strong indicator of how lucky one is in other areas of life—e.g., finding a good job and 
finding a partner for life. 
The experimental task will consist of drawing ping-pong balls out of a box. The box 
contains 100 ping-pong balls, of which 90 are white and ten are red. The measure of luck is 
the number of red balls an individual is able to draw.
You will be working on your own. The ultimate goal of the task is to draw only 5 out 
of the ten red balls that are mixed in with white balls.   You can make up to 20 attempts to 
draw all 5 red balls but you can stop at any time.  And I want to stress this—drawing only 
all 5 balls counts as a successful completion of the task, i.e. drawing one, two, three or four 
red balls constitutes failure to complete the task. You are starting the experiment with 10 
raffle tickets and you will receive extra credit for participation regardless of your 
performance.  If you successfully complete the task—draw 5 red balls—you will receive 
additional 20 raffle tickets—bringing the total to 30. For every red ball you draw in addition 
to 5 you need to successfully complete the task, you will receive another raffle ticket.  For 
every white ball drawn you will lose one raffle ticket (of the ten tickets you started with).  If 
you draw a red ball you will gain two raffle tickets.  If you get “in the negative” (maximum 
minus ten raffle tickets), you will have to pay $1 for each ticket lost.  So, the maximum 
penalty is $10. 
But I want to stress that regardless of how many points you lose, if all 5 red balls are 
drawn by the end of the task, you will receive 20 raffle tickets with no penalties.  For 
example, if you had negative points at the time of drawing all 5 red balls, you don’t have to 
pay any penalties and you will receive all 20 raffle tickets for successfully completing the 
task.   
After the drawing task is completed, you will report in-person to me. 
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Do you have any questions regarding the procedures that we just covered?
THE RESEARCHER WILL TAKE THE PARTICIPANT TO THE EXPERIMENT 
ROOM AND GIVE THE HIM/HER THE INSTRUCTIONS AND PAY-OFF SHEET.  
THE RESEARCHER WIL ASK THE PARTICIPANT TO SIGN THE CONSENT 
FORM, FILL OUT DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, MANIPULATION CHECK 
AND LUCK QUESTIONNAIRES.
AFTER THE PARTIPANT COMPLETES QUESTIONNAIRES, THE RESEARCHER 
WILL MENTION:
I forgot to mention, that even though some people feel unlucky, their performance on this 
task does not depend on it.  And, furthermore, even if you feel that you are unlucky, there 
is still about one in ten chances that you will be successful in accomplishing the task.
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Condition IV:  No constituency; no reporting.
RESEARCHER INSTRUCTIONS
Hello, my name is ___________________________.  Thank you for volunteering to 
participate in this experiment.  You will receive an extra credit for your participation.  Also, 
in addition to extra credit, here are 10 raffle tickets for four drawings of $50.  Each ticket is 
worth $1.  I also want to stress that the results of this experiment are strictly confidential.  
Please feel free to ask questions or withdraw from participation at any time and without 
penalty.  By quitting you will just forfeit the raffle tickets but you will not lose the extra 
credit points.
The experiment you are about to participate in is designed to study decision making 
and luck.  I will provide you with more background on this experiment after you complete 
the experimental task.  I just don’t want to bias the outcomes of the research by giving you 
too much detail.  
So, as I just mentioned, the study is about luck.  The results of many past studies 
investigating luck indicate that how well one performs in this particular experimental task is a 
strong indicator of how lucky one is in other areas of life—e.g., finding a good job and 
finding a partner for life. 
The experimental task will consist of drawing ping-pong balls out of a box. The box 
contains 100 ping-pong balls, of which 90 are white and 10 are red. The measure of luck is 
the number of red balls an individual is able to draw.
You will be working on your own. The ultimate goal of the task is to draw only 5 out 
of the 10 red balls that are mixed in with white balls.   You can make up to 20 attempts to 
draw all 5 red balls but you can stop at any time.  And I want to stress this—drawing only 
all 5 balls counts as a successful completion of the task, i.e. drawing one, two, three or four 
red balls constitutes failure to complete the task.  You are starting the experiment with 10 
raffle tickets and you will receive extra credit for participation regardless of your 
performance.  If you successfully complete the task—draw 5 red balls—you will receive 
additional 20 raffle tickets—bringing the total to 30. For every red ball you draw in addition 
to 5 you need to successfully complete the task, you will receive another raffle ticket.  For 
every white ball drawn you will lose one raffle ticket (of the 10 tickets you started with).  If 
you draw a red ball you will gain two raffle tickets.  If you get “in the negative” (maximum 
minus 10 raffle tickets), you will have to pay $1 for each ticket lost.  So, the maximum 
penalty is $10. 
But I want to stress that regardless of how many points you lose, if all 5 red balls are drawn 
by the end of the task, you will receive 20 raffle tickets with no penalties.  For example, if 
you had negative points at the time of drawing all 5 red balls, you don’t have to pay any 
penalties and you will receive all 20 raffle tickets for successfully completing the task.   
Do you have any questions regarding the procedures that we just covered?
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THE RESEARCHER WILL TAKE THE PARTICIPANT TO THE EXPERIMENT ROOM 
AND GIVE THE HIM/HER THE INSTRUCTIONS AND PAY-OFF SHEET.  THE 
RESEARCHER WIL ASK THE PARTICIPANT TO SIGN THE CONSENT FORM, FILL 
OUT DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION, MANIPULATION CHECK AND LUCK 
QUESTIONNAIRES.
AFTER THE PARTICIPANT COMPLETES QUESTIONNAIRES, THE RESEARCHER 
WILL MENTION:
I forgot to mention, that even though some people feel unlucky, their performance on this 
task does not depend on it.  And, furthermore, even if you feel that you are unlucky, there is 




Condition I: Constituency;  reporting.
PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS
As a group representative you will perform the drawing task on behalf of your group. Your 
ultimate goal is to draw 5 red balls out of the box.  Drawing only all 5 red balls will be 
considered a successful completion of the task.  You can make up to 20 attempts to draw all 5 
balls but you can stop just after a few drawings.  
At the conclusion of the task, you will write a short essay (one or two paragraphs) 
summarizing the outcome of the task and explaining your strategy and the results.  You will 
use this essay as a basis for reporting to the group members after you are finished with the 
drawing task.  After the explanation is presented to the group members, they will carefully 
weigh the information and decide how much money to award you for your performance.
To aid you in tracking the outcomes you will find a pay-off sheet on the next page of this 
packet.  The sheet also contains a sample pay-off table and reminders on how to keep the 
score.  Please review the pay-off sheet.




You and your group members start with 10 raffle tickets each
THIS IS A SAMPLE PAY-OFF SHEET:
Drawing Red Ball White Ball Tickets:  You Tickets: Group 
Members
1. X -1 -1 
2. X -1 -1 
3. X +2 +2
…
8. X +2 +2
9. X -1 -1 
10. X -1 -1 
…
12. X +2 +2
13. X -1 -1 
…
18. X -1 -1 
19. X -1 -1 
20 X +2 +2
Drawing 
Total:





• For every white ball you draw, you lose 1 raffle ticket.  If you lose all raffle tickets and 
continue to draw, you will pay $1 for any additional round of drawing.
• For every white ball you draw, each of your group members will lose 1 raffle tickets.  If 
you lose all raffle tickets and continue to draw, each group member will pay $1 for every 
additional round of drawing.
• If you draw a red ball, you will gain two raffle tickets and your group members will also 
gain two raffle tickets each.
• If you draw all 5 balls, you and each of your group members will receive 20 raffle tickets 
(each) and you will incur NO PENALTY REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY WHITE 
BALLS YOU HAVE DRAWN IN THE COURSE OF THE TASK.
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Condition II:  Constituency, no reporting.
PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS
As a group representative you will perform the drawing task on behalf of your group. Your 
ultimate goal is to draw 5 red balls out of the box.  Drawing only all 5 red balls will be 
considered a successful completion of the task.  You can make up to 20 attempts to draw all 
five balls but you can stop just after a few drawings.  
At the conclusion of the task, you will hand the researcher the tally sheet summarizing the 
outcome of the task.  The researcher will share it with your group members.  After the 
explanation is presented to the group members, they will carefully weigh the information and 
decide how much money to award you for your performance.
To aid you in tracking the outcomes you will find a pay-off sheet on the next page of this 
packet.  The sheet also contains a sample pay-off table and reminders on how to keep the 
score.  Please review the pay-off sheet.




You and your group members start with 10 raffle tickets each
THIS IS A SAMPLE PAY-OFF SHEET:
Drawing Red Ball White Ball Tickets:  You Tickets: Group 
Members
1. X -1 -1 
2. X -1 -1 
3. X +2 +2
…
8. X +2 +2
9. X -1 -1 
10. X -1 -1 
…
12. X +2 +2
13. X -1 -2 
…
18. X -1 -1 
19. X -1 -1 
20 X  +2 +2
Drawing 
Total:





• For every white ball you draw, you lose 1 raffle ticket.  If you lose all raffle tickets and 
continue to draw, you will pay $1 for every additional drawing round. 
• For every white ball you draw, each of your group members will also lose 1 raffle tickets.  
If you lose all raffle tickets and continue to draw, each group member will pay $1 for 
every drawing round.
• If you draw a red ball, you will gain two raffle tickets and your group members will also 
gain two raffle tickets each.
• If you draw all 5 balls, you and each of your group members will receive 20 raffle tickets 
(each) and you will incur NO PENALTY REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY WHITE 
BALLS YOU HAVE DRAWN IN THE COURSE OF THE TASK.
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Condition III:  No constituency, reporting.
PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS
You will perform the drawing task. Your ultimate goal is to draw 5 red balls out of the box.  
Drawing only all 5 red balls will be considered a successful completion of the task.  You can 
make up to 20 attempts to draw all 5 balls but you can stop just after a few drawings.  
At the conclusion of the task, you will write a short essay (one or two paragraphs) 
summarizing the outcome of the task and explaining your strategy and the results.  You will 
use this essay as a basis for reporting to the researcher after you are finished with the drawing 
task. 
To aid you in tracking the outcomes you will find a pay-off sheet on the next page of this 
packet.  The sheet also contains a sample pay-off table and reminders on how to keep the 
score.  Please review the pay-off sheet.




You start with 10 raffle tickets
THIS IS A SAMPLE PAY-OFF SHEET:
Drawing Red Ball White Ball Tickets:  You
1. X -1 




9. X -1 
10. X -1 
…
12. X +2
13. X -1 
…
18. X -1 









• For every white ball you draw, you lose 1 raffle ticket.  If you lose all raffle tickets and 
continue to draw, you will pay $1 for every additional round of drawing. 
• If you draw a red ball, you will gain two raffle tickets. 
• If you draw all 5 balls, you will receive 20 raffle tickets and you will incur NO 
PENALTY REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY WHITE BALLS YOU HAVE DRAWN 
IN THE COURSE OF THE TASK.
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Condition IV:  No constituency; no reporting.
PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTIONS
You will perform the drawing task. Your ultimate goal is to draw 5 red balls out of the box.  
Drawing only all 5 red balls will be considered a successful completion of the task.  You can 
make up to 20 attempts to draw all 5 balls but you can stop just after a few drawings.  
To aid you in tracking the outcomes you will a find pay-off sheet on the next page of this 
packet.  The sheet also contains a sample pay-off table and reminders on how to keep the 
score.  Please review the pay-off sheet.




You start with 10 raffle tickets
THIS IS A SAMPLE PAY-OFF SHEET:
Drawing Red Ball White Ball Tickets:  You
1. X -1 




9. X -1 
10. X -1 
…
12. X +2
13. X -1 
…
18. X -1 









• For every white ball you draw, you lose 1 raffle ticket.  If you lose all raffle tickets and 
continue to draw, you will pay $1 for every additional round of drawing. 
• If you draw a red ball, you will gain two raffle tickets. 
• If you draw all 5 balls, you will receive 20 raffle tickets and you will incur NO 
PENALTY REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY WHITE BALLS YOU HAVE DRAWN 
IN THE COURSE OF THE TASK.
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Upon reviewing the instructions received from the experimenter, please answer the following 
questions (Please circle the appropriate answer).
1. Will you be evaluated?
Yes _____ No _____





2. How closely do you believe your actions will be examined? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not at all closely Very closely
3. How much will you be required to justify your outcomes and strategy? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Not at all required Very much required
4. To receive 20 extra raffle tickets at the end of the task, how many red balls do you have 
to draw?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. What is the maximum number of drawing rounds you can conduct?
3  7  10 15 17 19  20 22  As many as I want
6. If you lose twelve raffle tickets, what will be the monetary penalty you incur?
$1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $10
7. If in the first four tries you draw only white balls, how many raffle tickets will you have 
left?
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
187
8. Constituency Conditions ONLY:  If you lose thirteen raffle tickets, what will be the 
monetary penalty incurred by each of your group members?




On a scale from 1 to 6 where “1” indicates “strongly disagree” and “6” indicates “strongly 
agree” please rate the following statements:
1.  Luck plays an important part in everyone’s life.
1             2             3             4             5             6   7         
Strongly  Strongly
Disagree Agree
2.  Some people are consistently luck, and others are unlucky.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3.  I consider myself to be a lucky person.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4. I believe in luck.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5. I often feel like it’s my lucky day.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
6. I consistently have good luck.




7.  It’s a mistake to base any decisions on how lucky you feel.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. Luck works in my favor.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. I don’t mind leaving things to chance because I’m a lucky person.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. Even the things in life I can’t control tend to go my way because I’m lucky.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
11. There is such a thing as luck that favors some people, but not others.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
12. Luck is nothing more than random chance.




After reading the scenarios presented below, please select a statement that most 
accurately describes your feelings.
13. If you were walking down a street that was full of people and someone dropped a $20 bill 
in the middle of the crowd, do you feel that you would (check one): 
___ most certainly find it
___ probably find it 
___ have a slightly better than even chance of finding it
___ have no feeling one way or the other
___ have a slightly better than even chance of not finding it
___ probably not find it
___ most certainly not find it
14. If you were on a bus that crashed on the roadway and half the people were injured while 
the other half were safe, do you feel that you would:  
___ most certainly be safe
___ probably be safe
___ have a slightly better than even chance of being safe
___ have no feeling one way or the other
___ have a slightly better than even chance of being injured
___ probably be injured
___ most certainly will be injured
15. If you had to flip a coin to see whether you would get a set of extra tickets to a show or 
someone else would get them, do you feel like you would:
___ most certainly lose
___ probably lose
___ have a slightly better than even chance of losing
___ have no feeling one way or the other
___ have a slightly better than even chance of winning
___ probably will win
___ most certainly will win
Please read the following questions and circle the answer that most accurately describes you.
16.  When it comes to games of chance (gamble), usually my chances of winning are:




17. How often do you play games of chance (gamble)? 
___ never
___ once every couple of years
___ once a year
___ once every couple of months
___ once a month
___ once a week
___ more than once a week
18. To what extent do you feel that luck is a quality of the person versus a quality of the 
situation?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
quality quality
of the of the 
situation person
19. If you were to say that you were lucky in terms of some event, to what extent do you 
mean that you a lucky type of person or that a lucky thing happened to you?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7








Please complete the following form.  
Section I
Round 1
1. What was the color of the first ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing






1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing





1. What was the color of the ball you drew? _____________________
2. What did you chose to do next?  (Please check one) 
________withdraw from the task (Proceed to Section II)
________continue drawing


















We want to know if you agree or disagree with the following statements. Read each
statement carefully.  Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statement by 
using the following scale “1” is “strongly disagree” and “7” is “strongly agree.”  
Please answer ALL of the questions below.  CIRCLE the number that best reflects your 
answer. 
1. I feel that my strategy was rational.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2.  I made my decision to continue (or stop) drawing unemotionally.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3.  I weighed potential risks and gains carefully prior to making each round of drawing.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4.  I calculated my odds prior to each drawing.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5. I felt that my investments in the process will be justified by the eventual pay off.




6. Under the circumstances, I believe that the course I pursued had the best potential for 
earning most extra raffle tickets for my group members.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
7. I wanted the other group members to understand the logic used in choosing my course 
of action.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. I wanted my group members to feel that my choices were well-calculated.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. In general, it was important to me that the group members see me as a rational person.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. I felt it was important to perform well in this task for my group members.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
11. I was concerned for my group’s needs.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
12. I wanted to help my group.




13. I did not want to let my group down.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
14. When performing the task it was important to me to consider the consequences my 
behavior might have for my group.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
15. I was worried what the group members will think about me after the task was 
completed.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
16. It was important for me to do well on this task.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
17. I wanted to perform well to make a positive impression on my group members.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
18. I don’t want my group members to be mad at me for loosing some of their raffle tickets 
and/or money.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
19. I think this was an unfair task.




20. I didn’t want my group members to think that I’m unable to calculate the odds.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
21. I don’t think I understood the instructions well.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
22. I believe that any person in my position would have behaved the same way I did.




No constituency; reporting condition.
Post-Experiment Questionnaire
We want to know if you agree or disagree with the following statements. Read each 
statement carefully.  Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statement by using the 
following scale “1” is “strongly disagree” and “7” is “strongly agree.”  
Please answer ALL of the questions below.  CIRCLE the number that best reflects your 
answer. 
1.  I feel that my strategy was rational.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2.  I made my decision to continue (or stop) drawing unemotionally.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3.  I weighted potential risks and gains carefully prior to making each round of drawing.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4.  I calculated my odds prior to each drawing.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5.  I felt that my investments in the process will be justified by the eventual pay off.




6.  Under the circumstances, I believe that the course I pursued had the best potential for 
earning most extra raffle tickets.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
7. I wanted the researcher to understand the logic used in choosing my course of action.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. I wanted the researcher to feel that my choices were well-calculated.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. In general, it was important to me that the researcher sees me as a rational person.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. In general, when performing in a group/team environment, it is important to me to 
perform well for my group members.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
11. When working in a team, I’m concerned for my group’s needs.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
12. When working in a team, I want to help my group.




13. When working in a group, I do not want to let my team down.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
14. When working in a group, it is important to me to consider the consequences my 
behavior might have for my group.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
15.   When working in a group, I worry what the group members will think about me after 
the project is completed.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
16. It was important for me to do well on this particular task.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
17. I wanted to perform well to make a positive impression on the researcher.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
18. I don’t want the researcher to think less of me for losing raffle tickets and/or money.




19. I think this was an unfair task.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
20. I didn’t want the researcher to think that I’m unable to calculate the odds.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
21. I don’t think I understood the instructions well.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
22. I believe that any person in my position would have behaved the same way I did.




No constituency; no reporting condition.
Post-Experiment Questionnaire
We want to know if you agree or disagree with the following statements. Read each 
statement carefully.  Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statement by 
using the following scale “1” is “strongly disagree” and “7” is “strongly agree.”  
Please answer ALL of the questions below.  CIRCLE the number that best reflects your 
answer. 
1. I feel that my strategy was rational.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
2.  I made my decision to continue (or stop) drawing unemotionally.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
3.  I weighted potential risks and gains carefully prior to making each round of drawing.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
4.  I calculated my odds prior to each drawing.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
5. I felt that my investments in the process will be justified by the eventual pay off.




6. Under the circumstances, I believe that the course I pursued had the best potential for 
earning most extra raffle tickets.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
7. In general, when I do something it is important to me that others understand the logic I 
used in choosing my course of action.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
8. If I were to perform this task in a group in which I was a group representative, I would 
want the group members to feel that my choices were well-calculated.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
9. In general, when working in groups, it is important to me that group members see me as 
a rational person.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
10. In general, when performing in a group/team environment, it is important to me to 
perform well for my group members.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
11. When working in a team, I’m concerned for my group’s needs.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
12. When working in a team, I want to help my group.




13. When working in a group, I do not want to let my team down.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
14. When working in a group, it is important to me to consider the consequences my 
behavior might have for my group.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
15. When working in a group, I worry what the group members will think about me after 
the project is completed.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
16. It was important for me to do well on this particular task.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
17. When working in a group, it is important to me to perform well to make a positive 
impression on my team members.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
18. I think this was an unfair task.
1             2             3             4             5             6             7
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
19. I don’t think I understood the instructions well.




20. I believe that any person in my position would have behaved the same way I did.







Thank you for your participation in today's study. Communication scholars are interested in 
decision-making processes.  Often individuals use heuristics, or rules of thumb, as shortcuts 
to reduce the amount of information that needs to be processed while making a decision.  
However, there are situations in which these judgmental heuristics have been shown to bias 
decisional outcomes.   One of these decision biases is called entrapment bias.  Entrapment 
bias is the tendency for decision makers to persist with a failing course of action.
So, today’s study had nothing to do with luck but it dealt with entrapment bias. Our 
experiment today examined factors that compel individuals to either pursue or stop 
performing the task.  These factors were:  the presence of group members, the fact that group 
members make a decision regarding monetary reward, and the fact that you were told that 
you will have to report to the group members.  All together, there were four conditions:  
1. Individuals worked in groups and report to the groups in-person.
2. Individuals worked in groups and did not report to the group members in-person.
3. Individuals worked alone and report in person to the experimenter.
4. Individuals worked alone and did not have to report to anyone.
To simulate the futility of the action the box had no red balls.  So even if you were the 
luckiest person in the world you could not draw five red balls.   Therefore, regardless of your 
performance, you do not lose any raffle tickets and/or owe any money that you might have 
lost.  If you represented a group, your group members did not lose any raffle tickets and/or 
they do not owe any money.  Once again, I want to stress that this experiment does not have 
anything to do with luck and your performance is not indicative of how lucky you are as a 
person.
Al the information collected in today's study will be completely confidential, and there will 
be no way of identifying your responses in the data archive. I am not interested in any one 
individual's responses; rather, I want to look at the general patterns that emerge when the data 
are aggregated together. 
Please do not discuss any aspects of this study with others who may later participate in 
it  (until after June 1, 2004, when data collection is complete) as this could affect the 
validity of our research conclusions.
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION
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